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Introduction 
What did oligarchy mean for Thucydides and his contemporaries? 
The first hint to a thesis on oligarchy as a political form of government came to be some 
years ago during a discussion with my beloved Professor Nikos Birgalias at the Athens 
University. Birgalias, who unluckily passed away some years later, emphasized to me the 
interest that could emerge from a research of this type of constitution, because, in his opinion, 
the bibliography on this subject was not so conspicuous. I think that in hindsight he gave to 
me a very good suggestion and it is unfortunate that we could not discuss further on this 
interesting topic. But I had then the opportunity to accomplish my research at the University 
of Palermo under the careful and constant supervising of my Professor Nicola Cususmano 
who gave me the possibility to make the subject of my work more specific and mature. 
The term oligarchy, deriving from the term ὀιίγνο (few) and ἄξρσ (rule, govern), indicates 
the rule of the few, the government in the hands of a few families or persons
1
. The term 
appears for the first time in the Histories of Herodotus
2
, but its history will not end with the 
collapse of the ancient world, quite the opposite: oligarchy has survived as a political term till 
modern times, even though in a different meaning. In the 19
th
 century A.D., the term changed 
its meaning and characterizes till now associations (even of a democratic character), which 
get guided by a small group of persons.
3
 This observation is important, in order to understand 
both the long history of the term and the different characteristics, which it received during its 
long existence. Already from the antiquity, oligarchy did not correspond to one and only form 
of government, as both Thucydides, and his subsequent scholars show in their work. This 
‗poly-interpretability‘ of the term is very interesting because it can lead us to a very important 
conclusion: a modern reader should not read and interpret the ancient texts with the standards 
of his times. As Versnel says: 
―In doing so, many interpreters take their departure from the almost axiomatic 
presumption that, always and everywhere, there is a coherence in our sense of that word. 
It is only under heavy pressure that the most pliable among them may momentarily 
                                                          
1
 See LSJ and Beekes 2010, ad locum. 
2
 See the chapter on the term oligarchy. 
3
 See Treccani (http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/oligarchia). Nowadays, for example, we use the word 
‗oligarchy‘ for  Russian businessmen  of the former Soviet republics who rapidly accumulated wealth during the 
era of Russian privatization in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. 
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surrender and pay lip service to the theoretical possibility that it is our sense that is thus 
being imposed on a text which was not created according to the same principles‖4. 
In modern times, we have the tendency to interpret the ancient terms in our way, but this 
cannot work always for ancient societies, which were formed on another basis. A modern 
researcher should try to understand deeply the society and the way it worked, before drawing 
any conclusions. What we call nowadays ―oligarchy‖ is in reality not translatable with one 
and only word and this was more than clear to Thucydides. The need that we have in the 
modern times to ‗create‘ absolute definitions was not an end in itself for several ancient 
Greek thinkers and addittionally could be very misleading for the modern researcher at the 
end. 
Aim of this thesis, consequently, is to research deeply the oligarchical political structures of 
the fifth century
5
, as presented in the work of Thucydides, trying to not overlook the distance 
between ours and the classical world. The great Athenian historian dedicated a period of his 
life in the writing of the history of the Peloponnesian War, which he considered as the most 
important war of all times, with great detail. Since he understood very well the way, in which 
this war would change radically the Greek history, he decided to write down, in the most 
painstaking way, all the events he could gather: 
―Thucydides of Athens wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, how they 
waged it against each other. He began writing at its very outset, in the expectation that 
this would be a great war and more worthy of account than any previous one (ἐιπίζαο 
κέγαλ ηε ἔζεζζαη θαὶ ἀμηνινγώηαηνλ η῵λ πξνγεγελεκέλσλ)‖6. 
This admission from our historian had as a consequence the extremely analytical description 
of the events of the Peloponnesian War and especially of the armed conflicts, which exploded 
between its participants. Thucydides is disposed to dedicate many pages of his work in the 
description of every military detail of the war, every battle, every important or less important 
event; in other words he wanted to mention every single detail he could gather through the 
years, in order to leave as inheritance his θηῆκά ηε ἐο αἰεὶ (a possession for all time)7 to the 
subsequent generations. It is obvious, consequently, that from this description could not have 
been absent also the narration of the very important political changes, which inevitably 
                                                          
4
 Versnel 2011, 190. 
5
 All dates are B.C. 
6
 Thuc. 1.1. 
7
 Thuc. 1.22.4. 
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happened in the Greek world during a war of this importance. How easy can it be for a 
modern scholar, however, to draw forth from the text of the historian all the information 
provided in the text, in order to build the ―puzzle‖ of the political development in the Greek 
world of the fifth century? And in particular, is it possible to specify the – sometimes very 
different between each other – oligarchic forms of government, which multiplied during the 
fifth century? 
At this question, I would answer that this task can be easy and difficult at the same time. On 
the one hand, even if Thucydides is not primarily interested to write down the constitutional 
history of the Greek world, his very important information on the several political structures 
in the Greek city-states of the fifth century are our only – contemporary of the events – 
source for the diverse oligarchic constitutions and their development. In my thesis, I have 
tried to gather all the information offered by our historian and with the help of his antecedent 
and subsequent sources to complete the image of oligarchy as a political term in general and 
the oligarchic constitutions developed in Greece during the war, in particular. Without the 
help of Thucydides, a reconstruction of this type would be extremely difficult – if not 
impossible. On the other hand, when it comes to the analysis of the different political 
structures, our historian remains many times mute or limits himself to the description of them 
in some few lines, leaving in this way important questions to the reader. This fact is the 
reason for many shortages in his description of the diverse oligarchies in his history. 
In my thesis, I have tried to gather all the information provided by our historian, as I already 
said, even though sometimes my narration will have to remain unsatisfying, because of the 
lack of fundamental information. All this information that I managed to gather is divided in 
the different chapters of my work, which are tightly connected each other: oligarchy in the 
work of our historian has so many different shades and denominations that require a constant 
comparison. Thucydides was completely aware of the fact that the city-states were in a 
continuous contact with each other and so were also their forms of government obviously. In 
a war of this importance, one cannot make a list of oligarchies, believing that they remain 
independent between each other. The connections between the cities and the political – and 
not only – influence that the two big protagonists of the war, Athens and Sparta, had on them 
have been decisive for the development of the Peloponnesian war 
Aim of this thesis, consequently, is not to reproduce the historical truth: this is impossible, in 
my opinion, for a modern scholar, who has as basic source the work of the only author, who 
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dedicated a long period of his life, in order to write in the most detailed way the events of the 
Peloponnesian war. More than that, my aim is to understand as more as possible through the 
words of the historian, at first which were the oligarchic constitutions of the fifth century and 
secondly the way, in which they were organized and consequently their importance for the 
development of the war itself. Thucydides is a contemporary writer of the events and his 
narration is fundamental, exactly because he represents a society, which he experienced with 
his own eyes.  
Oligarchia in the modern literature  
When it comes to the modern literature on oligarchia, I have to admit that the contribution of 
the modern scholars is rather limited. It is impressive that, whereas democracy is analysed in 
such profundity from the modern research, oligarchy, which has been one of the most 
important forms of government in the antiquity, remains a restrictedly researched field of 
ancient politics. Of course this does not mean that the idea of oligarchy was not a field of 
interest for several scholars, who understood its importance for the Greek politics of the 
archaic and classical period; but the monographs on this subject are very limited, which 
makes me think that between the two leading constitutions of the fifth century, it was mostly 
democracy to have awaken the interest of the modern research leaving oligarchy in the 
background.  
One of the most important monographs on oligarchy is for sure the one of Whibley. His very 
accurate work on the birth and evolution of this constitution especially in the archaic period 
should be considered as one of the most important works on the understanding of the real 
character of this form of government, according to me. On the conditions of the birth of 
oligarchy, the scholar explains that it arose in a period of the decline of the old aristocracies. 
According to Whibley, ―a close society, based upon hereditary succession and maintained by 
intermarriage, tends naturally to become narrower, and as it become narrower, to become also 
more despotic‖8. This turnaround of the aristocratic constitutions into a more despotic 
government in combination with ―the growth of trade and navigation, which succeeded the 
spread of colonies and introduced new methods of producing wealth‖ led to the gradual 
replacement of aristocracy by oligarchy, still a constitution based on the sovereignty of the 
―few‖, but not the same ―few‖ as the ones of the aristocratic constitution9. The power of the 
                                                          
8
 Whibley 1913, 75. 
9
 Whibley 1913, 76. 
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―best men‖ of the aristocratic government was based mostly on a hereditary succession of 
people considered as ―descendants of the gods, who had given them both their power and 
their wealth, and with whom they alone could mediate‖. According to Whibley, ―to 
overthrow this government and set oligarchy in its place was to substitute wealth for ‗virtue‘, 
to ignore the power of the gods and drive them from the earth, to give to might the place of 
right, to abolish privilege and let social forces have unchecked play‖10. 
When it comes to the definition of oligarchy, the scholar defines it as ―a form of government 
in which supreme power is held by a privileged class, small in proportion to the total number 
of free men in the state‖11. This privileged class owes for sure its power to wealth, which 
means that both aristocracy and oligarchy were the governments of the rich, as also Aristotle 
highlights in his work
12
. Aristotle was the one to make an accurate definition of oligarchy in 
his Politics, by basing, however, his observations on the text of Thucydides. According to 
Whibley, the philosopher follows the historian both in his phraseology and in his general 
descriptions. To Thucydides the Peloponnesian War was ―a conflict of political principles, a 
duel between oligarchy and democracy: it was even more particularly a trial of strength 
between the free and popular constitution of Athens and the rigid, military aristocracy of 
Sparta‖ 13. Whibley makes the same observation that I have also noticed in my research of the 
term in the ancient literature
14
; the one to make a precise definition of oligarchy as a political 
structure is for sure Aristotle, but the philosopher without the contribution of Thucydides 
would have never had the instruments to make his so profound political analysis. 
The other for sure fundamental research of oligarchy is the one of Ostwald. The scholar 
attended thoroughly to understand the concept of oligarchy in the Greek political thought and 
especially to conceive the way, in which Aristotle dealt with this constitution; the 
Thucydidean view of oligarchy is rather restrictedly analysed from Ostwald in opposition to 
Whibley, who is more analytical in his research on the evolution of the term in the ancient 
Greek thinking. The scholar delineates the fact that, till the Peloponnesian War, oligarchy, 
which had been already adopted as the regular form to describe the government of the few, 
was considered as indistinguishable from aristocracy; Herodotus makes this clear, when in 
                                                          
10
 Whibley 1913, 73. 
11
 Whibley 1913, 18. 
12
 Whibley, 1913, 22. 
13
 Whibley 1913, 3ff. 
14
 See the chapter on the term oligarchy. 
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the famous debate of the three Persians equates oligarchia with an ―aggregate of the best men 
(ἀλδξ῵λ η῵λ ἀξίζησλ)‖15. 
After Herodotus and during the Peloponnesian War, however, oligarchia tends to be 
considered basically as the antonym of democracy, a fact, which becomes very clear in the 
civil strife of Corcyra, where oligarchy and democracy become political factions
16
. This 
opposition of the two constitutions is delineated, according to the scholar, also by Pericles in 
his Funeral, where the Athenian politician highlights the main characteristic of the 
democratic constitution, which is ―administered not with a view to a few (as in the case of an 
oligarchic constitution), but with a view to a greater number‖17. According to Ostwald, 
―oligarchical or democratic ideology is seen as a more potent bond than patriotism, and 
reaches across the boundaries of the state‖. Thucydides is the one to describe this new 
concept of the leading political systems of the fifth century.  
Other important works on the development of the idea of oligarchia in antiquity (even though 
not so detailed) are also of great interest. I could not leave out from this list the very 
important work of Gehrke on Stasis. The scholar believes that the oligarchic constitutions of 
the antiquity can be divided in two categories. The first should be the government of the 
―few‖ citizens, whose power is based on the propriety and wealth18 (which is the most 
common case of oligarchic governments), the second type is the oligarchy based on the 
sovereignty of the ―few‖, who have usurped the political power of the state19 (the one that 
Aristotle denominates as dynasteia in his list of the different forms of oligarchy
20
). I think 
that the examples of the diverse oligarchies offered by Thucydides can confirm this 
classification of Gehrke.  
Other references to oligarchy from the modern literature concentrate mainly on the famous 
question on if the Spartan constitution could be characterized as oligarchy or not
21
. Lane, 
basing his argumentation on the fourth century text Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
22
, defines 
                                                          
15
 Ostwald 2000a, 23. 
16
 Ostwald 2000a, 21. 
17
 Ostwald 2000a, 22. 
18
 Gehrke 1985, 316ff. 
19
 Gehrke 1985, 318ff. 
20
 Aristot. Pol. 4.1293a 30-34, if not indicated differently, all translations of the Politics of Aristotle are taken 
from Rackham 1944, ad locum. 
21
 See the chapter on ―the Lacedaemonians and their slaves‖, first note. 
22
 Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 2.18-19. 
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oligarchy as the constitution, in which the multitude ―should be citizens, but they should be 
excluded from the ‗offices‘ that are assigned ‗on an equal footing to all those sharing in the 
constitution‘, i.e. to the select few who share in governing the oligarchy‖23. As used in 
oligarchies, wealth is the one to differentiate these ―few‖ from the ―many‖, according to the 
scholar. Of the same idea is also Poma, who mentions that in an oligarchy ―i criteri che 
regolano l‘accesso alla politeia […] sono in genere fondati sulla richezza [...] oppure sulla 
capacità di corrispondere a certe funzioni civiche, ad esempio il servizio oplitico‖24. Wealth 
is, consequently the main factor for the rise of an oligarchical constitution, according to the 
modern scholars. 
From the list of the scholars, who dealt particularly with Thucydides, the fundamental works 
of Gomme and Hornblower could not be absent for sure. The extremely important work of 
Gomme, which after his death was continued by Dover and Andrewes, as long as the more 
modern version of Hornblower are considered as the most important comments of the work 
of Thucydides. Both of them offer additionally important information on the development of 
the political history in Greece, as described by the historian, and on the oligarchic 
constitutions, which derive from his text. With their detailed bibliographical note (especially 
by Hornblower), both texts are a very important ―manual‖ for a researcher of the 
Thucydidean political history. 
Even though the bibliography on oligarchy is more limited compared to other constitutions, 
one cannot refuse that there are some very fundamental works on the characteristics of this 
form of government: what can a thesis on the oligarchy in Thucydides add to this research 
consequently? It seems that most of the scholars dealt mainly with the development of the 
term through Aristotle and I find it very logical since the philosopher with his accurate – 
almost scientific could someone say – view on the political structures in the Greek world 
manages really to offer to us a more complete picture of oligarchy. With his numerous 
definitions, Aristotle understood very well the diverse shades of this form of government and 
with his painstaking research, he managed to present oligarchy to us in a very specific way. I 
think, however, that a more detailed research on the way, in which his precedent scholar 
Thucydides, understood this type of governing is missing from the modern research. Our 
historian, contemporary of the events in Greece during the Peloponnesian War, offered not 
                                                          
23
 Lane 2014, 81. 
24
 Poma 2003, 154. 
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only to the modern research, but also to his own subsequent ancient scholars, as already said, 
plenty of information on the way, in which this constitution got established in the Greek 
world of the fifth century and managed to play an important role at the development of the 
Peloponnesian War. I think, consequently, that a thesis on this subject is more than important, 
in order to understand deeper the development of oligarchy through time. 
Thucydides: An Oligarch? 
A thesis on the Thucydidean perception of oligarchy could not leave out the interesting 
theories, expressed by several modern scholars, on the political identity of our historian and 
especially on his conceivable preference for oligarchic forms of government. This 
consideration is based basically on the admission of the historian in his eighth book that in 
the period of the government of the Five Thousand, which succeded the oligarchy of the Four 
Hundred in Athens in the year 411,  
―[...] for the first time, in my life at any rate, the Athenians appear to have enjoyed good 
government (εὖ πνιηηεύζαληεο), with a moderating balance between the few and the many 
(κεηξία γὰξ ἥ ηε ἐο ηνὺο ὀιίγνπο θαὶ ηνὺο πνιινὺο μύγθξαζηο ἐγέλεην), and this was the 
thing that first began to lift the city out of its sorry state‖25. 
This new government for Athens, which is destined to have a brief history and be replaced by 
the traditional Athenian democracy in 410, has interested the modern literature for several 
reasons and especially because Thucydides is extremely laconic on the description of its 
characteristics
26
. The regime was for sure law-abiding, in opposition to the precedent one and 
consisted of Five Thousand citizens, who should have been wealthy, since it was not planned 
from the new regime to offer a public salary. Thucydides did describe indeed perfectly this 
form of government as the balance between the few and the many, since it is obvious that we 
cannot speak, neither of a typical oligarchic constitution because of the large number of its 
participants, nor of a democracy, of course, the existence of which presupposes the 
participation of the whole demos.  
The enthusiasm of Thucydides for this new form of government in Athens is the reason, for 
which some scholars attributed a more oligarchical political identity to our historian, who for 
the first time after the time of Pericles seems to express a personal opinion on the politics of 
                                                          
25
 Thuc. 8.97.2.  
26
 All characteristics and theories on this new constitution are to be found in the corresponding chapter. 
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Athens. At this point, and before starting to mention the different ideas of the modern 
scholars, I would like to make an important declaration: I am not interested to give an answer 
to this question, because I truly believe that we cannot really have a complete idea of the 
political ideals of Thucydides. I think that one cannot speak with absolute certainty of the 
political identity of a historian, who tried with passion to write down the events of the 
Peloponnesian War and leave in the next generations its θηῆκά ηε ἐο αἰεὶ27 in the most 
objective way possible.  
There are quite a few scholars, who sustain the oligarchical identity of Thucydides actually. 
Canfora is one of the most important researchers of the Thucydidean history and a scholar, 
who did not hesitate to call directly Thucydides an ―oligarch‖28. In one of his books, Canfora 
refers to the enthusiasm of Thucydides for the new Athenian regime, which 
―non contraddice il suo ben noto apprezzamento per Pericle, poichè Pericle è per 
lui il correttivo necessario, e fortunatamente efficace, di un pessimo regime, 
quello popolare‖.29 
According to the scholar, Thucydides‘ enthusiasm for a constitution with clear oligarchic 
characteristics does not cancel his admiration for Pericles and his governing, but not because 
the historian admired together with its leader also the Athenian democracy, but because in 
reality he considered Pericles as the most efficient politician for a constitution so awful as the 
one based on the sovereignty of the demos. 
The same opinion adopts also De Ste Croix, who believes that Thucydides is much closer to 
be called a moderate oligarch than a moderate democrat.
30
 The scholar highlights the fact that 
our historian ―is much less interested in the form than in the practical working of 
constitutions‖ and this is the reason, for which he approved the Periclean constitution, but 
disapproved the governance in his city after him, although ―in constitutional form there was 
no difference whatever between the two‖. Indeed Thucydides in his second book, when he 
speaks of the death of Pericles, finds an excuse to glorify the great Athenian politician and to 
highlight his important contribution to the city of Athens both in periods of peace and during 
                                                          
27
 Thuc. 1.22.4. 
28
 See e.g. the titles of his books ―Tucidide, l‘Oligarca imperfetto‖ (Canfora 1988) and ―Storie die Oligarchi‖ 
(Canfora 1983), in which he dedicates one chapter in Thucydides.  
29
 Canfora 1983, 44. 
30
 De Ste Croix 1956, 21. 
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the war
31
. On the other hand, he does not hesitate to criticize rigidly the successors of 
Pericles, which committed mortal errors and brought Athens to its complete disaster in 
Syracuse and definitive defeat from the Peloponnesians. The following admission of 
Thucydides is emblematic: 
―So it came about that what was in name a democracy (ἐγίγλεηό ηε ιόγῳ κὲλ δεκνθξαηία) 
was in practice government by the foremost man (ἔξγῳ δὲ ὑπὸ ηνῦ πξώηνπ ἀλδξὸο 
ἀξρή)‖32. 
It seems that besides the enthusiastic description of the ‗Five Thousand‘ regime by the 
historian, this is the other point, on which several scholars, Canfora and De ste Croix 
included, based their arguments on the oligarchical political direction of Thucydides: 
according to them, the historian, was an admirer of Pericles himself and not of the Athenian 
democracy in general. This consideration does not mean anyway that Thucydides was 
oligarch in an absolute sense, according to De ste Croix. The moderate character of the 
Thucydidean political ideas should not be disputed, as long as his recognition of the benefits 
of a ―healthy‖ democratic constitution. He should have been in favour of a moderate 
democracy, according to the scholar, which ―accepted certain oligarchic elements as a 
temporary measure but retained the power to abolish those elements and did before long 
abolish them, without resort to violence‖33. 
On the other side are the scholars, who do not recognize an oligarchical background behind 
the words of Thucydides. According to Hornblower, for example, the εὖ πνιηηεύζαληεο does 
not refer to the recognition of Thucydides that Athens enjoyed a good form of constitution, as 
De ste Croix believed. The scholar mentions that ―the more we incline to take πνιηηεύσ as 
referring to behaviour not structure, the less inclined we will be to label Th. as oligarch not 
democrat‖ (even if Hornblower adds anyway that ―this passage does not make him an 
enthusiast for democracy either‖).34 Of the same idea is Leppin, who believes that 
Thucydides in this passage refers to the political conduct of the new regime and not the way 
the constitution was structured
35
. Donini additionally believes that also Aristotle uses the verb 
πνιηηεύσ ―non in senso constituzionale ma per indicare la vita dei cittadini nei loro rapporti 
                                                          
31
 Thuc. 2.65.5-9. 
32
 Thuc. 2.65.9. 
33
 For other scholars, who highlight the oligarchical identity of Thucydides, see Edmunds 1975, 78, who 
characterizes Thucydides‘ ethical sympathies as Spartan or oligarchic as revealed in 3.82.4-5. 
34
 Hornblower 2008, 1036.  
35
 Leppin 1999, 192. 
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l‘uno con l‘altro‖36. One should not believe, consequently, that Thucydides with εὖ 
πνιηηεύζαληεο refers to the new constitution of Athens and the way, in which it is structured. 
Which could have been then the political direction of Thucydides? According to several 
scholars, the answer should be ―a moderate one‖. Thucydides, according to Raaflaub, should 
have been not in favour nor of oligarchy, which was likely to turn into oppressive tyranny 
because of the ruthless selfishness and ambition of those dominating it‖, nor of democracy, 
which as rule by the entire dèmos could not but fail ultimately because of the fickleness of 
the masses, their vulnerability to demagogic rhetoric, and their propensity for emotional 
reactions and irrational decisions‖.37 In other words, according to Wolpert, Thucydides 
praises the constitution of the Five Thousand, because ―he saw in the intermediate regime a 
way for the Athenians to move beyond past extremism and factionalism that threatened to 
destroy Athens‖38.  
This should have been the main reason for the admiration of Thucydides of the new regime in 
Athens after the fall of the Four Hundred, according to several scholars: every constitution (a 
democracy under Periclean leadership, or a moderate oligarchy like the one of the Five 
Thousand, or even a tyranny, like the one of Pisistratus) can be good for the city, as long as 
their main objective is to serve the interests of its citizens and bad ―as soon as individual 
ambitions (ἴδηαη θηινηηκίαη) prevail against the common good‖.39 He seems to have been in 
favour of a mixed constitution between oligarchy and democracy ―for it represents not only a 
mix of the rule of the few and the rule of the many, but also a blend of political wisdom and 
domestic stability‖40. This should have been the reason, for which the constitution of the Five 
Thousand, which was based on the κεηξία μύγθξαζηο between the few and the many, could 
have seemed at our historian as an ideal form of government, after he has seen with his own 
eyes the total collapse of the post-Periclean Athenian democracy and the damages, which the 
misleading policy of its demagogues caused to the city.  
                                                          
36
 Donini 1969, 11. 
37
 Raaflaub 2006, 220ff. 
38
 Wolpert 2017, 190. Of the same opinion is also Lange 1894, 626ff, who highlights that Thucydides should not 
be considered as an oligarch, but more as a ―Vernunftdemokrat‖, whose main interest is the maintenance of the 
outer position of power of his city, even if it means that Athens should have passed a period of oligarchic 
government, in order to hold its power. 
39
 See Saïd 2013, 209. For the same opinion, see also Harris 1990, 276.  
40
 Jaffe 2017, 405 
14 
 
As I have just shown, the discussion on the political identity of our historian is various, 
mainly because Thucydides himself was not so interested to give an absolute answer to this 
question.  Are these evidences enough for us, consequently, to reconstruct a full image of his 
political identity and beliefs? As, already said, the aim of this thesis is not to understand if 
Thucydides was in reality a ―hidden oligarch‖, but more than that to gather more information 
possible on the diverse oligarchical forms of government of the fifth century through the 
words of our historian. Secondly, I believe that no definite answer can be given to this 
question, also because Thucydides was directly influenced from what he lived. He 
experienced one of the most crucial wars in history and lived with his own eyes the fall of his 
own city, as long as the banishment of himself, even if he paid his duty to Athens as a 
General. During such intense facts, the political ideas of our historian could also have been in 
constant change. Even his admiration to Pericles should have been more a personal belief and 
should not be combined with a general political direction of him. I will cite at this point the 
opinion of Pope, with which I too agree: 
―He is neither oligarch nor democrat nor anywhere in between not only because he grew 
up before this dichotomy existed but also because its very existence implies discord and 
makes it impossible for a citizen to have a whole-hearted loyalty to his city‖41. 
An absolute definition of the Thucydidean political ideas is, consequently, not the topic of my 
thesis. On the contrary, I will concentrate my work on the way, in which oligarchy gets 
presented in the History, in order to understand as more as possible the evolution of the term 
during the years of the war. An analysis like this cannot only offer to us important 
information on the diverse constitutions of the fifth century and their development, but also 
help us to conceive a bit more the way, in which the political thought in the antiquity was 
structured After all this research, I am even more convinced that, through the sharp eyes of 
the ancients, we can manage to understand a bit more the way in which politic works also 
today. 
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Chapter 1. Eunomia and the constitution of Sparta 
The concept of eunomia as a political value 
The concept of eunomia is one of the main political ideas that appear in the work of 
Thucydides. In his first book the historian, when describing the Spartan system of governing, 
mentions the following:  
―Sparta itself, after the arrival of the present Dorian inhabitants, went through the longest 
period of unrest in recorded history (ἐπὶ πιεῖζηνλ ὧλ ἴζκελ ρξόλνλ ζηαζηάζαζα), yet even 
so its system of good order is very ancient and it has never been subject to tyrants (ἐθ 
παιαηηάηνπ θαὶ εὐλνκήζε θαὶ αἰεὶ ἀηπξάλλεπηνο ἦλ). The Spartan constitution has 
remained unchanged for somewhat over four hundred years dating to the end of this war 
— a source of strength, enabling their political intervention in other states (ηῇ αὐηῇ 
πνιηηείᾳ ρξ῵ληαη, θαὶ δη' αὐηὸ δπλάκελνη θαὶ ηὰ ἐλ ηαῖο ἄιιαηο πόιεζη θαζίζηαζαλ).‖42 
In a few phrases, Thucydides lays out the pass of Sparta from the long period of unrest 
(stasis) to a calmer period of its history characterized by eunomia and the absence of 
tyrannical forms of government. This new constitution remained stable for about 400 years 
and permitted to the Spartans to carry out political interventions in other states. Gomme 
comments on this passage that eunomia in this context implies two things; a constitutional 
government (the rule of law) and the internal peace, the absence of stasis
43
. This long 
stability that Sparta has managed to experience because of the establishment of eunomia, is, 
according to Gomme, what the Greeks admired most about the Spartans. Eunomia, deriving 
from εὐ and λόκνο (λέκσ), indicates as a general idea the ‗good order‘44, the ‗lawful order‘45, 
in other words, the use of ―good laws‖, laws well established, that serve the good functioning 
of the city. It is anyway impossible, according to me, to give such an absolute definition to a 
political term that has been a topic of discussion by several ancient scholars. Further down, I 
will try first of all to comprehend the general idea that derives from the precedent and 
contemporary ancient sources of Thucydides about eunomia, but mainly – like already said – 
to understand, which is the connection of this political idea with the Spartan way of 
governing. 
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The idea of eunomia is a common subject in Greek literature. Chronologically, the first 
citation of the word can be found in Homer, when the suitors of Penelope opposed Antinoos 
because he struck Odysseus, who was transformed into a beggar. Inter alia, the suitors will 
mention that the gods sometimes may change their look and stroll along the cities 
unrecognizable, ―taking a look at the violence of men and at lawful behaviour (θαὶ εὐλνκίελ 
ἐθνξ῵ληεο)46‖. After Homer, Hesiod in his Theogony speaks also of eunomia by personifying 
the idea with one of the three Horai, the child of Themis and the sister of Dike (justice) and 
Eirene (peace)
47
. Hesiod does not speak more about the characteristics of this Hora but from 
her family tree, one can at least understand that she is directly combined with law and order
48
. 
Furthermore, eunomia will play a significant role in the elegiac poetry and especially in the 
poem of Solon, who will define this idea in a few words: 
―My heart bids me to teach the Athenians that lawless 
behavior is the bane of a city, 
but respect for law (εὐλνκίε) spreads order and beauty; 
it shackles the legs of the unjust, 
smooths and moderates, diminishes arrogance and withers 
delusion‘s burgeoning blossoms; 
it straightens crooked judgments, humbles pride, 
halts partisanship and the anger 
born of faction. Everything righteous and wise 
depends on respect for the law.‖49 
The Athenian lawgiver did not write this poem by chance: eunomia represents the order and 
sets limits on the injustice, an idea that Solon wanted to spread in Athens by offering the 
Athenians his laws; in other words, it represents the well-ordered state, which Solon wanted 
to construct in Athens.  
The concept of eunomia in Solon‘s poem is anyway different than the one presented in his 
precedent texts. In opposition to Homer and Hesiod, eunomia here abandons its mythological 
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existence and becomes a political idea
50
.  It is still, however, closer to a philosophical ideal 
than to an applied constitution, as it will become later. In this period eunomia represents the 
moderate lawful order that controls every exaggeration, unfairness, and discord. Ehrenberg 
mentions on Solon‘s poem the following:  
―It is obvious: eunomia is an ideal state of affairs. It is not a definite constitution, nor is it 
a State with good laws. It is a human community which is ruled by moderation, unity, and 
order. We hear nothing of custom and tradition, nothing of the good old times. They 
were, in fact, anything but good. Solon was not a romantic, but an idealist who traced his 
picture of eunomia in an ideal future.‖51 
I will totally agree with this idea. In this period of history, we cannot speak of eunomia as a 
form of constitution but as a condition of the state characterized by order and moderation. 
Eunomia, as the opposite of dysnomia (lawlessness)
52
 – according to Solon – characterizes a 
state that is well-ordered, a state in which the citizens obey the laws. As Andrewes remarks, 
―it is not, I believe, a new combination of εὖ and λόκνο, but the noun of εὔλνκνο and 
εὐλνκνῦκαη, meaning discipline and good order; a condition of the state in which the citizens 
obey the law, not a condition of the state in which the laws are good‖.53 Andrewes believes 
that eunomia originally refers to the conduct of individuals and not to the way that the 
constitution of the city-state is constructed and the afore-mentioned examples do not permit 
another assumption; the passage of Homer speaks directly of a lawful behaviour (εὐλνκίελ 
ἐθνξ῵ληεο) and not of a lawful state, when Solon concentrates also on the behaviour of the 
Athenians by trying to teach them what is eunomia and how this idea can be used, in order to 
create a better state. I cannot totally agree with the opinion of Andrewes that eunomia does 
not refer to a condition of state in which the laws are good, but to a state, in which the 
citizens obey the laws; according to Aristotle, the origin of the word indicates both the 
establishment of good laws and the constant obedience to the laws by the citizens
54
. But I will 
agree with Andrewes that the concept of eunomia in this period is not connected with some 
sort of constitutional reform. The same opinion has also Ostwald, who mentions that ―[…] 
                                                          
50
 See Melle 2004, 68, who accurately mentions that ―eunomia ha perduto il suo valore originario di ossequio a 
nome tradizionali e divine nel momento in cui una legislazione umana ha preso corpo‖. As the most ancient 
―legislazioni‖, which contributed at this development, are defined by the scholar the Great Rhetra and the 
legislation of Solon. 
51
 Ehrenberg 1946, 84-85. 
52
 Dysnomia is personified in Hesiod as the daughter of Eris, goddess of strife and sister of the Atë, goddess of 
mischief, delusion, ruin, and folly (Hes. Th. 230). 
53
 Andrewes 1938, 89. 
54
 Aristot. Pol. 4.1294a, 3-4. 
18 
 
before the end of the sixth-century εὐλνκία was used in two senses. As a quality, it describes 
the behaviour of a normal and decent human being, and as a condition, it characterizes a state 
which is well-governed and in which justice, peace and order prevail‖.55 The seventh and 
sixth century has introduced eunomia as a philosophical idea, as a characteristic of human 
behaviour. In the fifth century however the word will obtain its political character and 
Herodotus will be the first to express this new concept of the idea. In his first book he 
mentions the following: 
―But the Spartans, he heard, had just emerged from great difficulties and were now 
waging war victoriously against the Tegeans. Under their kings Leon and Hegesikles, the 
Lacedaemonians kept failing in their attempts against Tegea, although they had been 
victorious in all their other wars. In a still earlier period, the Spartans experienced the 
worst government of nearly all the Hellenes, in both their domestic and their foreign 
affairs, as they lived in an enforced isolation from others.  Their conversion from bad to 
good government occurred in the following way (ηὸ δὲ ἔηη πξόηεξνλ ηνύησλ θαί 
θαθνλνκώηαηνη ἦζαλ ζρεδὸλ πάλησλ Ἑιιήλσλ θαηά ηε ζθέαο αὐηνὺο θαὶ μείλνηζη 
ἀπξόζκηθηνη: κεηέβαινλ δὲ ὧδε ἐο εὐλνκίελ). Lykourgos, one of Sparta‘s most worthy 
men, went one day to the oracle at Delphi, and as he entered the inner shrine there, the 
Pythia spontaneously proclaimed: 
You have come, Lykourgos, to my rich temple, 
You are dear to Zeus and to all on Olympus; 
Do I speak to a god or a man? I know not, 
Yet, I rather think to a god, Lykourgos. 
Some say that in addition to this, the Pythia dictated to him the laws that established the 
present Spartan way of life. The Lacedaemonians say, however, that Lykourgos, who 
became regent of his nephew King Leobates while the latter was a child, brought these 
new institutions from Crete and implemented them in place of the old as soon as he 
became regent. Having changed all the institutions, he was careful to see that the new 
rules and precepts would not be violated. Later, he established Sparta‘s military 
institutions:  the platoons of citizens bound together by oath, the companies of thirty, and 
the system of communal messes. And in addition, he set up the Board of Ephors and the 
Council of Elders. 
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With these changes, they attained good government, (κὲλ κεηαβαιόληεο εὐλνκήζεζαλ) 
[…].‖56 
If one should compare the text of Herodotus and of Thucydides, he would discover many 
similarities; both texts have actually the same content, though the text of Thucydides is more 
concise. Both speak of a constitutional change in Sparta, which led the city from a period of 
unrest to a period of good governing. The connection of the constitution of Sparta with 
eunomia is not limited in those two passages, however. The idea of eunomia is referred 
already in the elegiac poetry of the seventh century from both Spartan poets Tyrtaeus and 
Alcman. Tyrtaeus‘s poem ―Eunomia‖ – apart from some few fragments – is unfortunately not 
in our possession, but from Aristotle, we get informed that the subject of the poem was about 
the Messenian War
57
. It was expressed also the idea that the poem ―seems to have included a 
discussion of the circumstances and substance of Lycurgus‘ reforms‖58. I think, however, that 
since we are not in possession of the entire poem, we cannot come to absolute conclusions 
about its content. Apart from this, the Spartan Alcman speaks also of eunomia, this time from 
a mythological point of view
59
. He defines eunomia as a goddess and sister of Peitho, the 
goddess of persuasion and seduction. In this period eunomia is however still combined with a 
philosophical interpretation and is not comprehended as a political idea like already said.  
On the other hand, the text of Herodotus does indicate a change of concept about the idea of 
eunomia; from this moment eunomia receives also a political dimension and the texts of 
Herodotus and Thucydides do indicate clearly this new interpretation of the word. Reading 
carefully the text of Herodotus, one can observe that the Spartan eunomia is clearly combined 
with the constitutional changes that Lycurgus brought to the city after he consulted the oracle 
of Delphi. Lycurgus changed all the laws and took care that everybody would obey the new 
ones. He established also the affairs of war, as long as the ephors and the council of the 
elders. These changes, which in the Spartan tradition are defined as the Great Rhetra, 
indicate the change of the Spartan way of living and governing from a bad-governed to a 
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lawful and well-governed constitution. Sparta passes from a period of unrest, as Thucydides 
mentions, to a period of eunomia, a constitution based on good laws. 
At this point, I find it very important to make a small parenthesis, in order to speak of an 
important problem, which arises from the afore-mentioned passages of Herodotus and 
Thucydides; the problem of the dating of the Spartan eunomia. Like already said, Herodotus 
speaks clearly of a transformation of the Spartan constitution from a bad-governed state, 
characterized by the establishment of bad laws (θαθνλνκώηαηνη) and xenelasia (μείλνηζη 
ἀπξόζκηθηνη) to a well-ordered one (εὐλνκήζεζαλ). In this passage, one can observe a clear 
dating confusion. On the one hand the historian dates the event at the beginning of the sixth 
century in the time of the kingship of Leon and Hegesikles, when right after he re-dates the 
Spartan eunomia at the beginning of the ninth century, when he connects its establishment in 
Sparta with Lycurgus and the kingship of Leobotes (c. 870-840). Thucydides does not help us 
unfortunately with Herodotus‘s confusing dating; he dates the Spartan eunomia 400 years 
before the end of the Peloponnesian War, i.e. in c. 800. The confusing dating of the two main 
historians of the fifth century caused naturally a very large discussion between the modern 
scholars about the dating of the Great Rhetra and consequently also the date, in which Sparta 
εὐλνκήζε. 
One of the main articles about the concept of eunomia, which has been an important source 
for many researchers of this idea is, of course, the one of Andrewes
60
. On the dating problems 
of the episodes of Herodotus and Thucydides, Andrewes expressed the very interesting idea 
that the establishment of the Spartan legislation and constitution by Lycurgus and the 
eunomia of Sparta should be considered and dated as two different events: the first one was 
placed, according to him, at a very early age in the history of Dorian Sparta, when the second 
should have been ―effected about 600 B.C. and has not necessarily any bearing on the 
constitution‖61. According to Gomme, who characterizes the passage of Herodotus as the 
most remarkable instance of a carefree chronology, even if the theory of Andrewes could be 
considered as ―tempting‖, is however groundless62. Gomme believes that the text of 
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Thucydides, which is correcting the anomaly of Herodotus with its reference to an earlier 
dating, is very clear about the concurrent establishment of the Great Rhetra and the Spartan 
eunomia, which guaranteed at Sparta a stable form of constitution. Further scholars, like 
Hornblower
63
, Hammond
64
, and Koiv
65
 do also rely their research basically on the texts of the 
two historians and believe that Herodotus and Thucydides may have aimed to supply the 
same date, i.e. an earlier dating (ninth – eighth century) according to a common opinion that 
existed in the Greek world about the establishment of the Spartan constitution and that the 
dating confusion in the text of Herodotus should not be a reason to believe that Lycurgus 
established the Great Rhetra in Sparta in the archaic period. Wade-Gery will also date 
Lycurgus in an earlier date and in particular in the early eighth century; the text of Plutarch
66
 
indicates, according to him, the existence of Lycurgus in the time of the First Olympiad  
(776-773)
67
, when in the Pseudepigraphus of Aristotle
68
 is indicated that the lawgiver was the 
first to receive the poesy of Homer and bring it to Peloponnesus. 
In contrast to the afore-mentioned dating stand several scholars, who prefer a later dating of 
the Spartan eunomia (seventh-sixth century) and basically recede themselves from the texts 
of Herodotus and Thucydides and base their arguments on other sources. Huxley, for 
example, considers that it is possible to believe in a later dating, since inter alia
69
 the ephors, 
which, according to Herodotus, were introduced in Sparta by Lycurgus
70
, did not exist before 
the eighth century and since the Cretan influence on the Spartan constitution, which Aristotle 
supported so vividly
71
, should be dated at approximately 700
72
. Of the same opinion is 
Toynbee, who dates the establishment of the Spartan constitution in the archaic period at the 
date of the political changes in Sparta and the agreement between aristocrats and commoners, 
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which resolved the problems between them
73
. Additionally, Forrest believes that the later 
dating of the Spartan constitution is supported first of all by the words of Herodotus about the 
dating of the event at the kingship of Leon and Hegesikles, which needs to be considered 
seriously, secondly by the poesy of the Spartan Tyrtaeus, who refers to eunomia and is dated 
in the seventh century and last but not least by archaeological evidences
74
. 
There is no doubt that our two basic historiographical sources of the fifth century do not 
indicate a clear date of the establishment of the Spartan constitution and the change of Sparta 
into an eunomoumene polis. I am asking myself if even Herodotus and Thucydides were 
aware of an exact date; their texts do not indicate something like that at least. But there is no 
doubt also that these are our main sources of the event and that they should also be 
considered in our research like that. The collection of diverse sources can help surely at our 
research, but they should be held anyway as supplementary sources to our basic texts. This is 
why I think that we should trust Herodotus and Thucydides about the earlier dating of the 
Spartan constitution and not insist on the confusion that Herodotus – unwillingly or 
purposefully – caused; there is a great possibility that he, like Thucydides, followed a certain 
tradition about the mythical story of Lycurgus and that he may have been confused also by 
himself. Since both historians agree – even on one point only – with each other about the 
earlier dating of the establishment of the Spartan constitution, I will live aside the confusion 
that Herodotus provoked with his dating and I will trust the direct sources of the fifth century. 
The sources about the Spartan eunomia are not limited, however, only in our basic ancient 
historiographers of the classical period. It is not adventitious that, the almost contemporary of 
Thucydides, Plato refers also to Sparta as an eunomoumene polis. In his Hippias Major, he 
defines Sparta several times – through the words of Socrates – as a city, which is well-
governed (ἀιιὰ κὴλ εὔλνκόο γ᾽ ἡ Λαθεδαίκσλ)75. If one wants to understand, what Plato 
means with the characterization of Sparta as eunomos, he should pay particular attention, 
according to me, to the combination of eunomia with virtue:  
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―and in well-governed states virtue is most highly honoured (ἐλ δέ γε ηαῖο εὐλόκνηο 
πόιεζηλ ηηκηώηαηνλ ἡ ἀξεηή)‖76 
Virtue is, according to Socrates, a very important value for the states combined with 
eunomia. Heitsch mentions that: ―Sparta is εὔλνκόο, d.h. in Sparta werden die Gesetze 
befolgt; in Staaten, in denen die Gesetze befolgt werden, gilt die Tüchtigkeit (ἀξεηή) viel.‖77 
What arete really means for Plato could be for sure the subject of a very big discussion, but I 
will not analyse it further, since this is not the aim of this thesis. The fact, however, that Plato 
connects eunomia to a value that is combined with goodness and excellence
78
 indicates the 
positive meaning of eunomia for the scholars of the fifth century. Arete is the offspring of an 
eunomos polis and Sparta is one of the states, in which arete and eunomia are strictly 
connected. 
On the other hand, it is very interesting in my opinion the fact that another contemporary of 
Thucydides, Pseudo-Xenophon, speaks of the same concept in his Constitution of the 
Athenians but from another point of view. More concretely, the writer, when describing the 
Athenian democracy, speaks of eunomia as a condition of slavery and mentions that the 
Athenians prefer the kakonomia
79
, which will guarantee them freedom. In a condition of 
eunomia the cleverest men make laws, in order to serve their own interests, a fact, which has 
as a result that, since the laws are not on favour of the common people, the last will plunge 
into slavery. 
―Such a way of life could never produce the best city, but this is the way democracy 
would be best preserved. For the common people want not to be slaves in a city which 
has good laws (νὐθ εὐλνκνπκέλεο ηῆο πόιεσο αὐηὸο δνπιεύεηλ), but to be free and in 
control – and they are not much worried if the laws are bad (θαθνλνκίαο). For what you 
consider
80
 not having good laws, is in fact what enables the common people to be strong 
and free (ὃ γὰξ ζὺ λνκίδεηο νὐθ εὐλνκεῖζζαη, αὐηὸο ἀπὸ ηνύηνπ ἰζρύεη ὁ δῆκνο θαὶ 
ἐιεύζεξόο ἐζηηλ). But if you are looking for good laws (εἰ δ᾽ εὐλνκίαλ δεηεῖο), the first 
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thing you will see is that the cleverest men make laws in their own interest; second, the 
good will punish the bad and the good will take counsel about the city and will not allow 
madmen to become members of the Council, nor to make speeches, nor to attend the 
Assembly. As a result of these excellent decisions, the common people would soon 
plunge into slavery.‖81 
In this passage of Pseudo-Xenophon one can observe a different concept of eunomia; in this 
case, the establishment of good laws results in the slavery of its citizens and not in a well-
governed state. It is indeed strange that an ancient scholar combines this idea with the plunge 
into slavery, when in other preceding and contemporary texts eunomia is interpreted as 
something positive. Lapini posed also his question about the fact that Solo perceived the idea 
of eunomia as a condition that guaranteed the harmony of the polis and not as the slavery of 
the demos
82
. One cannot precisely know, what Pseudo-Xenophon had in mind when he wrote 
this part, which could seem like a paradoxical theory to a modern scholar. I think that the aim 
of the writer in this passage is to highlight the difference between the Spartan and the 
Athenian way of governing and this could be, in my opinion, the best proof of the connection 
of the Spartan constitution with eunomia
83
; in order to underline the differences between 
Athens and Sparta, Pseudo-Xenophon defines the eunomia, i.e. the Spartan way of governing, 
as a condition of slavery and opposes it to the Athenian democracy, which guarantees 
freedom to its citizens.  
The opposed concept: isonomia as a democratic value 
Since we are trying to understand in depth the idea of eunomia and since the text of Pseudo-
Xenophon encourages the deeper analysis of the antithesis between the Athenian and Spartan 
way of governing, I would find it very interesting to make a parenthesis about the 
contradiction of the two main slogans of both cities; the eunomia and isonomia. Even if 
Pseudo-Xenophon does not use the exact term of isonomia, in order to define the opposed 
idea of eunomia, the contrast between the two political ideas is, also in Thucydides, one of 
the main characteristics of the antithesis between Athens and Sparta and one of the main 
instruments of propaganda that both cities practiced, in order to highlight even more the 
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difference of political and social mentality between them. Stechhini mentions, and I cannot 
find any reason to disagree, that in the Constitution of the Athenians the writer contrasts 
eunomia (good, traditional distribution of rights), which is the traditional Spartan slogan, to 
isonomia (equal, rationalistic distribution of rights), which is traditionally combined to the 
Athenian democracy
84
. Can we however really identify isonomia with democracy? 
The term isonomia is of great interest. Asheri mentions that the word etymologically should 
derive from ἵζνο and λέκεηλ. The original sense should have been ―equitable distribution‖, but 
later the meaning changed into ―equality in front of the laws‖ (from ἴζνο and λόκνο), a more 
convincible explanation if we consider the political meaning that the word obtained later.
85
 
One of the earliest uses of the word can be found in a text of Alcmaeon, where the 
philosopher speaks of the importance of the isonomia, i.e. the equity, between all elements of 
nature (humidity and dryness, cold and warmth, bitterness and sweetness, etc.) for the 
guarantee of good health.  
―Gesundheitbewahrend sei die Gleichberechtigung der Kräfte, des Feuchten, 
Trocknen, Kalten, Warmen, Bittern, Süßen usw., die Alleinherrschaft dagegen sei 
bei ihnen krankheiterregend (ηῆο κὲλ ὑγείαο εἶλαη ζπλεθηηθήλ ηὴλ ἰζνλνκίαλ η῵λ 
δπλάκεσλ, ὑγξνῦ, μεξνῦ, ςπρξνῦ, ζεξκνῦ, πηθξνῦ, γιπθένο θαὶ η῵λ ινηπ῵λ, ηὴλ δ’ ἐλ 
αὐηνῖο κνλαξρίαλ λόζνπ πνηεηηθήλ). Denn verderblich wirke die Alleinherrschaft des 
einen Gegensatzes (θζνξνπνηὸλ γάξ ἑθαηέξνπ κνλαξρίαλ)
86
‖.   
It is interesting that this perfect balance of nature, characterized as isonomia, is set in contrast 
with monarchia, the autocracy of one of these elements on the expense of the others. One 
cannot speak of a political dimension of the afore-mentioned terms, but it is for sure 
impressive that Alcmaeon highlights the contradiction of these two very important political 
terms
87
. 
When it comes to its connection with political constitutions, however, isonomia has a more 
concrete meaning and gets basically connected to democracy. In the famous discussion of 
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Herodotus between the three Persian Grandees about the ideal constitution for Persia, Otanes 
will support democracy as the ideal form of government by defining it as isonomia: ―but the 
rule of the multitude (πιῆζνο δὲ ἄξρνλ) has in the first place the loveliest name of all (νὔλνκα 
πάλησλ θάιιηζηνλ), equality in front of the laws (ἰζνλνκίελ) […]”88. In the text of Herodotus, 
isonomia is identified with the πιῆζνο ἄξρνλ and is considered as the total opposite of 
monarchy. It is a situation, which determines offices by lot, holds power accountable and 
conducts all the βνπιεύκαηα (resolutions) publicly. In a politeia isonomos all citizens are 
equal in front of the laws.  
This idea about the identification of isonomia with democracy will remain in the fifth 
century, as the text of Thucydides can show. It has provoked, however, a big discussion 
between the modern scholars about if isonomia could be connected also with other forms of 
government since the text of the historian does not help to the resolution of this confusion. 
On the one hand, it has been supported the idea that isonomia represented several forms of 
government and not only the democratic one. In the episode of Thucydides about the 
conquest of Plataea, during the discussion of the Thebans in front of the Lacedaemonians, in 
order to convince them to attack the city, the Thebans speak of their constitution during the 
Persian Wars, which is characterized as dynasteia, a form of tyranny, ruled by few men and 
extremely opposite to the isonomos oligarchia
89
. In this case, isonomia is used as an adjective 
of oligarchy. Hornblower mentions that, according to him, the noun isonomia is not identical 
with democracy and that the words of Otanes are ―merely a way of saying that ἰζνλνκία is 
something which can be predicated, as the philophers say, of democracy‖90, not that isonomia 
and democracy are the same. Even farther from the identification of isonomia with 
democracy is Gomme, who defines this constitution as: ―a constitutional, law-abiding 
government, in which all citizens have equal rights, though not equal political power‖91. In 
the episode of Thucydides, the idea of isonomia has another meaning from the one in 
Herodotus. The position of isonomos before the word oligarchia defines the character of 
isonomia: it cannot be defined as a political constitution, but more as an adjective not only of 
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oligarchy but of any other constitution, the citizens of which have equal rights; in other 
words, isonomia refers to constitutions, which are based on the equality of the laws. Asheri 
will interpret the term in the same way, as Gomme, when mentioning that the word isonomia 
―venne usato in età classica per qualsiasi regime «libero», cioè non monarchico‖. Isonomia is 
neither a synonym of democracy nor of oligarchy, ―è piuttosto lo slogan dei regimi liberi, in 
particolare delle democrazie‖92. Any constitution, which has this basis, can be ἰζόλνκνο.  
When it comes to the connection of isonomia with democracy, however, Thucydides offers 
us two important passages, which highlight this connection particularly. The first instance 
appears during the events of the Civil War in Corcyra in the year 427, a war exploded 
between the two ἑηαηξεῖαη93 of Corcyra, the oligarchic faction (νἱ ὀιίγνη) and the democratic 
one (ὁ δῆκνο), during which each of them participated and fought – with the help of the 
powerful cities of the war, Sparta and Athens respectively – for another objective; the first to 
cultivate good relations with the Peloponnesians, whereas the second to remain on the side of 
Athens. In the context of the political propaganda of the two factions, which aimed the 
accomplishment of their personal interests and not the commonweal, Thucydides describes 
the instruments of propaganda for both factions: 
―The leaders in the various cities would each of them adopt specious slogans professing 
the cause either of ‗political equality for the masses‘ (πιήζνπο ηε ἰζνλνκίαο πνιηηηθῆο), or 
‗aristocracy – the government of moderation‘ (ἀξηζηνθξαηίαο ζώθξνλνο)94; they 
pretended in their speeches to be competing for the public good, […]‖95 
It would be natural to be confused about if in this passage isonomia is really identified with 
democracy since we have seen that Thucydides may interpret this idea also in other ways. In 
Gomme‘s opinion, however, the reason why we can be sure that in our passage this idea is 
expressed by the democratic faction and not the oligarchic one is the use of the word πιῆζνο 
(the multitude)
96
, which in the political propaganda of the democratic faction indicates the 
majority of the people. In his sixth book, Thucydides will also combine isonomia with 
democracy, when the Syracusian Athenagoras will hold a speech in front of the Syracusian 
ecclesia in favor of the Athenians shortly prior to the arrival of the last in Syracuse in 415. 
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During his speech the δήκνπ πξνζηάηεο97 will ask his co-citizens the following question: ―Or 
is it that you don‘t want to be equal before the law (ἰζνλνκεῖζζαη) with the majority?‖98 In 
this case, Athenagoras uses the idea of ἰζνλνκία as an adjective of democracy and highlights 
that it would not be just
99
 if the citizens of a city would not have the same rights. If one 
considers that Syracuse is democratic in this period of its history, then the connection of 
isonomia with democracy gets even more evident. Dover mentions that in this passage it 
seems that ―ἰζνλνκία, the situation in which all have the same rights, is one face of 
democracy; δεκνθξαηία, ‗power in the hands of the majority‘, is another.‖100 Isonomia and 
demokratia are both two faces of the same way of governing; the one that is based on the 
sovereignty of its citizens
101
. 
The afore-mentioned interpretation of isonomia has been supported by several scholars. 
Ehrenberg, for example, believes that Herodotus in his famous speech of Otanes uses the 
expression νὔλνκα πάλησλ θάιιηζηνλ102 , not in order to translate isonomia as ―equality in 
front of the laws‖ 103. According to him, Herodotus wants mostly to highlight that the term 
indicates the share of state and power from all the citizens of the city, which constitutes the 
main characteristic of the democratic ways of governing and of the Cleisthenic democracy in 
particular
104
, since Cleisthenes had realized through the use of isonomia the ἀλακίζγεζζαη ηὸ 
πιῆζνο105 in an exemplary manner. Szegedy-maszak mentions that the slogan was adopted 
and perhaps invented by Cleisthenes ―to denote his new order, dedicated to the proposition 
that in Athens all free adult males were created equal‖106. When it comes to Thucydides, for 
many scholars even his most confusing passage about the isonomos oligarchia of the 
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Thebans does not indicate an oligarchical character of the term. According to Vlastos, who 
had to write a second article about isonomia after the publication of Gomme‘s commentary, 
in order to support once again his opinion about the democratic character of isonomia
107
, 
oligarchies could use the term isonomia ―only by borrowing it from democracy and only by 
approximating as best as they could the democratic pattern‖. In the case of Thebes, the 
isonomos oligarchia refers to a responsible constitution, which grants ―an equal share in 
government to its fully enfranchised civic body‖108, i.e. a democracy.  
In my opinion, the democratic aspect of isonomia in the fifth century cannot be really 
questioned. It is true that Thucydides does not explain clearly the real character of this term, 
especially in the case of Thebes, but I think that in this case Thucydides uses this idea not 
because he wants to give another meaning to the word but in reality because he wants to 
highlight the antithesis between the so-called dynasteia
109
 and the lawful oligarchy based on 
the equality of the citizens in front of the laws
110
. The same idea will be expressed also in the 
fourth book of the historian, when Thucydides refers to the expedition of the Spartan 
Brasidas to Thessaly and the constitution that he found, when he passed by there: ―So if the 
Thessalian system had been based on equal rights for all, rather than the traditional 
dominance of oligarchic cliques (εἰ κὴ δπλαζηείᾳ κᾶιινλ ἢ ἰζνλνκίᾳ), Brasidas could never 
have gone on.‖111 The afore-mentioned passage is also a part of the contradiction between 
dynasteia and isonomia that Thucydides wants to highlight. It does not represent, however, 
according to me, the general idea about isonomia in the fifth century; in this case, the use of 
the term is an instrument of the historian, in order to show the antithesis between a 
constitution based on laws and a tyrannical form of it
112
. 
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Finally, I would like to quote the words of Vlastos, who has given, according to me, a very 
convincing explanation of how isonomia became a special feature of democracy and not of 
other forms of government. According to him, isonomia assures the good functioning of a 
democratic society, since it guarantees equality in front of the laws of all citizens, poor or 
rich, common citizens or aristocrats:  
―Isonomia refused to countenance either the ancient monopoly of law in the hands of a 
hereditary aristocracy or the claims to political privilege of the new plutocracy whose 
social power rivalled that of the old nobility. It promised the poorest citizen an equal right 
in the law-making, law-administering, law-enforcing power of the state. It expressed the 
spirit of a constitution, hitherto undreamed of in civilized, which declared that the poor 
man's share in law and political office was equal to that of the noble and the rich‖113. 
In these few phrases is concentrated, according to me, in whole the main idea about the 
concept of isonomia in the fifth century. Isonomia offers to all citizens equal rights by 
guaranteeing to the poor equal share in law and public administrations with the richer ones; 
there can be nothing more democratic than that. 
What can we understand about eunomia from the comparison with its opposed 
term? 
Much could be said about isonomia and its political shades; this is not the topic of my thesis, 
however. In this small parenthesis, I have tried to present the main characteristics of this idea 
in the period of the Peloponnesian War and the main bibliography about this subject, in order 
to understand the connection of the term with the Athenian constitution. Returning to our 
main subject, i.e. the research of the connection of eunomia with the Spartan way of 
governing, I think that the comparison between isonomia and eunomia is of great interest, in 
order to understand the real character of eunomia. From a lexicological point of view, the two 
terms derive from the same word, λόκνο, i.e. custom, law, which derives from the verb λέκσ, 
i.e. allot, dispense, distribute
114
. Consequently, the prefix of each word is the factor that 
changes the whole meaning of the word. In the case of isonomia, the attribute ἴζνο (equal) 
indicates the equality in front of the laws, when the prefix εὐ (good, well) in the case of 
eunomia indicates the use of well-established laws. One could ask, which is the real 
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lexicological difference between the two terms. Indeed, Ehrenberg believes that both 
isonomia and eunomia ―with all their contrasting qualities and their contradictory nature, […] 
implied one and the same fact, the rule of law‖115. According to Ehrenberg, since Nomos 
became the fundamental idea, on which the Polis rested, whether we speak of oligarchic or 
democratic forms of government, the concepts of eunomia and isonomia, both connected with 
the sovereignty of law, should have become relative ideas between each other. ―For that 
reason, they disappeared during the fifth century from the front line of actual politics‖, 
according to the scholar. 
I have to disagree with Ehrenberg. The concepts of eunomia and isonomia indicate, in my 
opinion, clearly different political ideas, which could easily represent different forms of 
government, especially in the fifth century. In the case of isonomia, the term indicates that the 
citizens of the city are equals in front of its legislation when in the case of eunomia the 
equality in front of the laws is not a prerequisite, only the good quality of the established laws 
is. This means that an eunomoumene polis can consist of diverse political institutions with 
different functions and different power since it is based on a constitution of well-established 
laws and not on a constitution, which is based on the sovereignty of its citizens. On the other 
hand, the isonomos politeia requires the equality of the citizens in front of the laws of the 
city, a measure that indicates the equal position of all citizens and therefore their sovereignty 
in the city.  
There is no doubt, in my opinion, that the case of eunomia fits better to oligarchic 
constitutions and the case of isonomia to democratic ones; this does not mean, however, that 
one can speak of an identification of the afore-mentioned terms and constitutions. Even more 
important that that should be to investigate the background of the tendency of the ancient 
scholars to identify eunomia with oligarchy and isonomia with democracy and I think that in 
the fifth century this background is strongly connected with the concurrence of the two 
protagonists of the Peloponnesian War, Athens and Sparta. Both eunomia and isonomia –like 
already seen – are much older than the war and their initial meaning can be sometimes very 
far from any connection with Athens or Sparta; this is why one can observe Solon teaching at 
the Athenians the benefits of eunomia. Even if the Spartan Tyrtaeus in the seventh century 
speaks of eunomia, the first direct connection of isonomia and eunomia with the proper forms 
of government, i.e. democracy and oligarchy respectively, appears in Herodotus and 
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continues in Thucydides and this cannot be adventitious, according to me. The two main 
historians of the fifth century represent the society of their time, a society, which ―simmers‖ 
because of the concurrence of Athens and Sparta, which will lead the Greek world to its 
cruelest Civil war. The two philosophical ideas of the past centuries get transformed in this 
way to the two main political slogans of the two powerful cities, which will empower their 
political propaganda. Thucydides manages to present very successfully the two dimensions of 
the Peloponnesian War; the one in the real battlefield and the other in the battlefield of the 
concurrence of the political ideas, each of which will determine in another way the 
development of the war. In this context, eunomia and isonomia, as the slogan of Sparta and 
Athens respectively, had a very important role in the concurrence of the political forms of 
government that each part represented. One should not forget that one of the main initial 
reasons of the concurrence between the two cities has been the different constitutions of each 
of them, which indicated also different mentalities and way of life; consequently, eunomia 
and isonomia as political slogans have served perfectly as the instruments of the cities to feed 
this concurrence. 
Last but not least, the reference of the subsequent of Thucydides, Aristotle in his politics 
about eunomia and its characteristics should not be omitted from the research on the 
connection between eunomia and Sparta. First of all, Aristotle defines eunomia as a political 
condition, which requires not only the enactment of good laws but also the obedience to them 
(“νὐθ ἔζηη δὲ εὐλνκία ηὸ εὖ θεῖζζαη ηνὺο λόκνπο, κὴ πείζεζζαη δέ‖)116 and highlights that  
―now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state which is governed not by the best 
citizens but by the worst should be well-governed (δνθεῖ δ᾽ εἶλαη η῵λ ἀδπλάησλ ηὸ 
εὐλνκεῖζζαη ηὴλ κὴ ἀξηζηνθξαηνπκέλελ πόιηλ ἀιιὰ πνλεξνθξαηνπκέλελ), and equally 
impossible that the state which is ill-governed should be governed by the best (ὁκνίσο δὲ 
θαὶ ἀξηζηνθξαηεῖζζαη ηὴλ κὴ εὐλνκνπκέλελ)‖.117  
Aristotle seems to connect directly eunomia with aristocracy, which is presented here from 
the philosopher as a ‗good government‘118. If one considers the connection of aristocracy 
with Sparta
119
, this passage of Aristotle does not indicate for sure any identification of the 
Spartan constitution with eunomia but can indicate at least the non-connection of this 
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political idea with democratic forms of government. Bertelli and Moggi mention on this 
passage the following:  
―Stabilito che l‘aristocrazia è il regime dei ―cittadini migliori‖ (1293b 41), simile in 
questo all‘ oligarchia come regime dei più ricchi dotati di educazione e prestigio (1293b 
41-42), il ―buon governo‖ (eunomia) apparterebbe per definizione a una città aristocratica 
(ἀξηζηνθξαηνπκέλε πόιηο), mentre sarebbe impossibile per una città retta dai poneroi 
(πνλεξνθξαηνπκέλε πόιηο [...]): l‘opposizione non implica che con πνλεξνθξαηνπκέλε 
πόιηο Aristotele stia alludendo alla politeia, che non potrebbe in alcun modo essere 
definita in questi termini, ma fa riferimento a un‘ opposizione del genere di quella che 
troviamo in [Xen.] Ath. 1, 5-9, tra ―governo dei migliori‖ (chrestoi) e ―governo del 
demos.‖120 
Even if Aristotle does not identify clearly eunomia with oligarchy and Sparta in particular, I 
think that in his text he represents the society of his time, in which the perception of Sparta as 
an eunomoumene polis should have been a common idea. This theory will be strengthened, 
when one reads some characteristics of the eunomia, which can remind the reader of the way 
that the Spartan constitution is constructed. Aristotle refers to two elements of the 
eunomoumene polis: in the first place, he is asking himself if a city with many citizens can be 
governed in a right way because the πόιεηο who are eunomoumenai do not have many 
citizens
121
 and in the second place, if the contact with πόιεηο that have different laws could be 
beneficial for the eunomoumenai poleis
122
. When it comes to the second argument Aristotle 
expresses his doubts about if the communication of a city with the sea is beneficial to a well-
ordered state, because of the constant coming and going of merchants and strangers in the 
city, which will cause the increase of the population; there could be nothing more 
―Lacedaemonian‖ than this description. Sparta, a traditional territorial power, located in a big 
distance from the sea and with a weak marine, was known about the ὀιηγαλζξσπία, the small 
number of citizens, which in her history was constantly diminishing
123
, but also about the so-
called μελειαζία, a practice of the city to keep away the influences of people who are μέλνη 
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(strangers)
124
. If one reads the text of the philosopher of the fourth century behind the lines, 
he can easily observe the similarities of the idea about eunomia represented in his text with 
the ideas that the historians of the fifth century, Herodotus and Thucydides expressed. 
The afore-mentioned observations have been a subject for discussion from several modern 
scholars. Ostwald, for example, notes that the texts of Herodotus and Thucydides 
―[…] use the noun and the verb to describe the lasting social and political conditions 
brought about by the reforms of Lycurgus, but that the same terms could also be applied, 
as Herodotus‘ discussion of Cheops and Deioces shows, to conditions prevalent 
elsewhere. This suffices to prove that the Greeks of the fifth century would associate 
eunomia no more closely with Sparta or with the Spartan constitution after Lycurgus than 
with any other state‖125. 
The idea of Ostwald is that the concept of eunomia should not be considered as the definition 
of the reforms of Lycurgus, but as an adjective of every political situation that fits to its 
characteristics. In this sense eunomia can be interpreted not only as a form of political 
constitution but also as a political idea, which can be adapted to every political situation that 
represents a well-governed state; in other words, genuine eunomia is, according to Szegedy-
Maszak ―a force of moderation that preserves a state intact‖126. It is for sure not adventitious 
that Thucydides speaks of eunomia once again in his work when he speaks of the oligarchy of 
the Four Hundred imposed in Athens in the year 411, even if this time he uses the word in a 
different way than we are used to. Thucydides, while describing the effort of the Athenian 
oligarchs to impose the new constitution on their submissive cities, will mention that the 
Thasians preferred freedom instead of the ὑπνύινπ (fraudulent) εὐλνκίαο127, which the 
Athenians offered to them. The constitution that the Athenian instigators tried to impose on 
their submissive city-states is an eunomia, i.e. an oligarchy but a fraudulent form of it. 
Eunomia is equivalent to a ―healthy‖ oligarchic constitution, based on the good functioning 
of the laws; the authoritarian constitution of the Four Hundred could never be identified with 
this form of government. Eunomia in Thucydides is consequently not only combined with 
Sparta but with several forms of government. If we presuppose however that this theory is 
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true, why is then prevailed in the ancient texts a connection of eunomia with the Spartan way 
of governing in particular? 
I think that the answer to this question is of particular interest. Like already seen, the 
connection of eunomia with Sparta does not appear for the first time in the time of Herodotus; 
in particular, it appears in the seventh century and the poesy of the Spartans Tyrtaeus and 
Alcman. Kiechle supported the idea that the awareness of Herodotus and Thucydides about 
the Spartan kakonomia and the staseis that took place in archaic Sparta should have derived 
from the oral tradition and not from any written evidence, considering that Sparta is in no 
case known for its inheritance of written texts
128
. In this context, according also to Koiv
129
 
and Hammond
130
, the poems of Tyrtaeus, in particular, had to have been an important source 
for the historians of the fifth century about the development of the archaic history of the 
Lacedaemonians, since they represented the traditions of the past
131
. In this way, the ―Spartan 
propaganda‖ about its very unique mentality of governing and living and in particular in our 
case about the strong connection of Sparta with the concept of eunomia got spread in the 
whole Greek world. This is the reason why this tradition of the Lacedaemonians survived 
also in the subsequent years including the text of Plutarch and Diodorus, who both speak of 
Sparta as eunomoumene. Erasmus believes that ―when Diodorus132 and Plutarch133 used 
eunomia as the name of the Spartan constitution, […] had Herodotus and Thucydides, and the 
writers of the fourth century, before them‖134. This means that this idea about Sparta as 
eunomoumene is based on a tradition of the archaic period and remained alive in a large 
period of its history
135
. 
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Is this tradition about Sparta, however, sufficient, in order to speak of an identification of the 
concept of eunomia with the Spartan way of governing? I think the answer to this question is 
somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, the fact that Sparta is an eunomos politeia does 
not indicate also that every eunomos politeia is identified with Sparta, as the examples of 
Herodotus und Thucydides have shown. Eunomia, which appears in the Greek thought as a 
mythological creation and a philosophical idea indicating the good order, receives a political 
character in the fifth century and gets used from the two main historians of this period as a 
political concept, combined with the calming down of unrests and the establishment of a 
well-governed state, based on the good functioning of the laws. As a general idea, this 
concept can be adapted obviously to several political constitutions, since, which non-
tyrannical form of government should not have been based on a well-constructed legislation 
actually? When we speak, however, of political systems of this complexity, like the ones of 
the Greek city-states of the fifth century, a period of a particular political instability because 
of the explosion of the Peloponnesian War, the answer cannot be so simple. We know very 
well, which was the importance of tradition for the Greek world in general; in our case, the 
archaic tradition of Sparta as eunomoumene is too powerful to be forgotten in the next 
centuries. We know very well also, that the Peloponnesian War was based first of all on the 
concurrence between Athens and Sparta, which was not limited only to their military power 
but was also interpreted as a concurrence of political ideas and way of life. In this 
background, the political propaganda from both sides had to be one of the main instruments 
of the two cities, in order to impose their power on the other and win the war. For Sparta the 
concept of eunomia, historically combined with its ancient form of government through the 
poems of Tyrtaeus and Alcman, should have been a basic political weapon against the 
corresponding Athenian weapon, isonomia, a concept also historically combined with Athens 
and its form of government, like already seen. Of course, one cannot say that eunomia was a 
term used only by and for the Spartans, as several afore-mentioned examples can show; the 
same happens also with isonomia. But, on the other hand, we cannot say that the connection 
of the afore-mentioned political concepts with the corresponding poleis is also a coincidence. 
I think that in the Peloponnesian War, a war of life and death, in which both leading cities 
had to fight for their interests in extreme conditions, every idea that derives directly from 
their historical background can become an important ―weapon‖. Eunomia is not exclusively 
Spartan but is connected so intensely with the development of the history of the city, that I 
will have to agree with the scholars that have characterized eunomia as a clearly 
Lacedaemonian value. 
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Chapter 2. The Lacedaemonians and their slaves. The role of phobos in the 
development of the Spartan state 
The phobos of the Helots 
When it comes to Sparta and to the Lacedaemonian constitution
136
, Thucydides is not really 
interested to offer us detailed information about its form and development; unlike Xenophon, 
our historian refers to the several institutions of the Lacedaemonian state many times without 
several explanations of their particular characteristics. On the other hand, he is very interested 
to understand the deepest layers of a society, which was widely characterized as strict and 
introverted. One of the most important factors, which determined the development of the 
Lacedaemonian state, was for sure the existence of their Messenian slaves, called Helots
137
 
and the constantly insecure relationship between them and their masters. 
Thucydides highlights in different parts of his work the constant fear of a possible revolution 
of the helots in Sparta, which influenced a lot the story of the city. The small number of 
Spartan citizens
138
, (which constantly became smaller) against the huge number of the 
helots
139
 caused the extreme phobos of the Lacedaemonians of a possible rebellion of their 
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Messenian slaves
140
. Apart from the disproportion of the numbers between them, the fact of 
the enslavement of a whole region, i.e. Messenia, by the Spartans indicated that the 
Messenians were probably bound together ―by something far more than just the weak 
negative factor of sharing a common fate, by ties of kinship, nationhood (if I may use the 
term) and tradition, all perpetually reinforced through their survival on their native soil.‖141 It 
should have been consequently much easier for them to get organized and attempt a rebel for 
the common cause.  
All of the afore-mentioned parameters have caused a constant feeling of insecurity in the city 
of Sparta. Thucydides writes that the relations between Lacedaemonians and helots were 
determined from the effort of the Lacedaemonians to guarantee their security (Thuc. 4.80.3), 
which means, that somehow the Spartans were ―subject‖ to their own fear. This fact has 
influenced not only the military and social life of the Spartans, but also their political life and 
has probably affected the Spartan constitution in a great measure. How realistic was this fear 
anyway and in which way could the Spartan constitution have been conditioned by this? 
The willing of the helots to rebel is made clear from Thucydides already from his first book, 
where the historian mentions the closed-door discussions of the Spartan general Pausanias 
with some helots in 478 during the period, in which he was accused from his city for being 
medized. According to the historian, Pausanias had promised to the helots that he would have 
liberated them if they had collaborated at his plan to revolt against the state
142
. His plan was 
never realised, but the helots did indeed rebel some years later and specifically after the great 
earthquake
143
, which hit Sparta on in the year 464 and caused the death of 20.000 people and 
serious damages in the city
144
. Thucydides mentions that this natural catastrophe gave the 
helots and the Messenians
145
 the chance to enter in a 10 years‘ revolt146 and at the end 
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manage to capitulate with the Spartans and leave from Peloponnese. In order to face this 
revolution, which has been characterized as the greatest social upheaval that Sparta 
experienced during the Classical period
147
, the Spartans asked the help of the Athenians, 
which was never really given from the city of Athens at the end: this fact showed, according 
to the historian, for the first time the open difference between the Spartans and the 
Athenians
148
. Consequently, the Spartans got constrained to liberate the Messenians, who 
were settled in Nafpaktos from the Athenians
149
, but, as Diodorus narrates, only the last were 
the ones saved, because the Spartans punished the ones, who were responsible for the revolt 
and enslaved the rest.
150
 The unexpected rebellion of their slaves should have panicked the 
Spartans, who were constantly under the terror of a possible revolution of their slaves. 
Indeed, this fear of the Spartans gets highlighted in diverse passages of the Thucydidean 
history. In the discussion before the destruction of the city from the Spartans in the year 426 
the citizens of Plataea, in their attempt to convince the Spartans to cancel their predicted 
attack, evoke to the Lacedaemonians that they had sent troops at Sparta during the revolt of 
the helots after the earthquake. Inter alia, the Plataeans mention that:  
―You, men of Sparta, were particular beneficiaries at that critical moment after the 
earthquake when your city was gripped by fear (κέγηζηνο θόβνο πεξηέζηε ηὴλ Σπάξηελ) 
because the helots were in revolt and had seized Ithome […]‖151. 
This phobos of the Lacedaemonians, which, according to Aristotle, is not unreasonable
152
, 
will become the characteristic that will accompany Sparta during the whole Peloponnesian 
War. Thucydides does not hesitate to speak of this fear in several passages of his work. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Messenian wars. There should have been also some Laconian helots, who of course should have been a 
minority, see Hornblower 1991, 157 and Ducat 1990, 138. 
146
 Thuc. 1.103.1. 
147
 Jordan 1990, 47. 
148
 Thuc. 1.102, see also Plut. Cim. 17.2. 
149
 Thuc. 1.103.3. 
150
 Diod. 11.84.8. 
151
 Thuc. 3.54.5. 
152
 See Aristot. Pol. 2.1269a, 38-40. The philosopher mentions that the helots in Sparta were ―like an enemy 
constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartiates‖. When he will speak of the differences between 
Sparta and Crete afterwards, the philosopher will mention that in contrary to Crete, where the serf population 
stands firm, the helots in Sparta often revolt (Aristot. Pol. 2.1272b, 17-20). Obviously there was a common 
voice in Greece that helots were always ready to rebel against their masters and indeed the helots would not 
finish with the attempts of revolution after the one of the great earthquake. Plutarch mentions that during the 
expedition of Agesilaus some helots ran away from the army and enjoyed the enemy (Plut. Ages. 32.7). Apart 
from that, Xenophon narrates that some helots had also participated at the conspiracy of Cinadon against the 
state in the year 399 (Xen. Hell. 3.3.6).  
40 
 
intention of the historian is made very clear also from the choice of the words, which he uses, 
in order to express this fear; he makes a constant use of two words, when he describes the 
problems between the Lacedaemonians and the helots: the use of the participle θνβνύκελνη 
and of the verb λεσηεξίδσ or the form λεώηεξόλ ηη γέλεηαη.   
For example, when Thucydides describes the events after the battle in Sphacteria, an island 
opposite to Pylos, the victory of the Athenians and the surrender of the Lacedaemonians of 
Sphacteria to them, he speaks once again of the fear of the Spartans. After their victory, the 
Athenians settled down some garrisons in Pylos, an event, which gave the opportunity to the 
Messenians of this region to desert. Under these circumstances is described the fear of the 
Lacedaemonians, which were afraid of a possible rebellion of the helots in the region:  
―The Spartans had no previous experience of predation and warfare of this kind. 
Moreover, the helots were deserting (η῵λ ηε Εἱιώησλ αὐηνκνινύλησλ), and they were 
afraid that they might be faced with a more extensive uprising throughout the country 
(θαὶ θνβνύκελνη κὴ θαὶ ἐπὶ καθξόηεξνλ ζθίζη ηη λεσηεξηζζῇ η῵λ θαηὰ ηὴλ ρώξαλ), so they 
became seriously troubled […]‖.153 
All of this aside, the successful efforts of the Athenians in the region of Pylos caused the 
expedition of Brasidas in Chalkidike, in order to support the cities of the region, who wanted 
to rebel from the Athenian League. This mission has been used by the Lacedaemonians as an 
excuse, in order to send a part of the helots out of the country. The conquest of Pylos by the 
Athenians gave to the Spartan slaves the opportunity to rebel, as we have seen, and the fear of 
this revolution appears always to be present for the Lacedaemonians:  
―Moreover, the Spartans were glad to have an excuse for sending some of their helots out 
there (θαὶ ἅκα η῵λ Εἱιώησλ βνπινκέλνηο ἦλ ἐπὶ πξνθάζεη ἐθπέκςαη), (for fear) that the 
present aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might encourage them to rebel (κή ηη 
πξὸο ηὰ παξόληα ηῆο Πύινπ ἐρνκέλεο λεσηεξίζσζηλ154). The Spartans‘ relations with the 
helots had always been largely determined by issues of security, and indeed on one 
occasion they were so fearful of the large numbers of helot youth that they even 
perpetrated the following deed. (ἐπεὶ θαὶ ηόδε ἔπξαμαλ θνβνύκελνη αὐη῵λ ηὴλ ζθαηόηεηα 
                                                          
153
 Thuc. 4.41.3. 
154
 In this sentence we could mean the participle θνβνύκελνη because of the existence of the participle 
θνβνύκελνη in the next sentence, which is connected with the former sentence with the conjunction θαὶ. 
41 
 
θαὶ ηὸ πιῆζνο (αἰεὶ γὰξ ηὰ πνιιὰ Λαθεδαηκνλίνηο πξὸο ηνὺο Εἵισηαο ηῆο θπιαθῆο πέξη 
κάιηζηα θαζεηζηήθεη) […]155‖. 
The interesting part in these passages is the use of the verb λεσηεξίδσ. The word can be 
translated inter alia as ―to attempt political changes, to make revolutionary movements‖156. 
Thucydides uses the verb in both meanings
157
. In my opinion, in our text, the combination of 
the word θνβνύκελνη with λεσηεξίδσ means not only the fear of a possible revolution of the 
helots but could also refer to the fear of some changes in their constitution because of this 
revolution. This assumption is more obvious in 4.55.1 because of the use of the word 
θαηάζηαζηο158, which is combined with the phrase θνβνύκελνη κὴ ζθίζη λεώηεξόλ ηη γέλεηαη 
and defines the fear not only of a possible revolution from the part of the helots but also of a 
possible change or even an overthrow of the Spartan constitution
159
. 
The measure of this fear can be understood from a future episode of the Peloponnesian war: 
the beguilement and the assassination of a part of the helots from their masters. The Spartans 
announced that the helots who claimed to have offered the most services of all to the 
Lacedaemonians would be liberated. Instead of this, however, they were assassined from the 
Lacedaemonians, for the reason that the Spartan masters got afraid that the first that would 
rebel against them would be exactly those helots, who claimed that they should have the right 
to be free men. Thucydides describes that:  
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take advantage of the circumstances and revolt, as they had done before (αὐηνκνινύλησλ ηε η῵λ Εἱιώησλ θαὶ 
αἰεὶ πξνζδνθίαο νὔζεο κή ηη θαὶ νἱ ὑπνκέλνληεο ηνῖο ἔμσ πίζπλνη πξὸο ηὰ παξόληα ζθίζηλ ὥζπεξ θαὶ πξόηεξνλ 
λεσηεξίζσζηλ).‖ According to Hornblower 1996, 460 ―ὥζπεξ θαὶ πξόηεξνλ‖ refers to the helot revolt of the 
460s. Gomme 1956, 658, mentions that ―this passage certainly says that helot desertions played a considerable 
part in determining Spartan policy‖. 
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 ―They made a proclamation that all those helots who could claim to have best 
distinguished themselves in war would be selected as candidates for emancipation (ὅζνη 
ἀμηνῦζηλ ἐλ ηνῖο πνιέκνηο γεγελῆζζαη ζθίζηλ ἄξηζηνη, θξίλεζζαη, ὡο ἐιεπζεξώζνληεο). In 
fact they were testing them out, with the thought that the ones who had the confidence to 
press their case for freedom would be the ones most likely to turn on them. Accordingly, 
they selected about 2,000 of them, who then paraded round the temples in garlands
160
 in 
the belief that they were freed, but shortly afterwards the Spartans did away with them 
and no one ever knew how they each met their end. So on the present occasion they 
gladly dispatched 700 helots as hoplite support for Brasidas and he hired the rest of his 
men from the Peloponnese as mercenaries‖ 161. 
Thucydides does not define the date of this event, ―it is in fact an achrony‖, so 
Hornblower
162
. Gomme mentions in relation to this episode that ―a stratagem at once so 
perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, 
stands without parallel in any history.
163‖ This is anyway not the first time, in which the 
Spartans treat the helots in a cruel way. The humiliation and assassination of their slaves was 
a common practice of the Spartan state. When it comes to the practices of humiliation of 
them, Plutarch mentions in his ―Instituta Laconica‖, for example, that the Spartans ―used to 
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make the helots drunk and exhibit them to the young as a deterrent from excessive 
drinking‖164, when in the life of Lycurgus he mentions also that the helots were made to sing 
obscene and ridiculous songs and perform dances of the same kind
165
. Apart from that, 
Thucydides refers in his first book to an episode from the past of Sparta
166
, during which the 
Lacedaemonians killed some Helots, who went at the temple of Poseidon at Tainaron
167
 as 
suppliants
168. It was believed actually, according to our historian, that this ―unholy‖ act of the 
Lacedaemonians has caused the great earthquake in Sparta.  
The Lacedaemonians were actually famous in the Greek world for their continuing effort to 
exterminate more or less large numbers of helots in any occasion that was given to them: we 
need only to think of the extreme institution of crypteia, which Plutarch describes as an 
abominable measure of Lycurgus, during which the trainee young Spartans, as part of their 
rigid military training, were left in the country equipped only with daggers and such supplies 
as were necessary
169
. In the progress of their training, the young Spartans were allowed to kill 
every helot they found in their way and to take any food they needed. The institution of 
crypteia was not considered however only as an educational system of the young Spartans. 
Plutarch mentions that normally they slew the sturdiest and best of them
170
, which means that 
it should have been used from the state also as a measure of diminution of the large numbers 
of their slaves and especially of the best and strongest of them.
 
 
Violent measures against the helots were, however, not the only way, in which the citizens of 
Sparta tried to face the ―helot‖ problem. They proceeded also to other methods. First of all, it 
was a common practice of the Spartans to use helots as hoplites in their battles
171
. According 
to Jordan, ―The Spartans sent helots on military expeditions in order to prevent revolts and 
secure their backs at home.‖172 For example, the ―Brasideioi‖ helots, as they were 
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characterized, i.e. the ones, who have accompanied Brasidas at his expedition in 
Chalikidike
173
, have been one of the most famous groups of helot soldiers, especially for their 
enfranchisement. In his fifth book, Thucydides mentions that after the death of Brasidas and 
the return of the soldiers of Chalcidice in the year 421: 
―the Spartans then voted that the helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free men 
and should live where they liked (νἱ Λαθεδαηκόληνη ἐςεθίζαλην ηνὺο κὲλ κεηὰ Βξαζίδνπ 
Εἵισηαο καρεζακέλνπο ἐιεπζέξνπο εἶλαη θαὶ νἰθεῖλ ὅπνπ ἂλ βνύισληαη); and not much 
later they settled them with the freedmen (κεηὰ η῵λ λενδακσδ῵λ) at Lepreum, a place on 
the border between Laconia and Elis (the Spartans now being at odds with the 
Eleans).‖174 
Thucydides inserts here a new term, which will characterize the newly freed helots. The term 
λενδακώδεο, which derives from λένο and δᾶκνο175 indicates the newly enfranchised slaves 
and especially the helots freed by the Lacedaemonian state in reward for service in war
176
. It 
is interesting that the historian does not explain further the term, but he writes as the reader 
already knew about them; according to Andrewes and Hornblower, this omission from 
Thucydides should be considered an ‗indication of incompleteness‘177. One should note that 
no other group of neodamodeis is mentioned in the Thucydidean narration. The Brasideioi 
helots seem to be the only enfranchised Messenian slaves during the Peloponnesian War. All 
other mentions of the historian to the neodamodeis and their contribution to the 
Lacedaemonian expeditions in Sicily and Euboea
178
 refer to these freed helots, who had 
accompanied Brasidas. When it comes to the conditions of living of the neodamodeis after 
their enfranchisement, Willets mentions that they should have remained farmers, ―freed from 
the obligations of helotry, which must surely mean that their right to hold land was 
recognized, since they obviously remained without political rights‖.179 They should have 
enjoyed consequently a limited economic freedom, which did not offer them the right to vote 
or participate at the koina of the Spartan society but gave them the right to usufruct of their 
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land without paying tribute to a Spartan master
180
. In any case, the enfranchisement of a part 
of their slaves should be considered, in my opinion, as a desperate measure of the Spartans, in 
order to avoid the rebellion of the ever-increasing number of them; their phobos determined 
much of the development of the history of the city. 
There can be no doubt that the Spartan phobos of a possible rebellion of the helots has 
determined the development of the Spartan history in the fifth century. It is, however, 
remarkable that the first traces of hostility between helots and Spartans after the two 
Messenian wars of the eighth and seventh century appears with the great earthquake and the 
events after it; Herodotus does not refer to any kind of problematic relationships between 
helots and their masters in his Histories
181
. On the contrary, the historian mentions constantly 
episodes, in which the Messenian slaves participated without particular complaints in the 
battles of Thermopylae and Plataea against the Persians and were buried in graves next to 
those of the Spartans
182
, when they seem also willing to stand under the direct command of 
the kings who trusted them to carry out their orders
183
. Dickins believes that before the great 
Earthquake the economic position of the helots ―was by no means unique in Greece and it is 
only at a later time that they developed into a class of discontented slaves‖184. Their 
cooperation with their masters during the Persian wars is a proof of their good relationships, 
according to the scholar.  
Additionally, I should mention also at this point the interesting theory of Birgalias, who went 
one step further and believed that the idea that the Spartan society was determined by the fear 
of the Spartans of a ‗helotean‘ rebellion is exaggerated185. If one considers the large number 
of the helots, on the one hand, and the very rare revolutions of them after the Messenian wars, 
on the other hand, it should be obvious, according to the scholar, that this so discussed 
phobos should not have been so present in the Lacedaemonian society, as we today tend to 
believe. Even though the helots were subjugated to their masters, they were still in a better 
position than the Athenian slaves in the Spartan society, which means that their relationships 
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with their masters should not have been so tensed at the end
186
. I cannot disagree completely 
with the afore-mentioned colleagues; indeed the helots seem many times really calm in 
respect to their relationships with the Lacedaemonians and the lack of the Herodotean 
testimony of problems between masters and slaves could reinforce this idea. On the other 
hand, one cannot refuse a turmoil of these relationships in the second half of the fifth century, 
as we have seen. What could be the fact that changed their behaviour in that period of time 
consequently? 
The historical development of the fifth century would have a key role in this development. 
Even if Herodotus does not speak clearly of this phobos, one can assume anyway that the 
period of the Persian wars meant for the Greek city-states a period of fear of a possible 
conquest from the Persian King. Under these circumstances, the priority of the Greek cities 
has been their survival and independence from the enemy that was attacking them. When this 
danger disappeared, the hidden anger of the Messenians subdued in the eighth and seventh 
century
187
 should have returned and the great earthquake that has caused great damage in the 
city of Sparta should have been the perfect chance for them to attempt a revolution. If we 
consider that the Messenians were enslaved by their neighbours in a violent way and that the 
Spartans, after the submission of them, treated the helots in a very cruel way, we can easily 
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understand the dudgeon that was hidden in the hearts of the helots for several centuries. With 
the explosion of the Peloponnesian War and the ever-increasing fear of the Spartans of the 
Athenian power
188
, additionally, these revolutionary ideas of the helots and correspondingly 
the fear of the Spartans of a helot rebellion grew bigger, as the text of Thucydides (and not 
only) can prove. Epps mentions that:  
―From 450 B.C. on, as they are portrayed by Thucydides, it would be difficult to find a 
people more actuated and controlled by fear than the Spartans […] They seem literally to 
have passed their lives in fear, and the moral effect of defeat on this people was always of 
greater import than any loss sustained in the field‖189.  
I find this consideration very accurate if we consider the extreme violent measures taken from 
the Lacedaemonians, but also their decision to enfranchise a part of them, in order to prevent 
a helot rebellion. There is no doubt consequently, according to me, that this extreme fear of 
the Spartans not only existed but played also a significant role in the development of the 
Spartan politics in the fifth century. 
Was the Spartan foreign policy influenced by the fear of the Helots? 
When it comes to the Spartan domestic and foreign policy, I think that the first thing that 
comes to the mind of a scholar is its conservatism. The Spartans were famous in the Greek 
world for their extreme isolation from the rest of Greece. The Lacedeamonian state was 
characterized by μελειαζία (expulsion of foreigners)190, fear of living the city and an extreme 
form of government and leaving. It is notable that one of the main arguments of Pericles in 
his epitaphios in relation to the predominance of the Athenians over the Spartans is that:  
―we keep our city open to the world (ηήλ ηε γὰξ πόιηλ θνηλὴλ παξέρνκελ) and do not ever 
expel people to prevent them from learning or observing the sort of thing whose 
disclosure might benefit an enemy (νὐθ ἔζηηλ ὅηε μελειαζίαηο ἀπείξγνκέλ ηηλα ἢ 
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καζήκαηνο ἢ ζεάκαηνο). Our way is to place our trust not so much in secret preparations 
as in our own innate courage in action‖191. 
The purpose of this Lacedaemonian practice should have been to keep the citizens from being 
demoralised by contact with foreigners, as Xenophon remarks
192
. In order to understand the 
Spartan foreign policy, one should return to the text of Thucydides. The historian already in 
his first book speaks of the practices, with which Sparta and Athens managed to hold their 
hegemony between their allied cities: 
―The Spartans exercised their leadership not by making their allies subject to tribute but 
by taking good care to ensure that they were governed by an oligarchy, which served the 
Spartan interests exclusively (νὐρ ὑπνηειεῖο ἔρνληεο θόξνπ ηνὺο μπκκάρνπο ἡγνῦλην, θαη᾽ 
ὀιηγαξρίαλ δὲ ζθίζηλ αὐηνῖο κόλνλ ἐπηηεδείσο ὅπσο πνιηηεύζνπζη ζεξαπεύνληεο). The 
Athenians, by contrast, ruled by taking possession of the ships of allied cities over time, 
except for those of Chios and Lesbos, and by imposing fixed taxes on all these (Ἀζελαῖνη 
δὲ λαῦο ηε η῵λ πόιεσλ ηῶ ρξόλῳ παξαιαβόληεο πιὴλ Χίσλ θαὶ Λε ζβίσλ, θαὶ ρξήκαηα 
ηνῖο πᾶζη ηάμαληεο θέξεηλ)‖193. 
I think that Thucydides summarizes in these few lines one of the most important differences 
between Athens and Sparta. At first reading, one can directly understand that Sparta is not 
interested to have economic profits from its allies
194
 like Athens did. The imperialistic policy 
of Sparta is not characterized by territorial conquests, but by the coercion of the submissive 
cities to change their constitution into an oligarchic one. Athens, on the other hand, was for 
sure a more extroverted imperialistic power, which was not afraid even to cross the Aegean 
and make allies far away from its land. On this subject Thucydides speaks at length further 
down in his work, when he refers to the events after the historical battle of Mantineia in 418 
between Sparta and its allies and an army led by the – in 420 agreed – coalition of Argos and 
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Athens
195
, which led to the victory of the Lacedaemonians
196
. The victory offered to the 
Lacedaemonians the opportunity to approach Argos and try to sign an alliance with them: 
―Right at the start of the following winter, with the Carneia celebrations now over, the 
Spartans went back out on campaign and on reaching Tegea they sent peace proposals 
ahead to Argos. They already had various sympathisers in Argos who wanted to 
overthrow the rule of the people there (ἦζαλ δὲ αὐηνῖο πξόηεξόλ ηε ἄλδξεο ἐπηηήδεηνη θαὶ 
βνπιόκελνη ηὸλ δῆκνλ ηὸλ ἐλ Ἄξγεη θαηαιῦζαη), and after the battle these men were in a 
much better position to persuade the majority to an agreement (πνιιῶ κᾶιινλ ἐδύλαλην 
πείζεηλ ηνὺο πνιινὺο ἐο ηὴλ ὁκνινγίαλ). They wanted first to make a treaty with the 
Spartans and after that to have an alliance, so preparing for an eventual attack on the 
people (θαὶ νὕησο ἤδε ηῶ δήκῳ ἐπηηίζεζζαη)‖197. 
The historian mentions that the Lacedaemonians went to Argos, in order to sign a treaty with 
the city and collaborated with the oligarchic party, which wanted to overthrow the dominant 
democratic constitution of Argos. After some secret discussions between the oligarchic party 
of the last and the Lacedaemonians, the first managed to convince their fellow citizens to sign 
a treaty with the Spartans.
198
 Consequently, the Lacedaemonians went to Sicyon, where they 
converted the already oligarchic constitution of the city into a more oligarchic form
199
, 
because of the fear of the Spartans that the Sikyonians might go over to Argos. In the 
meantime the Lacedaemonians and the –obviously- oligarchic Argives overthrew the 
democracy in Argos and established an oligarchy: 
―The Spartans and Argives now mounted a joint campaign, each supplying a thousand 
troops. First the Spartans themselves went and instituted arrangements at Sicyon to 
impose a narrower oligarchy on Sicyon (ἐο ὀιίγνπο κᾶιινλ θαηέζηεζαλ); then they jointly 
put an end to the rule of the people in Argos, and an oligarchy more sympathetic to Sparta 
was established there (θαὶ ηὸλ ἐλ Ἄξγεη δῆκνλ θαηέιπζαλ, θαὶ ὀιηγαξρία ἐπηηεδεία ηνῖο 
Λαθεδαηκνλίνηο θαηέζηε)‖200. 
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The third station of the Spartan imperialistic policy was Achaea, where the Lacedaemonians 
went, in order to settle affairs in a way more suitable to their interests:  
―and the Spartans restructured the political situation in Achaea to conform better than 
before to their own interests. (θαὶ Λαθεδαηκόληνη ηὰ ἐλ Ἀραΐᾳ νὐθ ἐπηηεδείσο πξόηεξνλ 
ἔρνληα θαζίζηαλην).‖201  
Even if at the end the democrats of Argos managed to rally with the help of Athens
202
, to 
attack against the oligarchs and despite the expedition of the Spartans against the city with 
the help of some oligarchic Argives
203
, to dominate
204
, the way that the Spartans tried to 
enforce the oligarchic constitution to the above-mentioned cities is very important, in order to 
understand how the imperialistic policy of Sparta worked.  
In order to focus on the character of this Spartan policy, it would be helpful to make a deeper 
lexicological analysis. The keyword of the text of Thucydides about this subject is the use of 
the adjective ἐπηηήδεηνο next to the ὀιηγαξρία, which the Spartans wanted to establish in the 
Greek city-states. This is not the only example of the use of the word ἐπηηήδεηνο in the work 
of the historian. However, when the word is combined with the constitution of oligarchy, it 
receives a particular meaning. If we return to the text, Thucydides uses the word in 1.19, 
when he says that: “θαη' ὀιηγαξρίαλ δὲ ζθίζηλ αὐηνῖο κόλνλ ἐπηηεδείσο ὅπσο πνιηηεύζνπζη 
ζεξαπεύνληεο”. As we have seen, he uses the word also in the fifth book in 5.81.2, in the case 
of Sicyon: ―θαὶ κεη᾽ ἐθεῖλα μπλακθόηεξνη ἤδε θαὶ ηὸλ ἐλ Ἄξγεη δῆκνλ θαηέιπζαλ, θαὶ ὀιηγαξρία 
ἐπηηεδεία ηνῖο Λαθεδαηκνλίνηο θαηέζηε‖ and in 5.82.1, in the case of Achaea: ―θαὶ 
Λαθεδαηκόληνη ηὰ ἐλ Ἀραΐᾳ νὐθ ἐπηηεδείσο πξόηεξνλ ἔρνληα θαζίζηαλην‖.205 We can observe 
consequently, that the historian refers to the afore-mentioned term in connection with the 
form of constitution that the Lacedaemonians wanted to establish in many Greek city-states, 
i.e. an ὀιηγαξρία ἐπηηεδεία. 
First of all, it would be of great interest to understand how the adjective ἐπηηήδεηνο is defined 
in this context. Bétant
206
 translates the word as ―obnoxious‖, i.e. ―subject, submissive, 
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obedient‖, which means that the ὀιηγαξρία ἐπηηεδεία ηνῖο Λαθεδαηκνλίνηο207 should be, in 
Bétant‘s opinion, the oligarchy subject to the Lacedaemonians, an oligarchy dependent from 
Sparta. On the other hand, Parker
208
 interprets this adjective as ―more expediently, 
commodiously‖ and the Liddell Scott209 as an oligarchy ―fit or serviceable for the 
Lacedaemonians‖. Finally, Hornblower translates the word as ―an oligarchy congenial to the 
Spartans‖210. As far as I am concerned, all translations want to indicate the same thing: the 
ὀιηγαξρία ἐπηηεδεία is the oligarchy friendly to the Spartan way of life and thinking, the 
oligarchy serviceable for the Lacedaemonians.  
The use of this adjective is for sure not randomly chosen by the historian. By placing the 
word ἐπηηεδεία next to the Spartan oligarchy, Thucydides manages to emphasize that the 
constitution, which got established from the Lacedaemonians to the cities, was a type of 
oligarchy friendly to the Spartans, so even if in some cities did exist already an oligarchic 
constitution, like in the case of Sicyon, the Spartans wanted anyway to overthrow the 
constitution of the city and establish a type of oligarchy friendly to them. The 
Lacedaemonians are not only interested to establish a similar constitution to the Spartan one 
in the city-states: they want often to establish their own form of government, which will be 
friendly to their interests, in order to control better the cities. This is the imperialistic policy 
of Sparta: they are not interested to conquer the Greek city-states in a military way or more 
economically like Athens. For the Lacedaemonians is enough to have the political 
domination over the city-states. 
Thucydides describes consequently Sparta as a conservative city, which does not dare to 
move away from its land, but makes alliances only in Peloponnese, which Sparta tries to 
control by imposing them its own form of government. The afore-mentioned policy of Sparta 
does not appear for the first time during the events of the Peloponnesian War. Herodotus 
delineates several times the fear of the Spartans to leave their city and attempt warfare far 
away. The reason, for example, for which the Spartans did not participate at the Ionian 
revolution, was the fact that they should have done a three months‘ journey from the sea211 
and they seem many times to not want to pass the Isthmus, but to stay fortified in 
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Peloponnese and protect the peninsula during the events of the Persian wars
212
. Herodotus 
admits even that Athens was actually the saviour of Hellas exactly because the Athenians 
were more courageous to leave the city when the main concern of the Spartans was to protect 
the Isthmus
213
. This conservatism of the Spartans caused naturally their denial for any 
innovation at their way of life and of course any influence from the outside of the city
214
. 
Their imperialistic policy was based on submitting their neighbour Peloponnesian cities in a 
political way by imposing them an oligarchical form of government
215
 contrary to Athens, 
which – apart from that – tried to have also an economical profit from its ―allied‖ cities. This 
is the policy, which the Lacedaemonians will continue to use for the whole of their history. 
This is why, after their victory at the Peloponnesian War, we observe the Spartans to attack 
Mantineia in Arcadia, which during the war had allied with Argos and has been turned into a 
democratic state, and to send away the democrats from the city. It is characteristic that the 
aristocracy of the city remained satisfied with the overthrow of the democratic constitution 
and the conquest of the city from the Spartans
216
. Allies and enemies of the Lacedaemonians 
should have had similar forms of constitution with them, in order for the Spartans to manage 
to govern them or even discuss with them; for a strict state like the Lacedaemonian one, there 
would be no other way to make foreign policy than this. 
The deos of the Athenians and the phobos of the Spartans 
In order to understand more the Spartan mentality, I think we should go back to the 
connection of Sparta with fear and point out an interesting observation on the use of the terms 
phobos and deos in Thucydides
217
. It is important to note that the historian differentiates in 
some way the phobos of the Spartans, which determined their history, from the deos of the 
Athenians. When it comes to the Spartan phobos, the Lacedaemonians seem to have diverse 
reasons to feel terrified. On the one hand, when Thucydides in 1.23.6 defines the reason for 
the explosion of the war, he mentions clearly that it was the ever-increasing power of the 
Athenians, which caused the phobos of the Lacedaemonians (θόβνλ παξέρνληαο ηνῖο 
Λαθεδαηκνλίνηο) and consequently the beginning of the war (see also Thuc. 1.88; 1.90; 
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1.33.3). On the other hand, they seem constantly to be controlled by their fear of a revolution 
of their slaves, as I have shown in the main text. They see to be, consequently, under constant 
fear of their two main enemies (the Athenians and the helots) and it seems that all of their 
actions are determined by this. Athens nevertheless seems to be connected more with deos 
than phobos, according to the historian. Athens, for example, lives in the most of the passages 
ὑπὸ δένπο of the barbarians (Thuc. 1.75.3), of their defeats in the battlefield like the one in 
Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.108), of the defection of their allies (Thuc. 5.14.2), of the Syracusans 
(Thuc. 6.83.4; 6.85.3; 7.77) et al.
218
 De Romilly observed that deos is connected with verbs, 
which express a thought (e.g. λνκίδεηλ) and is a more intellectual type of fear could someone 
say, whereas phobos with terms which indicate alarm and anxiety (e.g. ηαξαρή); According to 
the scholar, deos is more active, when phobos is passive, leaving its victim defenceless; deos 
may have also positive consequences, when phobos leads usually to negative ones.
219
 Even if 
we consider, however, this theory of de Romilly as a right one, one should note that the two 
words are normally translated by the diverse dictionaries as synonyms.
220
 Konstan mentions 
that:  
―there is no cognitive difference between phobos and deos in ordinary usage. Deos, as 
well as phobos, may be paired with alarm (Lysias 6.35); one may feel phobos just as 
much as deos before the gods of the laws of the city (Lysias 32.17, 14.15; for deos and 
virtue, 2.57). There attaches, I think, a slightly more elevated tone to deos, which thus 
more easily assumes the sense of reverent awe, but I can find no context in which the two 
terms are not effectively interchangeable‖221.  
I will agree, on the one hand, with Konstan, when it comes to the general interpretation of the 
word, but when it comes to the way, in which Thucydides uses it, I think that de Romilly is 
closer to the truth. Indeed one can note that our historian connects in most of the cases the 
idea of phobos with the Spartan‘s fear against the Athenians and the helots and deos with the 
Athenian fear, which could be described, according to me, as a more controllable fear. It 
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cannot be compared with the unmanageable and irrational fear (phobos) of the Spartans, 
which determined the development of the history of a whole city. If however the two terms 
are interchangeable, why does our historian make this choice, which is of course not random?  
I think that the answer is combined with the fact that the phobos of the Spartans had a 
different effect on the history of the city as the deos on Athens. The fear of the Spartans, both 
of their helots, and of the ever-increasing power of Athens had direct consequences on the 
development of the history of the city. Epps makes a very accurate observation: 
―The fanatical conservatism of the Spartans which caused them to lean away from all 
innovation is also, it seems, consonant with, if not the result of undue fear; for nothing 
could be more fatal to progress than inordinate fear‖222. 
Fear was indeed a great barrier for the development of Sparta, both inside of the city, and in 
its relations with the other Greek cities, because ―men who have to guard against destruction 
every day of their lives have no time for day-dreams or large ambitions‖223, so Grundy. The 
fear of the Spartans should have been really uncontrollable if someone considers not only the 
violent measures that they took, in order to eliminate more helots as possible but also their 
willingness to keep their policy secret. When he describes the events of the battle of 
Mantineia, Thucydides mentions that the number of the Spartan troops were incalculable 
because of their secrecy about matters of state (ηὸ κὲλ γὰξ Λαθεδαηκνλίσλ πιῆζνο δηὰ ηῆο 
πνιηηείαο ηὸ θξππηὸλ ἠγλνεῖην).224 Thucydides describes with this phrase an extremely closed 
state, which did not want any exposure of its domestic politics. The Lacedaemonians were so 
terrified from their enemies in the internal and external of the city that they preferred to keep 
their policy more secret as possible from the rest of the Greek world. 
There is a reason consequently, why Thucydides uses two different terms, in order to describe 
the Spartan and Athenian fear; the two cities were completely different between each other 
and Thucydides makes it clear through a long passage of his text in 1.70, where the historian, 
through the speech of the Corinthian Ambassadors in the conference of the Peloponnesian 
League
225
, recites the most important differences between the two cities. The use of the 
words, which Thucydides chooses, in order to emphasize the differences between both cities 
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is of great importance. Sparta was ἀξραηόηξνπνο226, as the Corinthians highlight at the 
Lacedaemonians, i.e. old-fashioned
227
 and more conservative and negative at the idea to greet 
strangers in the city, when Athens was λεσηεξνπνηόο228, an innovating city often to new 
challenges and ideas. Sparta was limited in its own territory when Athens was ready to cross 
the sea and make alliances far away. Sparta made everything possible, in order to not have to 
deal with any changes in its constitution and way of life, when Athens was open to 
innovations. The fear of the Athenians could never be the same with the one of the Spartans, 
because the first was a fear open to new experiences when the second served to guarantee the 
stability of a conservative state.  
Conclusions: The double fear of the Spartans as a decisive character of their 
policy 
Many theories have been expressed on how much the fear of the Lacedaemonians influenced 
the Spartan political system and way of life. That this fear existed is out of doubt; the 
question is if this phobos was so exaggerated like Thucydides narrates in 4.80.3, or if it 
weakened after the great earthquake and the helot revolt. On the one hand, the fact that no 
other helot revolt was attempted during the years of the Peloponnesian War could be an 
evidence that the helots should not have been of such a great danger for the Spartan state, as 
several scholars believe today. It is true that helots and Spartans lived also peacefully with 
each other in several periods of time and that some helots accompanied their masters in 
several expeditions as hoplites without causing any problems. If one excludes the helot revolt 
during the period of the earthquake in Sparta, which is dated two decades earlier than the 
Peloponnesian War, the relationships between Spartans and their slaves during the war seem 
actually not so catastrophic.  
On the other hand, however, one cannot ignore the behaviour of the Spartans towards their 
slaves during the war. Apart from the fact that the Spartan state lived already a great revolt in 
the 460s, Thucydides delineates several times that the Lacedaemonians lived in reality under 
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the constant fear of a helot revolt and the several measures that they took during the history 
of the city prove exactly this fact. The institution of crypteia for example, during which 
several helots got eliminated, cannot be considered, in my opinion, only as an educational 
method of the Spartan state
229
; in the meantime served also the need of the Spartans to limit 
the great number of the helots, which with the passing of time grew always bigger and bigger 
and to make them live in constant danger. It is impossible also to forget the beguilement and 
massacre of the helots, who were considered as the most dangerous for the Spartan state. 
Sparta was in general famous for its cruel methods, but the afore-mentioned act could be 
considered as one of the most inhuman attitudes in history. Even the enfranchisement of the 
helots, who have served loyally alongside Brasidas could be probably considered as an act 
motivated by fear rather than humanity. The Spartans should have thought that with this 
goodwill gesture they would calm down the rest of their slaves by showing that a good 
behaviour of them could lead even to their liberation.  
Consequently, even if I partly understand the opinion of several scholars, who characterize 
the relations between Spartans and helots as calmer than we nowadays believe, the text of 
Thucydides does not leave much space for doubts, according to me. The historian mentions 
several times that the Spartans lived under this fear and that their actions were influenced by 
the phobos of a revolt from their slaves. Herodotus may not refer to this problematic 
relationship, but one should consider that the historian speaks of another period of Greek 
history. The Persian wars were the period, during which the Greek city-states, including 
Sparta and the helots, fought for their freedom and I cannot imagine that the Messenian 
slaves were really interested in attempting revolutionary movements in a period, in which the 
freedom of all Greek city-states was in danger. The end of the Persian wars however led to 
the emergence of two powerful cities, Athens and Sparta, which were destined to hold the 
power over the Greek world for several years. Under these circumstances and if we consider 
that the number of the Spartan citizens was in a constant decrease because of the strictness of 
the Spartan constitution, it is obvious that it would be much easier for the helots to attempt 
any kind of revolt, which caused the ever-growing fear of their masters. According to me, the 
narration of Thucydides should not be doubted and the history of Sparta should have been 
indeed determined by the constant phobos of their slaves. 
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When it comes to the way that this fear influenced the Spartan policy, I think that Thucydides 
is a great source of information about this fact. The historian delineates that Sparta was not 
interested in conquering cities by making them economic subjects like Athens did, but its 
foreign policy was based on the effort to settle oligarchies especially at its neighbour cities 
since the Spartans were afraid to leave Peloponnesus and attempt expeditions far away from 
home. Our historian is clear when he says that Sparta was suffering under two great fears, the 
fear of a possible helot revolt and the fear of the ever-growing power of Athens, which led 
also to the explosion of the Peloponnesian war. Under these circumstances, the Spartans 
developed a close and conservative state, not open to strangers and always willing to have a 
similar constitution with its subdued cities, in order to guarantee the security of the city. One 
cannot assume consequently that the Spartans were not seriously subdued by fear; it was this 
fear that determined the state of the Lacedaemonians and its development through history and 
its conservative and strict character was the one to guarantee the dominance of the city over 
all other Greek cities during the Peloponnesian War, except Athens of course. Consequently, 
one should not underestimate the important role that fear had for the Lacedaemonians; the 
Spartan phobos is very important, in order to understand the real character of the 
Lacedaemonian state, since it determined its development in a radical way.  
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Chapter 3. A tyrannical oligarchy. The concept of dynasteia 
One of the several ―deviations‖ of oligarchy, which arises from the work of the historian, is 
also the one of dynasteia, a non-constitutional form of government based on the sovereignty 
of the few. The term appears few times in the work of the historian, in order to characterize a 
very precise form of regime, which, even if it was not so popular as tyranny or oligarchy
230
, 
played, anyway, a significant role at the political development of some Greek cities. Apart 
from that, the research of dynasteia offers us the possibility to understand a bit more the 
variety of the oligarchic forms of government in the archaic and classical period. In the next 
few pages, I will try to understand as deeply as possible the characteristics of this form of 
government, as long as the importance of the Thucydidean narration for the understanding of 
this idea from the modern research. 
The city of Thebes and its medismos 
During the third year of the war (428/7) the city of Plataea was called upon to support its 
freedom from the long-lasting siege of the Spartans
231
. In the discussions, which emerged 
during the siege, the Plataeans made a long speech explaining to the Lacedaemonians, why 
they should be not attacked by them. On the other hand the delegates of Thebes, a city 
traditionally opposed to Plataeans because of their denial to submit to the Thebans, tried to 
explain to the Lacedaemonians, why the city of Plataea should be assaulted. The discussions 
ended with the decision of the Spartans to destroy completely Plataea. Between other 
arguments, however, which the Plataeans used, in order to support their right for freedom, 
occurs also the fact that during the Persian Wars their city was more useful against the enemy 
than the city of Thebes, which was known for betraying the Greek forces by offering to the 
Persians γῆλ θαί ὕδσξ. When the Thebans tried with passion to justify the reason for their 
κεδηζκόο during the Persian wars, an interesting information comes out for the past ways of 
governing of Thebes: 
―In our case the city was at that time not constituted either as an oligarchy with equality 
under the law or as a democracy (νὔηε θαη᾽ ὀιηγαξρίαλ ἰζόλνκνλ πνιηηεύνπζα νὔηε θαηὰ 
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δεκνθξαηίαλ), but affairs were managed by a cabal composed by few men (δπλαζηεία 
ὀιίγσλ ἀλδξ῵λ εἶρε ηὰ πξάγκαηα) – something at the opposite extreme to the rule of law 
and moderation in government, indeed closer to tyranny (ὅπεξ δέ ἐζηη λόκνηο κὲλ θαὶ ηῶ 
ζσθξνλεζηάηῳ ἐλαληηώηαηνλ, ἐγγπηάησ δὲ ηπξάλλνπ)‖232. 
Thucydides informs us that in the period of the Persian wars, Thebes was governed by a so-
called dynasteia oligon andron, a form of government, which is opposed both to oligarchy 
isonomos, i.e. an oligarchy, in which all citizens are equal in front of the laws
233
, and to 
democracy. The reason of the collaboration of the city with the Persians consequently is that 
Thebes was governed by an oppressive constitution, completely different from the two most 
common forms of government of the fifth century, democracy and oligarchy, both 
constitutions based on the sovereignty of law; it was not in the power of the citizens to resist 
the Persian King consequently. Thucydides highlights indeed in this passage that this form of 
government is closer to tyranny than to a lawful constitution. A closer approach to the 
constitution of Thebes in the period of the Persian wars can prove that there was indeed a 
small clique of citizens of Thebes, who collaborated with the Persians, as Herodotus informs 
us: 
 ―After the Hellenes buried their dead at Plataea, they at once held a conference at which 
they resolved to wage war on the Thebans and to demand from them the surrender of 
those who had medized (ἐμαηηέεηλ αὐη῵λ ηνὺο κεδίζαληαο). The most prominent of these 
were Timagenides and Attaginos, who were the leaders among their chief men (νἳ 
ἀξρεγέηαη ἀλὰ πξώηνπο ἦζαλ)‖234. 
The word ἀξρεγέηαη, i.e. the first leaders, also in the meaning of the founders of a city or 
family
235
, indicates probably the existence of a small group of men, who obviously decided to 
collaborate with the Persians in an authoritarian way without the common opinion of the 
demos. We know also that Thebes after this tyrannical-oligarchical period was governed by a 
democratic constitution (457-447) and that after the Athenian defeat in Koroneia in 447/6 the 
city returned to an oligarchical form of government
236
. It is, however, interesting, that 
between 382 and 379 the constitution of the city becomes once again a dynasteia, as 
Xenophon narrates: ―For in all of them (i.e. Thespiai and the cities around) oligarchical 
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governments had been established (δπλαζηεῖαη θαζεηζηήθεζαλ), just as in Thebes‖237. Even if 
we speak of a much later period of the history of the city than the period of the Persian Wars, 
the fact that a dynasteia re-appears after so many years in Thebes, especially in the period 
after the Peloponnesian War, in which such constitutions seem lost in the past, could signify 
the traditional connection that Thebes had with this kind of governing
238
. 
Brasidas, the Thessalians and the North Barbarians 
Thebes is, however, not the only city, which is connected with a dynasteia in the work of the 
historian. When Thucydides refers to the expedition of the Spartan Brasidas to Thessaly and 
the constitution that he found there, he mentions that: 
―Besides, the bulk of the Thessalian people had always been favourably disposed 
towards the Athenians. And so, if the Thessalians had not traditionally been governed 
by powerful ruling groups rather than enjoying equality before the law (ὥζηε εἰ κὴ 
δπλαζηείᾳ κᾶιινλ ἢ ἰζνλνκίᾳ ἐρξ῵λην ηὸ ἐγρώξηνλ νἱ Θεζζαινί), he would never have 
made any progress, since even as it was he was confronted on his march by Thessalians 
of the opposite persuasion. They stopped him at the River Enipeus and told him he had 
no right to go on without the consent of the whole community‖239. 
Thucydides explains very clearly that the reason, for which Brasidas was allowed to pass 
from Thessaly with his troops, was that at that period the region was governed by a dynasteia 
and not by an isonomia, i.e. a constitution based on the rule of law. In the very detailed work 
of Westlake on the history of Thessaly, it seems that the region was actually governed by a 
class of rich proprietors distributed through the principal cities processing most of the soil
240
. 
The theory of Thucydides about the existence of a dynasteia in Thessaly can be confirmed, 
consequently, if we consider that the power in the region was held by these rich landowners. 
A lawful government and especially a democracy would very hardly allow Brasidas to 
proceed through Thessaly if we consider also that the region was in this period friendly to 
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Athens
241
. When it comes to the constitution of Thessaly, I find very interesting the 
suggestion of Martin, who argues that till the middle of the fifth century the region had a 
rather loose organisation, based on the war and governed traditionally by the aristocratic 
families, who based their power on the exploitation of their slaves, called penestae. This 
should mean that the – from Thucydides mentioned – Thessalian dynasteia should have been 
a rather conservative constitution for the region and not a political clique of some few rich 
men, who aimed to overthrow an already established form of constitution, like in the other 
cases of dynasteia in the Thucydidean history
242
. Even if we consider this theory as possible, 
dynasteia is presented in this case anyway as a non-constitutional government with a lawless 
character. From the case of Thessaly we can understand that a constitution of this type is very 
similar to a tyranny; in a region ruled by this form of government there is no political 
consciousness but only chaos. 
At this point, I would like to add a rather controversial passage of Thucydides, where 
Brasidas makes a speech in front of his troop, in order to encourage them during the 
expedition of the Peloponnesians and Perdiccas (King of Macedonia) against Lynkestis 
(Greek kingdom of Upper Macedonia). During his speech he refers to the constitution of 
Sparta and to the reason, why the Spartan soldiers will manage to win the battle: 
―Do not fear their numbers, for you do not all come from states in which not many rule a 
few, but a few the many, having won their mastery only by military prowess‖ (νἵ γε κεδὲ 
ἀπὸ πνιηηεη῵λ ηνηνύησλ ἥθεηε, ἐλ αἷο νὐ πνιινὶ ὀιίγσλ ἄξρνπζηλ, ἀιιὰ πιεόλσλ κᾶιινλ 
ἐιάζζνπο, νὐθ ἄιιῳ ηηλὶ θηεζάκελνη ηὴλ δπλαζηείαλ ἢ ηῶ καρόκελνη θξαηεῖλ)‖243.  
This passage caused a great discordance between the researchers of the Thucydidean work 
about the real meaning of the words of the historian. The biggest problem of the modern 
analysis of this sentence is the admission of Brasidas that the Peloponnesians come from 
cities, where the many rule over the few when their enemies from the North come from cities, 
where the few rule over the many having won their dynasteia with their military skills. This 
phrase of the Spartan general may sound a bit strange, if we consider that especially Sparta 
was seen as a traditionally oligarchical society, in which the apella had a limited role at the 
important decisions of the city, in opposition to Athens, where the politeia was based on the 
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sovereignty of the demos. This is why several editors attempted emendations at the text (e.g. 
by changing νὐ πνιινί to νἱ πνιινί)244, which should indicate that the politeiai, in which the 
few rule over the many are the cities of Peloponnese. If we accept these changes of the text, 
then we should consider that Brasidas is congratulating his men for their achievement to win 
a privileged position, a dynasteia over the perioikoi and helots, a theory, which has been 
supported by several scholars
245
. In any case, in the light of the very negative meaning of this 
form of government in all the work can we consider this theory as a realistic one? 
I think that in this case, the dynasteia is actually a key-word, in order to understand the real 
meaning of this passage. Gomme especially, and after him also Hornblower and 
Hammond
246
, reject the emendation and keep the meaning of the original sentence. 
According to Gomme, the meaning of the text of Thucydides is the opposite of what has been 
supposed: ―Brasidas is slightingly referring to the large numbers of the enemy, who […] are 
no better than slaves of a small military clique, now being driven into battle by their 
rulers‖247. Gomme believes (and I agree with him) that the Peloponnesian troops (who were 
obviously not only Spartans) ―would not have recognized a description of themselves as 
citizens of states with military δπλαζηεῖαη at the head, and would not have been complimented 
by it, if they had: with them the majority, the sound hoplite burghers, did rule. Nor would 
Sparta itself have been so described by any but an enemy‖. I also believe that Brasidas, who 
does not hesitate to highlight during another encouragement speech the free spirit of the 
Peloponnesians
248
, would never connect his city with a tyrannical form of government, which 
in the antiquity had a clear negative meaning, as my text can show, especially when it comes 
to the encouragement of the Spartan troop before a difficult battle with the ―barbarians‖ from 
the North. In this case, consequently, the dynasteia refers, according to Gomme, ―to the small 
Argead ruling class among the Macedonians
249
 and similar chieftainships among the others‖. 
The theory of Gomme has been for sure revolutionary for the interpretation of the passage, 
which was established among the scholars for centuries with its first version and it is enough 
to mention that translations of the modern times still interpret the text by using the 
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emendations of the editors
250
. A further research on the term dynasteia, however, does not 
leave much space for doubts on this passage. Dynasteia is connected mainly with tyrannical 
forms of government of the ―barbaric‖ folks from the North (see above the example of 
Thessaly) or with constitutions of the past of the Greek city-states, which are often linked 
with black pages of their history. I cannot believe that Brasidas in his encouraging speech 
was referring to the Spartans or any other Peloponnesian city-state of the fifth century as 
cities based on the tyrannical dynasteia. 
Athenagoras and the dynasteia of Syracuse 
The idea of Thucydides about the tyrannical character of this constitution can be observed 
also in other two episodes of his work. In this speech, Athenagoras, the Syracusian leader of 
the commons, acknowledges that periodically the constitution of Syracuse, which in this 
period of its history happens to be democratic, gets destroyed from diverse staseis, i.e. 
internal conflicts, and overthrown by tyrannical forms of government: 
―There you have the reason why our city is rarely at peace but inflicts a multitude of 
conflicts and struggles (ζηάζεηο δὲ πνιιὰο θαὶ ἀγ῵λαο) not so much on its enemies as on 
itself, including sometimes tyrannies and oppressive cliques (ηπξαλλίδαο δὲ ἔζηηλ ὅηε θαὶ 
δπλαζηείαο ἀδίθνπο)‖251. 
Hornblower believes that this passage refers probably to the tyranny of Dionysius that came 
after and was the one to overthrow the democratic constitution in Syracuse in 405
252
. 
According to me, Athenagoras in this passage clarifies with his speech the opposition of the 
current constitution of his city not only with its future forms of government but also with its 
past ones. When it comes to the past of the Syracusian politics, one should note that the 
original constitution of the city was the aristocracy of Gamoroi
253
, who in Syracuse, in 
particular, were the wealthy land-owners, who constituted the class of the elite of the city, as 
we also can understand from the etymology connected probably with the word ‗ghe‘, 
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according to Powell‘s definition254. Herodotus informs us that the Gamoroi were exiled from 
Syracuse to the Syracusian colony of Kasmenai by the common people of the city and their 
slaves, the Cyllyrians and were called back from Gelon, to whom the demos handed over 
both itself and the polis
255
. Gelon took afterwards possession of the city of Syracuse and from 
that moment the city was ruled by the tyrant dynasty of the Dinomenids
256
. The tyranny was 
brought to an end in 466/5 when the Syracusans revolted against Thrasybulus, brother of 
Gelon and Hieron I and one of the subsequent tyrants of the first and expelled him
257
 
reintroducing in this way the democracy in the city
258
. When Thucydides speaks through 
Athenagoras of ―δπλαζηεῖαη ἄδηθνη‖, he refers probably to these powerful men of Syracuse, 
who possessed the power in the city in the past. Even if no further information about this type 
of government in Syracuse was provided to us, one can imagine the similarities of the 
Syracusan dynasteia with the other types of dynasteiai in the main continent; a clique of few 
men, who had the power and governed tyrannically. 
From Sophocles to Aristotle: a rapid look through the other sources 
Thucydides alludes to three different examples of dynasteia in the Greek world, all of them 
based on the same principle: the idea of a constitution of few (wealthy) men, who hold power 
in the city, comparable with a sort of tyranny and in opposition to other forms of constitution 
ordained by law. Actually, the term dynasteia
259
 derives from the noun δύλακηο, i.e. ‗strength, 
power‘260 and indicates in a general sense the dominion of a more or less arbitrary power261. 
When it comes to its political interpretation, the term is considered as a synonym of tyranny, 
as Thucydides mentions in his sixth book through the words of Alcibiades: 
 ―My family has always been opposed to tyrants (ηνῖο γὰξ ηπξάλλνηο) (and every form of 
opposition to absolute power gets identified as ―the people‘s party‖) (πᾶλ δὲ ηὸ 
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ἐλαληηνύκελνλ ηῶ δπλαζηεύνληη δῆκνο ὠλόκαζηαη), so as a consequence we have retained 
the leadership of the masses‖262. 
In the discussion of the famous Athenian politician in Sparta during the Sicilian expedition, 
which aims to convince the Spartans to send forces to Syracuse against the Athenians, 
Alcibiades parallelizes dynasteia to tyrannical forms of government, which are defined from 
the speaker as the opposite to democracy. The contradiction between dynasteia and 
democracy gets expressed, for example, also by Isocrates, who in his Panegyricus makes a 
reference to the period of the Athenian hegemony, during which Athens tried to guard the 
interests of the whole confederacy by supporting the plethos (people) and making war on the 
dynasteiai
263
. The difference between dynasteia and democracy is highlighted also in one of 
Democritus‘ fragments, where the philosopher in his ―hymn‖ for democracy mentions that 
―poverty under a democracy (ἡ ἐλ δεκνθξαηίεη πελίε) is much more desirable than the so-
called happiness under a dynasteia (ηῆο παξὰ ηνῖο δπλάζηεηζη θαιενκέλεο εὐδαηκνλίεο), as 
much as liberty is more desirable than slavery‖264. ―Δπλαζηεύεηλ is the exercise of power 
unrestricted by a constitution or code of laws‖, so Dover265. How is the term defined, 
however, in the anterior and contemporary sources of the Peloponnesian War? 
When it comes to the other ancient sources, dynasteia is not frequently used by the precedent 
scholars of Thucydides. The earliest written evidence for the term can be found in the tragedy 
of Sophocles‘ Oedipus Tyrannus. During a discussion between the protagonist and Creon, the 
second mentions that: 
―How, then, could royalty be sweeter to me to have (π῵ο δῆη᾽ ἐκνὶ ηπξαλλὶο ἡδίσλ ἔρεηλ) 
than painless rule and influence? (ἀξρῆο ἀιύπνπ θαὶ δπλαζηείαο ἔθπ;)‖266 
According to Jordović, dynasteia in this passage ―unambiguously refers to the rule of an 
individual, which is at the same time termed tyranny‖267. I will agree with the scholar: the 
term does not indicate in this case a tyrannical regime of the few. 
It is, also, interesting that Herodotus uses the verb δπλαζηεύσ several times in his work, in 
order to express the power of the ruling men, who constitute the elite of a city and can have 
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an influence also on the development of the political history of their region, like the example 
of the concurrence between Cleisthenes and Isagoras can show. In this case, the two powerful 
Athenian citizens (δύν ἄλδξεο ἐδπλάζηεπνλ), both of them with ancestry of the Athenian 
nobility of the sixth century, were involved in a struggle for power between them after the 
overthrow of Athenian tyrant Hippias
268
. It is also notable that, when the historian speaks of 
the arrival of Aristagoras in Athens, in order to ask for help against the Persian Achaemenid 
Empire, Herodotus mentions that the choice of the city was not randomly, since Athens ―was 
more powerful than any of the rest (η῵λ ινηπέσλ ἐδπλάζηεπε κέγηζηνλ)‖269. In this case the 
term δπλαζηεύσ indicates the superiority of power of a whole city and not of an individual. 
Even though dynasteia as a formed political constitution is obviously non-existent in the 
Herodotean thought, the use of the δπλαζηεύσ as a verb combined with power, which can 
have sometimes also political shades, as Powell justly remarks
270
, indicates that the idea of a 
few individuals or even a city, which dominate with a superior power exists already from the 
beginning of the fifth century, even if the term dynasteia is not defined yet. 
Apart from Sophocles and Herodotus, I have not noticed any other scholar, antecedent of 
Thucydides, who uses the dynasteia or the verbal form of it in a political way. It can be a 
strange fact if someone considers that dynasteia refers many times to constitutions of the 
past, like the case of Cleisthenes in Herodotus, but also the cases of Thebes and Syracuse in 
Thucydides proved. On the other hand, there are several sources, contemporary and 
subsequent to our historian, which try to define the term and understand its meaning. The 
most important authors to define the concept of dynasteia are for sure Plato and Aristotle. 
According to Plato, dynasteia can be parallelized to a tyrannical form of government
271
, 
which derives from the past (the period of time, in which Plato refers, is not definable in the 
―Laws‖), but has no political existence in the present of the Athenian reality of the Platonic 
times, even if it still exists in some cases among both Greeks and barbarians
272
. As for the 
characteristics of this constitution, the dynasteia appears in the list of Plato of the several 
constitutions after monarchy and before democracy (θαὶ κεηὰ κνλαξρίαλ εἴπνη ηηο ἂλ νἶκαη ηὴλ 
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ὑπὸ η῵λ ὀιίγσλ δπλαζηείαλ)273, when the attribute ὑπὸ η῵λ ὀιίγσλ indicates probably the 
existence of a few powerful men, who constitute the ruling power of the constitution. It is 
very interesting that in the ―Laws‖ of Plato, the dynasteia seems to be the ―father-
constitution‖ of aristocracy and kingship (ἀξηζηνθξαηίαλ ηηλὰ ἐθ η῵λ δπλαζηεη῵λ πνηήζαληεο ἢ 
θαί ηηλα βαζηιείαλ)274.  
One should mention at this point that the orator Lysias defines the ruling classes in Athens 
before the democratic period of the city
275
, during which the government of Athens was 
constituted by magistrates appointed from the rich and well-born
276
, as dynasteiai
277
. The 
parenthood of dynasteia with the traditional aristocratic and monarchical forms of 
government indicates for sure that this constitution is based on the power of some few rich 
and powerful men with absolute power, in the same way as ἀξηζηνθξαηία is the constitution 
based on the rule of the ―aristoi‖, the best-born278. I will not agree with the theory of Martin 
that ―Platon unterscheidet sich von den übrigen Autoren, dadurch, daß bei ihm Reichtum als 
Voraussetzung für die frühe dynasteia und die Konnotation von Tyrannis fehlen―279. A 
constitution, so strictly connected with the aristocracy, i.e. the conservative elitist classes, is 
most likely directly connected with wealth too. Moreover the connection with the basileia 
confirms that Plato has probably a very similar concept of the term as Thucydides; he 
interprets dynasteia as a tyrannical form of constitution, based on the hereditary ruling power 
of the few wealthy men and totally opposed to the actual constitution of Athens, i.e. the 
democracy. 
If one has to draw forth from Plato the meaning of dynasteia as a political constitution, from 
the text of Aristotle one can understand much easier and in a very detailed way how the 
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philosopher understood this constitution and through his point of view also the idea that 
existed about this way of governing in the fourth century at least. According to the definition 
of the philosopher: 
―Another variety of oligarchy is when son succeeds father in office; and a fourth kind is 
when the hereditary system just mentioned exists and also the magistrates govern and not 
the law (ἄξρῃ κὴ ὁ λόκνο ἀιι᾽ νἱ ἄξρνληεο). This among oligarchies is the form 
corresponding to tyranny among monarchies and to the form of democracy about which 
we spoke last among democracies
280
, and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special 
name of dynasty (θαὶ θαινῦζη δὴ ηὴλ ηνηαύηελ ὀιηγαξρίαλ δπλαζηείαλ)‖281. 
In these few lines, Aristotle summarizes the characteristics of a dynasteia
282
; it is all about a 
form of an oligarchical constitution, which is based on the power of the few rulers and not on 
the sovereignty of the law, as it would happen in the case of a typical oligarchy
283
. This type 
of ―collective dictatorship‖, as Stalley so accurately mentions284, can be understood better 
through an example that Aristotle himself uses. Concretely, Aristotle defines the regime of 
the thirty tyrants imposed by the Spartans after their victory over Athens at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War in 404
285
, a regime known for its cruel and oppressive tactics, as 
dynasteia
286
. If we consider that also the logographer Andocides defines in one of his 
speeches the regime of the Four Hundred Athenian oligarchs, which managed to take power 
in Athens in 411 and overthrow the democracy in the city
287
, as dynasteia
288
, one can 
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understand that this term, which originally derived from the past decades, is used also in the 
fifth and fourth century, in order to describe tyrannical constitutions, which are governed not 
by one and only tyrant but by few important citizens. 
Furthermore, Aristotle speaks also of the conditions, which can lead to an overthrow of a 
constitution and the establishment of a dynasteia. First of all, a dynasteia can rise, when the 
influence of one or more people on the city and its citizens manages to become stronger than 
the influence of the demos
289
. Secondly, when the rich men manage to become richer and 
their properties become wealthier
290
. Thirdly, when under oligarchical constitutions, the 
ruling class uses mercenaries instead of its own citizens for its expeditions in times of war 
because of the lack of trust between the governors and the demos; the lack of trust in the city-
core may lead to the leader of the mercenary army to overthrow the constitution and establish 
tyranny or to some few important soldiers of the troop to establish a dynasteia
291
. 
Additionally, when under an aristocratic form of government a clique of citizens manages to 
bring upon some, even small ones, constitutional changes in the city, which gradually can 
cause bigger changes and even the overthrow of the constitution, like the example of Thurii 
in South Italy can prove
292
. Furthermore, dynasteiai rise also, when the existing constitution 
of the city does not try to involve ever more citizens in the public offices, but distributes them 
to the few; in this case ever fewer citizens receive a public salary for their contribution at the 
koina of the city and the conversion of an oligarchy to a dynasteia is very probable
293
. Last 
but not least, Aristotle mentions that, in order to avoid the conversion of aristocratic and 
oligarchic constitutions to dynasteiai, the governors of the afore-mentioned constitutions 
should be authorized to stay in power for brief periods and not long-lasting ones
294
.   
The modern interpretations 
On the other hand, when it comes to the modern bibliography, I have to admit that the 
research on the term dynasteia in the fifth century is rather limited. I consider as the most 
important works on this subject the articles of Bearzot and Walsh. According to Bearzot, 
when the term dynasteia (including its derivatives δπλάζηεο and δπλαζηεύσ) gets combined 
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with political movements and constitutions, expresses originally the idea of an authority, able 
to impose itself, but not necessarily in an arbitrary way
295
. This is also the way, in which 
Herodotus conceives this idea with the use of the verb δπλαζηεύσ, which ―esprime di norma 
l‘idea della preminenza di un singolo o di un gruppo, dovuto a un potere di fatto, all‘interno 
di una città (V 66; VI 35,3; 66,7; IX 2,11), senza che emergano peraltro risvolti di 
illegittimità, oppure, in un caso, quella della preminenza di una città, Atene, fra le altre (V 
97,5)‖. If one follows this idea, consequently, the term dynasteia can express, according to 
Bearzot, many different aspects of power; the absolute power of an individuum, the 
hegemony of a single city on others, the political power on a territorial or dynastic base. 
According to Bearzot consequently, dynasteia appears to have also a lawful nature, when the 
word gets connected with constutions of a monarchic nature, like, for example, the one of the 
king Amyntas III, father of Philip.
296
 
Bearzot admits, however, that dynasteia can be interpreted both as a tyranny of a single man, 
according to the example of Syracuse, and as the extreme illegal oligarchy, like Thucydides, 
Plato and Aristotle have noticed
297
. I can imagine that the scholar, in the case of Syracuse, 
refers to the tyrannical period of the city, during which the city was ruled by one leading 
figure, but I believe that the period of dynasteia in the Sicilian city concerns another period of 
its political history. Like already analysed, the reference of Athenagoras to δπλαζηείαο 
ἀδίθνπο, which caused struggles and conflicts in the inside of Syracuse is probably connected 
with the existence of the so-called Gamoroi, the conservative elite of the city and not with the 
period of the tyrannical governing in Syracuse. Besides, if Thucydides had referred to the 
tyranny of one man when speaking of the politics of Syracuse, why would he then have 
spoken clearly of ―ηπξαλλίδαο […] θαὶ δπλαζηείαο ἀδίθνπο‖? I think that in this case the 
conjunction θαὶ indicates the existence of two different forms of constitution. When it comes 
to the definition of dynasteia as an absolute oligarchy, Bearzot mentions that especially the 
illegality of this type of governing is expressed mainly through its contradiction to forms of 
government based on the concept of isonomia, and especially to democracy, like the texts of 
Democritus, the cases of Thebes and Thessaly and the discussion of Alcibiades can show
298
. 
In any case, dynasteia is considered from the ancient sources as an exceptional example, 
which cannot be considered as a constitutional form of government. The same opinion 
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expressed also Martin, who, following the Aristotelian way of thinking, argues that dynasteia 
cannot be considered as a constitution, because of its obvious parallelism with tyrannical 
forms of government
299
. I will agree with the observation of Bearzot and Martin: both 
Thucydides and Plato highlight the despotic and not constitutional character of dynasteia, 
when Aristotle characterizes this form of government as the last and most extreme form of 
oligarchy, characterized from the lack of laws. 
The second important article on dynasteia, even if the scholar concentrates in this case on the 
concept of the term in Aristotle in particular, is for sure the one of Walsh. The author 
mentions that ―dunasteia is reserved for when the oligarchy exercises its authority to a high 
degree. It is when men become supreme instead of the law that Aristotle recognizes 
dunasteia, the critical condition of dunasteia.‖300 Dynasteia is in other words in the 
Aristotelian thought ―an abuse of authority‖ 301. According to Walsh, this radical expression 
of oligarchy emerges after the failure of democratic regimes
302
, as the tyrannies of the Four 
Hundred in 411 and of the Thirty in 404 in Athens can prove. What is here important for 
Walsh and is also important, in order to understand the difference of the ancient dynasteia 
with the subsequent ones, as I have already noticed, is the fact that ―dynastic power is not 
characterized by successive, but by excessive rule
303‖. Dynasteia is defined from Walsh as 
the equivalent of tyranny, even though in this case it is a tyranny of more than one man, 
which is outside the bounds of the constitutional, as Bearzot also noticed.  
The opposition between dynasteia and democracy is highlighted also by Vlastos, who notices 
that the rule of law is the determinant factor, which distinguishes the non-isonomic states, 
where the rulers have the ―ability to act without restraint of law and force their own arbitrary 
will upon the governed pushing them into a course of action for which they cannot be held 
responsible, since they lacked the power to accept or reject it for themselves‖, like the 
dynasteia, from a democratic one, ―where power belongs to the people, and officials do not 
decide the policies of the state but administer the policies which the people decide‖304. I 
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believe that the rule of law is the one to distinguish dynasteia also from the oligarchical forms 
of government. Even though oligarchies are not based on the sovereignty of the demos, they 
are for sure constitutions based on the use of good laws and this is one of the reasons for their 
connection with eunomia
305
. It has to be clear that oligarchy and dynasteia are two 
completely opposed forms of government and the reason for that is the importance that the 
rule of law has for the formation of the state. Indeed, Ostwald gives a very accurate definition 
of the term: ―The narrowest kind of oligarchy is more properly called a ―clique‖ (δπλαζηεία), 
in which wealth and a network of relationships are the self-perpetuating constitutional factor, 
it is a rule of men and not of laws‖306. 
Conclusions: a despotic form of government of the past? 
In these few pages I have tried to summarize the different theories of the modern 
bibliography on the idea of dynasteia, but, the information on this subject is limited, because 
of the fact that the term was handled to a limited degree already from the antiquity. Like 
already said, the main sources of dynasteia are Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, all sources 
of the fifth and fourth century, when the term refers mainly to forms of government of the 
prior centuries of the Peloponnesian War and this is for sure not a coincidence. According to 
me, this observation is directly connected with the fact that the ancient writers of the sixth 
century and some of the fifth were not so interested to define the diverse political systems in 
Greece, like Plato and mainly Aristotle do. Not even Thucydides is interested to define 
specifically the terminology of the diverse constitutions like it can be seen in several other 
chapters of my work. He speaks of this idea as something that the contemporaries already 
know and understand instantly. I think consequently, that dynasteia was defined and handled 
as a formed political term especially from the scholars of the end of the fifth and fourth 
century, even though the regime should have been developed mainly at the archaic period, 
during which the tyrannical forms of government were in their acme.  
When it comes to the definition of the term, I think that the sources leave us no other choice 
than to understand dynasteia as a hereditary, non-constitutional form of government, which is 
based on the ruling power of some few wealthy men. It is equivalent to tyranny and, 
according to Plato, the father-constitution of aristocracy and kingship, when Thucydides 
highlights its opposition to “isonomic” constitutions based on the sovereignty of law, like 
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oligarchy and democracy. In a few words, dynasteia is opposed to the rule of law and to the 
constitutional order. I will agree with the definition of the term by Graves as ―a narrow 
oligarchy or πνιπθέθαινο ηπξαλλίο (a many-headed tyrannis)‖307. When it comes to the 
period of its existence in the political scene of ancient Greece, I think that the examples of 
Thebes, Syracuse, but also the constant comparison of the term to traditional aristocratic and 
tyrannical forms of government, which belong mainly to the archaic period, indicate a form 
of government, which derives from the past. This fact does not exclude, however, the re-
appearance of the dynasteia in the next centuries of Greek history, even though Plato insists 
that this narrow oligarchy has no political existence in the present of the Athenian reality. The 
tyranny of the Four Hundred in 411, as long as the one of the Thirty after the defeat of the 
Athenian army in the Peloponnesian War in 404, are parallelised from Andocides and 
Aristotle correspondingly with dynasteiai, since both of them are based on the tyrannical 
governing of few men with absolute power, who derive basically from the conservative 
oligarchic circles of the city. The case of Thessaly indicates also the presence of a dynasteia 
in the period of the Peloponnesian War. I believe consequently that dynasteia is probably a 
form of government developed in the archaic period, which re-appears in the fifth century 
under specific circumstances, which foster the overthrow of the ἔλλνκνη πνιηηεῖαη 
(constitutions based on the rule of law) and the establishment of absolute forms of 
government, based on the ruling power of the oligoi; the extreme brutality of the war does not 
leave much space for the development of ―healthy‖ constitutions in the Greek city-states. 
In the final analysis, I think that even though Thucydides does not make a detailed 
terminological analysis of dynasteia as Aristotle does, his work is fundamental, in order to 
understand the concept of this narrow oligarchy not only in the period of the Peloponnesian 
War but also in the years before it. If we consider that the term is mentioned rarely in other 
sources before Thucydides, one can easily understand the importance of the History for the 
understanding of the term and its subsequent definition from Plato and Aristotle. I think that 
in this case, even if the work of our historian can be in no case characterized as a political 
study, Thucydides manages to contribute in a determinant way on the comprehension of the 
political system of dynasteia by the ancient Greek thinkers by offering his subsequent writers 
a relatively complete definition of the term and its political presence in the Greek political 
scene of the sixth and fifth century. 
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Chapter 4. Internal political division in the Greek polis of the fifth century. 
The Thucydidean concept of hetaireia 
The Corcyraean Civil War 
In the year 427, in the heart of the Archidamian War (431-421), a dramatic civil war 
exploded on the island of Corcyra308. Corcyra was traditionally a region of internal disunity: 
one should not forget the cruel conflict between the metropole Corinth and its colony Corcyra 
some years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (435-431), which ended with the 
defeat of the first
309
. The historical background of the island as a Corinthian colony had, on 
the one hand, as a consequence the influence of the oligarchical Corinth on the city; on the 
other hand, the alliance of the island with Athens, a treaty, which was also to the Athenians‘ 
advantage, given that the Peloponnesian war was arriving and the last needed Corcyra as an 
ally because of its potent navy
310
, brought out the democratic character of the island. A 
situation like this developed consequently a fertile ground for internal conflicts already from 
the beginning of the war. The returning of the Corcyraean captives, who were captured by the 
Corinthians in the battleship of Sybota311, which took place between both cities in the year 
433, however, gave the chance to the different ideologies of the city to explode and lead the 
island to one of the cruellest civil wars in history. The captives, influenced by the oligarchic 
Corinthians, took the proxenos of Athens, Peithias, to trial by accusing him of intending to 
enslave Corcyra to Athens. Peithias got acquitted, started another trial against the five 
oligarchs, who he accused, but got killed together with other 60 members of the parliament of 
the Corcyraean boule by the afore-mentioned oligarchs, who managed to take also the control 
of the ecclesia.  
The conflict may have finished with the victory of the democrats, but Thucydides is not really 
interested in the victor; much more than this, he is interested to enter in the deeper layers of 
the internal conflict of the island, in order to understand the real motives of such a bloodshed 
and in this way to comprehend – as much as possible – the human nature. This is why he 
dedicates a large part of his third book on the narration of the events in Corcyra. The most 
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interesting part of his narration, however, is concentrated on his so-called ―pathology‖312, 
where the historian explains the consequences of the civil war on the behaviour of its 
participants and the way that this type of war managed to demonstrate the cruellest character 
of them. Thucydides delineates continuously the peculiarity of a war so awful that led even 
fathers to kill their own sons and beggars to get murdered inside of sanctuaries. The aim of 
this chapter of my work is to understand the consequences that this internal conflict had on 
the politics of Corcyra and through this example on the politics of the Greek world in general. 
Can one speak of an internal political division of the Greek polis after the civil war in 
Corcyra? 
The hetaireiai and their characteristics 
In his pathology inter alia Thucydides mentions the following:  
―The man who devised a successful plot was intelligent, the one who detected it still 
cleverer; but the man who thought ahead to try and find some different option was a 
threat to party loyalty (ηῆο ηε ἑηαηξίαο δηαιπηὴο) and must have been intimidated by his 
opponents‖313. 
In this passage, Thucydides speaks clearly of the existence of the so-called ἑηαηξεῖαη314 (from 
ἑηαῖξνο, i.e. comrade companion)315. Even if the term can indicate any form of association or 
‗brotherhood‘316, in the case of the civil war of Corcyra the word seems to have a political 
meaning. Thucydides speaks of the hetaireiai and their action as a self-evident fact, even if it 
is the first time in his work that he speaks of them. These types of associations did not only 
exist during the civil war but got also threatened by their partisans, who were not willing to 
be as cruel and violent as their co-ideologists. It is strange how Thucydides speaks for the 
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first time in his work of an association, which seems to have been formed completely during 
the civil war. How could one, however, arrive at the conclusion that Thucydides speaks of 
political clubs in this particular case? 
At first, one should comprehend deeper the events of the civil war, in order to understand the 
character of these political clubs, which I will call factions317 from now on. According to the 
historian:  
―Such was the savage progress of the civil strife (ζηάζηο)318, and it seemed all the worse 
because it was the first of its kind, though later practically the whole Greek world was in 
turmoil as everywhere there were rival efforts by the leaders of the populace (ηνῖο ηε η῵λ 
δήκσλ πξνζηάηαηο) to bring in the Athenians and by the oligarchs (ηνῖο ὀιίγνηο) to bring in 
the Spartans‖319. 
This phrase, with which Thucydides starts his pathology, makes clear the character of the 
Corcyraean civil war; the city is divided into two parts, the demos (the populace) and the 
oligoi (the few), each part of which participated in the war with the help of the Athenians and 
the Spartans correspondingly. This development indicates that the civil war in Corcyra was 
deeply political since the two different political mentalities of Athens and Sparta have an 
important role during the war. The political character of the civil war is expressed also further 
down in the pathology: 
―Indeed, the ties of family became less close than those of party since party members (θαὶ 
κὴλ θαὶ ηὸ μπγγελὲο ηνῦ ἑηαηξηθνῦ ἀιινηξηώηεξνλ ἐγέλεην) had no inhibitions about any 
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venture. Their associations did not exist to promote welfare in accordance with 
established laws but to subvert the law for selfish advantage‖320. 
Once more Thucydides uses hetaireia (this time as an adjective), in order to express the 
importance that these factions gained during the civil war; the partisan ties became more 
important than the family ones, since the cruelty of the war led the members of these factions 
to violent behaviours, in order to gain power and accomplish the interests of the faction. It is 
not the first time that the historian seems to take for granted the importance of these factions 
for the development of the civil war, even if these groups are not evident in his former books. 
When it comes to the intentions of the leaders of these factions, Thucydides mentions further 
down that: 
―The leaders in the various cities (νἱ γὰξ ἐλ ηαῖο πόιεζη πξνζηάληεο) would each of them 
adopt specious slogans (κεηὰ ὀλόκαηνο ἑθάηεξνη εὐπξεπνῦο) professing the cause either of 
‗political equality for the masses‘ (πιήζνπο ηε ἰζνλνκίαο πνιηηηθῆο) or ‗aristocracy – the 
government of moderation‘ (ἀξηζηνθξαηίαο ζώθξνλνο); they pretended in their speeches 
to be competing for the public good, but in fact in their struggle to dominate each other 
by any available means they brazenly committed all manner of atrocities and perpetrated 
even worse acts of revenge, with no regard for the constraints of justice and the public 
interest‖321. 
I believe that Thucydides expresses in this part his ―raw‖ opinion about the role that these 
factions had during the civil war; they were formed with the mask of a political direction 
when in reality they were only interested to serve their personal interests and not the interests 
of the commonweal. The slogans that each faction used, in order to couch their self-serving 
purpose, were directly combined with the political character of the two protagonists of the 
war, Athens, and Sparta, which were more than willing to intervene in the civil war and gain 
more benefits as possible from the Corcyraean bloodshed. Under these circumstances, the 
interpretation of the hetaireiai as a political model of faction is more than obvious; even if the 
purpose of these factions was to serve their personal interests like already said, the political 
character of them is incontrovertible. Consequently, how could we define the hetaireiai in the 
Thucydidean world and what was their character in the fifth century? 
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In the research of the diverse meanings of the word in the work of Thucydides, one could get 
confused from the so diverse interpretations that hetaireia and its derivatives can have. The 
use of this idea in a political way can be noted, however, only in a few passages of the 
Thucydidean History. It is remarkable that hetaireia as a political faction gets mentioned in 
the first place from the historian during his narration of the Corcyraean civil war and it 
reappears again in his eighth book when Thucydides narrates the events of 411 in Athens and 
the coup of the 400. The total defeat of the Sicilian expedition in the year 413 left Athens 
economically and psychologically devastated. This disaster induced in the city the fear of a 
possible invasion from the enemies that they had in Sicily and Greece. This insecurity that 
was caused in Athens was the perfect excuse that incited the oligarchic circles of the city to 
―wound‖ the Athenian form of constitution. The way that these circles managed – with the 
help of Alcibiades inter alia – to overthrow the constitution and impose a parliament body of 
400 with full authority is extremely long322. What is important at this point of the research is 
the way that Thucydides uses hetaireia in this historical context. It is characteristic that all 
three times that Thucydides uses the term in his eighth book he refers to the oligarchic circles 
of Athens, which planned and carried through the overthrow of democracy. When he speaks 
of the organisation of the coup from the Athenian generals barracked at Samos, he mentions 
that it was organized from the political associations on the island, which wanted the 
replacement of the Athenian democratic constitution with an oligarchical one.  
―[…] while those who were trying to establish the oligarchy (νἱ δὲ μπληζηάληεο ηὴλ 
ὀιηγαξρίαλ), after they had communicated this message to the masses, returned to 
examining Alcibiades‘ proposals among themselves and with a wider circle of their 
membership (ηνῦ ἑηαηξηθνῦ)‖323. 
The existence of the term ὀιηγαξρία with the idea of ἑηαηξεία in the same phrase indicates for 
sure a connection of these political factions with an oligarchic ideology. The story continues 
with the establishment of oligarchy in Athens; the contacts of the oligarchic circles of Samos 
with the ones in Athens provoked the organization of the coup of 411 and the overthrow of 
democracy: 
―Peisander and his colleagues sailed along the coast, unseating the popular parties from 
power (ηνὺο δήκνπο ἐλ ηαῖο πόιεζη θαηέιπνλ), as agreed. At some places they also got 
hoplites to join forces with them and arrived at Athens with these in support. There they 
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found that most of their work had already been done by their associates (ηνῖο 
ἑηαίξνηο)‖324. 
Once more the political factions seem to be connected with the overthrow of democracy and 
the oligarchic circles of the city, as also the example of the arrest of Alexicles from the 
Athenian soldiers at the period of the construction of the wall of Eetioneia, can show: 
―The hoplites in the Peiraeus who were working on the fortification of Eëtoneia […] 
made an arrest. They seized Alexicles, a general from the oligarchy (ζηξαηεγὸλ ὄληα ἐθ 
ηῆο ὀιηγαξρίαο) who was especially close to those in the political cabals (πξὸο ηνὺο 
ἑηαίξνπο ηεηξακκέλνλ), led him off and confined him in a private house‖325. 
Like already said, Thucydides uses the term hetaireia in a political sense in two different 
periods of the war; the civil war in Corcyra and the overthrow of the Athenian constitution in 
411. However, he does not interpret the term in the same way in both circumstances. In the 
case of Corcyra, the hetaireia is referred to political factions in general, but no connection 
with an oligarchical ideology can be noted. On the other hand, in the case of the oligarchic 
coup in Athens, the term is combined clearly with the oligarchical circles of the city, which 
wanted to overthrow democracy. How does Thucydides, consequently, understand the 
hetaireia as a political association of the fifth century? 
Hetaireiai in the ancient literature 
In order to answer the afore-mentioned question, a research on the antecedent and 
contemporary sources is more than important. Hetaireia as a term appears in different 
meanings. Like already seen, the word, except for its political meaning, can stand for any 
type of association. This means that the term is used also before Thucydides, but in which 
sense actually? It is characteristic, that Herodotus, the ―ancestor‖ of Thucydides, uses the 
term only once in his Histories326 when he describes the story of the Cylonian Affair, i.e. the 
attempt of Cylon of Athens to overthrow the Athenian democracy and impose a tyrannical 
form of government327. During this attempt, Cylon gathered a company (ἑηαηξίελ) of men of 
like age in order to seize the citadel. The political character of the attempt gives for sure a 
political shade at the meaning of the word, but at this period of history one cannot speak of a 
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real political faction; Herodotus narrates the story of one aspirant tyrant who wanted to take 
the power away from the state with violence and the company, which encircled him seems 
more a group of – maybe – unsatisfied citizens than an organized political association, which 
acts with the support of a part of the society. Apart from that, the word is mentioned only 
once in the work of Herodotus, as already mentioned, which means that it should have not 
been a very common word for the first half of the fifth century. One cannot characterize 
consequently the ―Herodotean‖ hetaireia in the same way as the ―Thucydidean‖ one, i.e. as 
an organized political faction, which acts with the support of a noteworthy part of the polis328. 
The main source before Thucydides does not mention the word in the same way as our 
historian consequently. But what happens with the contemporary sources of Thucydides? 
Plato, for example, mentions hetaireia several times, some of them in a clear political 
meaning. When he speaks of the cases of dissolution of the polity in his Laws, he offers to us 
a clear definition of hetaireia: 
―Whosoever enslaves the laws by making them subject to men, and makes the State 
subject to a faction (ἑηαηξίαο), and acts illegally in doing all this by violence and in 
stirring up civil strife,—such a man must be deemed the worst of all enemies to the whole 
State‖329. 
The reference of Plato to the hetaireiai in this phrase could remind us of the way that the 
Athenian constitution was overthrown in 411. In this case, Plato speaks clearly of the 
existence of factions, which in some cases manage to act illegally and stir up civil strife. 
Adam comments on this idea of Plato that in Plato‘s Republic, when the philosopher speaks 
once again of the hetaireiai330, he makes ―an allusion to the political life of Athens and that 
―in the laws, he would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand‖331, which 
means that for Plato these factions not only existed but were also powerful in the political life 
of Athens: 
―But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the 
footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies 
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and political clubs (ζπλσκνζίαο ηε θαὶ ἑηαηξίαο), and there are teachers of cajolery who 
impart the arts of the popular assembly and the court-room‖332. 
The period of the end of the Peloponnesian War and the years after can be even more 
characterized as a time of political division and a constant coming into being of political 
factions, as Xenophon narrates in his Hellenica333. In his second book, when the historian 
describes the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens in 404 and the conviction of 
Theramenes, one of the coup instigators, Xenophon speaks clearly of ἑηαῖξνη, when he refers 
to the oligarchic associates of the tyrannical form of government, imposed to Athens by the 
Spartans and the Athenian oligarchic circles334. According to Underhill, Xenophon refers to 
―the members of the oligarchic clubs through whose influence the Revolution of the Four 
Hundred had been effected‖335. It is not a coincidence, according to me, that Xenophon, who 
with his Hellenica continues the narration of the Peloponnesian War after Thucydides, uses 
the same word, in order to describe the political clubs that were formed in Athens after the 
establishment of a tyrannical form of oligarchy in 404, in the same way that Thucydides 
described the political factions formed under an equivalent form of government in Athens, 
i.e. the establishment of the oligarchic constitution of the Four Hundred in the year 411. The 
existence of these political factions seems even more clear in the first half of the fourth 
century when Xenophon speaks clearly of the existence of two completely formed hetaireiai 
in Thebes, one anti-spartan with leader Ismenias and one oligarchic with leader Leontiades, 
who were at variance with each other.336 Underhill comments on this passage that ―these were 
political clubs or secret societies organized for party purposes, ἐπὶ δίθαηο θαὶ ἀξραῖο, and 
naturally were more active in times of stasis.‖337 One can see consequently an evolution of 
these factions from Thucydides to Xenophon; the more the time passes and the more the 
Greek cities get even more fragmented, the more formed and stable become these political 
clubs.  
The interpretation of hetaireia as a political faction in the fourth century can be verified also 
in the text of the orator Isocrates. In his Panegyricus, Isocrates speaks of the glorified 
ancestors, which formed the generation of the Persian Wars, which:  
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―organized their political clubs (ηὰο ἑηαηξείαο) not for the personal advantage, but for the 
benefit of the people‖338. 
The hetaireiai mentioned here do not correspond to the political factions of the fourth 
century, but to political clubs of the past, which, according to Norlin, ―are here no doubt 
idealized to point the contrast to the selfish intrigues of the present‖339. The idealization of the 
period of the Persian Wars, a period of glory and patriotism for the Greek world, is 
commonly known in the Greek literature; according to this idea, the hetaireiai of the past 
should do not correspond to real political factions, but are compared to the factions of the 
present, which serve the personal interests of the partisans and not the commonweal, as the 
glorious idealized associations of the Persian wars once did; the same idea gets expressed 
also from Thucydides, when he speaks of the hetaireiai of the Corcyraean civil war340. 
Last but not least, one should not ignore in the research of hetaireia, the way that the word 
gets used from Aristotle. It is not a coincidence that the philosopher uses the term with the 
meaning of a political faction when he analyses his theory about the ways, in which an 
oligarchy can be overthrown. In two of these passages, he combines hetaireiai clearly with 
the political clubs developed in Athens in the period of the Thirty tyrants341. Actually, in his 
Athenaion Politeia342 Aristotle clearly combines these political factions with the oligarchic 
circles of the city, who wanted the establishment of an oligarchical way of governing under 
the power of the Thirty Tyrants after the Athenian defeat in Aegospotami
343
: 
―The peace having been concluded on terms of their carrying on the government 
according to the ancestral constitution, the popular party (νἱ δεκνηηθνὶ) endeavored to 
preserve the democracy (δηαζῴδεηλ ἐπεηξ῵λην ηὸλ δῆκνλ), but the notables who belonged 
                                                          
338
 Isoc. 4.79, transl. by Norlin 1928, 167. 
339
 Norlin 1928, 166. 
340
 Thuc. 3.82.8. 
341
 Aristot. Pol. 5.1305b, 23-24. See also Aristot. Pol. 5.1306a, 13-32. For the connection of hetaireiai with the 
attempt of undermining the democracy in the fourth century, see also Hyp. 4.8 and for later attestations see Plut. 
Lyc. 5.3. 
342
 We cannot come to the same conclusion from the use of hetaireia in the Athenaion Politeia 20.1, in which 
the word appears more in the sense of a Comradeship and not in the form of a formed political faction. Rhodes 
1981, 243 mentions that: ―what we have in A.P. is simply a restatement of what he found in Herodotus, and 
provides no evidence for the existence of ἑηαηξεῖαη (associations or ‗clubs‘ of men who were on occasion 
prepared to cooperate for political purposes: see on 34. iii) in the time of Cleisthenes […].‖  
343
 Xen. Hell. 2.1. 
83 
 
to the political factions (ἐλ ηαῖο ἑηαηξείαηο) and those exiles who had returned after the 
peace were eager for oligarchy (ὀιηγαξρίαο ἐπεζύκνπλ), […].344‖ 
It cannot be a coincidence that the hetaireiai receive a clear political meaning under these 
extreme political circumstances, which clearly remind us of the oligarchic coup of the Four 
Hundred and the hetaireiai formed in Athens by the oligarchic circles of the city, which 
organized the overthrow of democracy, as it appears in the work of Thucydides. There is 
obviously a connection of ideas between both ancient writers of the fifth and fourth century. 
The question, which derives from this observation, should be consequently the following: is 
Thucydides the first to conceive the hetaireia as a political faction? 
Thucydides’ innovation 
The way, in which the Greek literature of the fifth and fourth century comprehends the idea 
of hetaireia can lead us to several conclusions about the existence and the characteristics of 
the political factions during the Peloponnesian War. When do these factions appear in the 
Greek literature and in which way do they get their final political character? I can say with 
relative certainty that, even if the first attestation of the word should be the one of Simonides 
of Ceos345, the first comprehension of the term in a political way can be found in the Histories 
of Herodotus. This is very important for our research since it indicates the expanded use of 
the term as a political company of people in the fifth century. The difference between the use 
of hetaireia, however, between Herodotus and Thucydides is the one to determine the 
definition of these political factions. Even if in Herodotus the word has a clear political 
meaning, one cannot speak, like already said, of any identification of the hetaireia with 
formed political factions, which are fully organized and act with a certain plan; it seems more 
likely that the company of Cylon acts impulsively and without any kind of organisation.  
On the other hand, the hetaireiai of Thucydides seem much more formed. It is important to 
note that the historian uses the term once in the period of the Corcyraean civil war and does 
not use it again until the coup of the Four Hundred. According to the theory of Ostwald, 
Thucydides wrote the part of Corcyra at a later time. Ostwald argues that ―[…] this passage is 
generally agreed to have been composed long after the event. Thucydides may well be using 
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a vocabulary developed after 413 B.C. to describe a situation that existed in 427 B.C.‖346. The 
theory of Ostwald seems to get confirmed from Thucydides, since the historian, apart from 
the case of Corcyra, refers to the term and its derivatives in the sense of a political faction 
only in his eighth book, when he describes the oligarchic coup in Athens in 411. If this theory 
is true, then one should suppose that the hetaireia in Thucydides gets combined mainly with 
organized factions during the oligarchic coup of the 411 and that the reference of the 
historian to the term in his third book should not indicate the widespread use of the word 
during the period of the events in Corcyra. Even if this is correct, one should not ignore the 
existence and role that the political factions had during the civil war in Corcyra. Their 
political propaganda influenced the development of the war critically and led the island to a 
total massacre. The widespread use of the term in the works of contemporary and subsequent 
writers is consequently the result of this development. Thucydides is the first to define 
political factions in the Greek world and this is not irrelevant to the Peloponnesian War itself; 
this war, with the social and political crisis that caused to the Greek world, was the perfect 
field for the development of these factions and the internal political division of the Greek 
city-states. 
One could say consequently that Thucydides was not the first to insert the term in the Greek 
literature, but was the first to use it more extensively as one of the consequences of the 
Peloponnesian War. Apart from the frequency of the use of the hetaireia, however, the 
character of these political factions in Thucydides is also of great interest. During the large 
history of the term in the Greek literature of the fifth and fourth century the hetaireia can be 
considered mostly as connected with the attempt to overthrow the Athenian democracy and 
consequently with the oligarchical circles of Athens, which led the city to a first overthrow of 
constitution in the year 411 and a second one in the year 404. This consideration can be 
observed not only from Thucydides, when he narrates the coup of the Four Hundred, but also 
from his antecedent Herodotus, who speaks of the attempt of Cylon to overthrow democracy 
(even if in this case the purpose of the coup perpetrator is to establish a tyranny and not an 
oligarchy), and from the subsequent writers, like Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle, all of them 
speaking of hetaireia as an oligarchic faction, which acts against the democratic constitution 
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of Athens. At this point one should, of course, consider the fact that, when Thucydides speaks 
of the political factions in the Corcyraean civil war, he does not give an oligarchical shade to 
them; actually, the historian highlights the different political mentalities and influences, 
which determined the development of this war. However, I believe that in this case, 
Thucydides wanted to give particular attention to the influence that Athens and Sparta – and 
consequently also their political mentalities – had on the civil war through these political 
factions. The afore-mentioned interpretation of hetaireia should not be considered, however, 
as the norm for the use of the term; the connection of hetaireia with attempted coups against 
democracy is more than obvious in the literature.  
The most important common element of all these citations, in reality, is, however, the 
following: the hetaireiai are formed not in periods of political stability, but in periods of 
political crisis, in which the traditional political ideas are put in doubt. In times of peace, the 
political factions had no sense of existence in the Greek polis; they did not act as the modern 
political parties. Even in democratic societies, the factions have no role in the actual political 
life like it happens today. This fact does not indicate, however, that they did not exist, like the 
examples of Corcyra and Athens have demonstrated so clearly. The Greek city-states of the 
classical times were of course characterized by different political mentalities, which in times 
of peace simmered in the internal of the society and exploded only in periods of internal 
crisis, during which they could find a free field to actualise their political ideas. This is 
consequently one of the most important consequences of the Peloponnesian War for the 
Greek world of the fifth century. This war manages to lead several cities – including Athens 
and Sparta – to an internal crisis and to the doubt of traditional values, which were active for 
centuries; in this historical context, one could say that it was the Peloponnesian War itself, 
which formed the hetaireiai and gave them the political meaning, which they will maintain 
also during the fifth and the fourth century. 
Synomosia: a synonym?  
In the afore-mentioned text, I attempted to comprehend in-depth the idea of hetaireia in the 
Thucydidean world as a political faction, but the afore-mentioned term is not the only one to 
express the idea of political associations in the fifth century; of a similar meaning is also the 
word ζπλσκνζία (synomosia), which occurs in several passages of the Thucydidean History. 
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The word derives from the verb ὄκλπκη (swear, affirm with an oath, take a vow)347 and in its 
connection with the conjunction ζπλ can take the meaning of conspiracy, association, but also 
of political union348. The lexicological difference between hetaireia and synomosia is that the 
last is connected with the taking of a vow, which means that if someone wants to participate 
in an association of this type, should swear to be loyal to the association or political faction. 
The interpretation of synomosia as a political association can be found widely in the work of 
Thucydides. It is impressive that in most of the passages, in which the historian uses the term 
synomosia and its derivative synomotes349, he uses it in the sense of a political conspiracy or 
association, which aims to overthrow the democracy. One could say that Thucydides uses the 
word mainly in two different historical circumstances: first of all during the events in Athens 
before the beginning of the Sicilian expedition, when he narrates the vandalism of the hermai 
and the social crisis that followed in Athens and secondly, when he describes the oligarchic 
coup in Athens in the year 411.  
When it comes to the Sicilian expedition, like already said, Thucydides speaks of the 
synomosiai, when he describes the events of the year 415, the vandalism of the hermai and 
the affair of the Mysteries350, which provoked the fear of the Athenian citizens that behind 
this act was hidden the plan of the oligarchic circles of the city to overthrow the democracy: 
―They took the matter (i.e. the vandalism of the hermai) very seriously, since it seemed 
like an omen for the expedition and at the same time to betoken a conspiracy for a 
political uprising and the subversion of popular rule (ἐπὶ μπλσκνζίᾳ ἅκα λεσηέξσλ 
πξαγκάησλ θαὶ δήκνπ θαηαιύζεσο γεγελῆζζαη)‖351. 
The oligarchic shade of this conspiracy is more than obvious, according to me. The fear of 
the Athenians of a possible overthrow of the constitution is very common in Thucydides and 
is connected obviously with the power that the oligarchic circles of the city possessed 
                                                          
347
 Beekes 2010, ad locum. 
348
 Betant 1847, ad locum; LSJ, ad locum. 
349
 We cannot say the same about the use of the verb ζπλόκλπκη, which, in my opinion, is used strictly in the 
sense of ―take a vow, make an alliance‖. 
350
 See Thuc. 6.27-29 for the events. 
351
 Thuc. 6.27.3, see also Thuc. 6.60.1 and Thuc. 6.61.1 for the same use of the word by the historian. See also 
Diod. 13.5.1: ―[…] those in Athens who hated Alcibiades with a personal enmity, possessing now an excuse in 
the mutilation of the statues, accused him in speeches before the Assembly of having formed a conspiracy 
against the democracy (ὡο ζπλσκνζίαλ θαηὰ ηνῦ δήκνπ)‖, all translations of Diodorus are taken from Oldfather 
1989, ad locum. 
87 
 
traditionally352. In order to understand the historicity of these conspiratorial clubs, it should be 
enough to mention the important role that they seem to had had during the events of the 
assassination of Hipparchus from the Tyrannicides in the year 514, as Thucydides narrates. 
Inter alia, the historian speaks clearly of a synomosia, of which Harmodius and Aristogeiton 
seemed to be a part when they organized the assassination of the tyrant and the overthrow of 
the constitution353. With the domination of the democratic constitution in the Athenian 
political scene, the fear of a coup against the democratic way of governing showed up 
automatically, since the synomosiai became even more powerful in the city, as Thucydides 
describes. This fear got realized some years later when the several synomosiai really managed 
to dominate and establish an oligarchy of the Four Hundred: 
―But the conspirators (η῵λ ἐλ ηῇ μπλσκνζίᾳ) who were gathered at the meeting confirmed 
their original reaction and accepted the proposals now before them. They prepared to 
send Peisander and other envoys to Athens to negotiate about the return of Alcibiades and 
about overthrowing the democratic constitution (ηῆο ηνῦ ἐθεῖ δήκνπ θαηαιύζεσο) there 
and to establish the friendship between Tissaphernes and the Athenians‖354. 
Thucydides speaks clearly of conspiratorial clubs, which tried – and really managed at a later 
time – to overthrow the traditional democratic Athenian constitution. Once again the historian 
mentions the oligarchic character of these clubs. When he describes the effort of Alcibiades 
to convince the Athenian generals in Samos, who had already experienced the tyrannical 
behaviour of the new oligarchical government and wanted to oppose it, to trust him, the 
historian mentions the following: 
―An assembly was held in which Alcibiades blamed his personal situation on his exile 
and complained bitterly about his misfortunes. He also said a great deal about the political 
situation and instilled in them strong hopes for the future, while hugely exaggerating his 
own influence with Tissaphernes. His various intentions in this were: that those who 
controlled the oligarchy back at home (νἵ ηε νἴθνη ηὴλ ὀιηγαξρίαλ ἔρνληεο) would fear him 
the more; that the private associations would be led to break up (αἱ μπλσκνζίαη 
δηαιπζεῖελ); […]‖355 
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Thucydides speaks of the synomosiai as political associations in Athens, directly connected 
with the oligarchic circles of the city, whose aim was to overthrow the democratic way of 
governing. Which is, however, the way that other scholars of the fifth and fourth century use 
the term? In the research of the way, in which several scholars, anterior and contemporary of 
Thucydides, used the word, which I have accomplished, I have noticed that synomosia is 
normally used from the scholars in the meaning of an association or conspiracy and not in the 
meaning of a real political conspiratorial faction, which aims to overthrow the constitution
356
. 
This means that only Thucydides uses the term as a political faction with a conspiratorial 
character and this cannot be coincidental obviously. Thucydides is the only one to define 
synomosia as a form of political association in Athens, which derives from the traditionally 
very widespread oligarchic circles of the city with main aim the coup against the democratic 
constitution. If we consider that Thucydides uses both terms of hetaireia and synomosia as a 
political faction, which should be the difference between both types of association and why 
our historian feels the need to use a second term, in order to speak of the conspiratorial 
factions of Athens? 
The difference between both terms according to the modern literature 
Several modern scholars dealt with the question of the difference between hetaireia and 
synomosia in Greek literature. According to most of them (and according to me also), the 
most important works on the afore-mentioned terms are the ones of Calhoun357 and Sartori358. 
Both scholars made a very detailed research on political clubs in antiquity, even though I 
have to say that Sartori focused more than Calhoun on the difference between hetaireia and 
synomosia, when Calhoun‘s work is more focused on political clubs in general. However, 
both of them made a circumstantial definition of the two terms. According to Calhoun, the 
word hetaireia indicates ―a club of which the interests were chiefly political, and which was 
devoted either wholly or in part to the support of its members in politics and litigation‖359. 
When it comes to the idea of synomosia, however, Calhoun believes that the term indicates 
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an oath-bound companionship, which in the sense of a political club seems to be synonymous 
with the idea of hetaireia360.  
On the other hand, Sartori supports clearly the different meaning of hetaireia and synomosia 
in the Athenian political scene until the year 411 at least. In order to prove this difference, 
Sartori refers to the Dreros inscription, dated in the year 220 circa, in which the hetaireia and 
synomosia are used in two different ways361. In the text of the inscription, hetaireiai are 
described as official factions of the people when synomosiai are described as conspiratorial 
clubs of the city. Sartori mentions consequently that ―ciò prova l‘ incompatibilità originaria di 
eteria e sinomosia, l‘una essendo un organo riconosciuto dallo stato, l‘altra una consorteria 
antistatale‖362. I think that this is the main idea of Sartori about the different interpretation of 
the two terms; they are both political associations, even though hetaireia is recognized from 
the state when synomosia not. According to the scholar, if we consider that synomosia is an 
oath-bound association and that such oaths were sworn under extreme political conditions, 
then it should be no coincidence that the afore-mentioned type of political association was 
combined several times with revolutionary movements against the already-existing 
constitution; Synomosia indicates also lexicologically a conspiratorial faction, which acts 
exclusively in periods of political instability.  
The hetaireia, on the other hand, has other characteristics, according to the scholar. The word 
does not indicate only political clubs but can indicate also an association of coeval citizens 
with common interests. From this traditional form of hetaireia derives also the political 
version of it363. This is why the hetaireiai are considered traditionally as associations 
recognized from the state364. Sartori believes that the explosion of the Peloponnesian War and 
especially the internal dispute in Athens of the vandalism of the Hermai, in combination with 
the defeat in Sicily and the consequent oligarchic coups of 411 and 404 had as a consequence 
the strengthening of the historical – already from the period of the political action of 
Thucydides son of Melesias365 – oligarchic circles of Athens, which were now even more 
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available to combat against the democratic constitution366. As a consequence, the hetaireiai 
are normally combined with an oligarchic ideology. They are not, however, of the same 
nature as synomosiai. Sartori mentions that ―[…] il vocabolo ―eterie‖ indica per lo più quei 
circoli oligarchici che combattono la loro battaglia antidemocratica nei limiti di un‘ 
opposizione riconosciuta e tollerata dalla legge‖367. The two terms hetaireia and synomosia 
start consequently as two different ideas in the Athenian political scene of the second half of 
the fifth century. This is obviously not the norm for the whole period of the war, however. 
The more power the Athenian democracy gained in the Athenian political scene, the more 
powerful became also the hetaireiai, which had to defend their political ideas, in order to 
continue to exist368. And the more power these hetaireiai got, the more conspiratorial they 
became, according to Sartori, which means that they resembled even more to the synomosiai 
the closer we get to the end of the war369. With the failure of the second oligarchic coup of the 
404 the hetaireiai had no reason to exist and they disappeared from the political life of 
Athens; the oligarchic factions got completely weakened370. 
Several other scholars have dealt with the definition of the two terms, even though not so 
thoroughly as Calhoun and Sartori. When it comes to the interpretation of synomosia, 
Andrewes mentions that the synomosiai were political associations, which aimed not at the 
public good but at the benefit of their members371. The same opinion has Ostwald, who 
believes that the synomosiai ―were intended for permanent social and private cooperation 
among friends in litigation and in furthering the political careers of one another‖372. These 
political clubs, which were formed for the personal interests of their members, existed in 
order to thwart the democratic process by manipulating elections and lawsuits, as the events 
of the vandalism of the Hermai have shown, so Hornblower373. In order to prove this theory, 
Hornblower uses the phrase of Thucydides in 6.60.1 and the characterization of the attempt of 
a coup against the Athenian democracy in 415 (i.e. the famous vandalism of the Hermai) as a 
μπλσκνζία ὀιηγαξρηθή θαὶ ηπξαλληθή (a conspiracy involving oligarchy and tyranny), in order 
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to prove that this phenomenon was not ephemeral and that these political clubs aimed mostly 
at the overthrow of the constitution. 
The hetaireia, on the other hand, has another historical background. Several scholars agree 
that the hetaireiai start as ―dining or drinking clubs of congenial men, usually of roughly the 
same age and social standing.‖374 Jones mentions that ―they were private societies of upper–
class males‖, i.e. the aristocratic elite, ―devoted to social activity among themselves‖375. 
―They met for drink, talk, amusement and political jobbery‖376, so Rhodes. According to 
Andrewes, the political character of the hetaireiai appears during the years of the 
Peloponnesian War, since wartime stress offered them the possibility to multiply and grow 
worse377, even if there is also a theory, which claims that the hetaireiai may have existed also 
before the explosion of the war. In 1937 American excavators have discovered in the 
Athenian Agora 190 ostraca with the name of Themistocles, who got exiled from Athens in 
the year 471. The interesting part of this discovery was that these ostraca were not written by 
190 different citizens, but rather were prepared by a small group of citizens, since only 
fourteen different hands can be detected on the fragments. The idea that behind these 
foundings could be hidden some sort of hetaireia is very tempting and has been supported 
continuously from the scholars378, still, I would be very careful when speaking of the 
existence of hetaireiai at this historical period; the ancient literature does not leave much 
space for such conclusions. 
In any case, the hetaireia takes a clear political meaning during the events of 411, i.e. the 
overthrow of democracy from the Four Hundred oligarchs and the reference of Thucydides to 
the political associations as hetaireiai during the Corcyraean civil war does not prove the 
contrary, so Ostwald; like already mentioned, the part of Corcyra seems to had been written 
at a later time from our historian379. The hetaireiai in a political sense should had been small 
groups of men, more tight-knit, sinister, and subversive than synomosiai, according to 
Hornblower380, and ―commonly on the fringe of the leisured class, whom a leading politician 
could employ as his agents‖381, each of which was held together more by personal 
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considerations than by political principles382. The reason for their existence lays in the ever-
growing power of the democratic constitution, especially in Athens, which led these 
associations to become even tighter and organized, in order to confront their opponent 
constitution, which with the passing of time becomes a governmental power. As Jones 
mentions, ―[...] from the very beginnings of the democracy, aristocrats, or at least some of 
them, had been in a permanent condition of emotional and ideological withdrawal. If the 
demokratia could not be fairly said to have created the clubs, at the very least it provided 
them with a powerful reason for their continuing existence‖383. Whibley supposes that the 
threat of their democratical opponent may have led these hetaireiai also to communicate with 
each other and with similar clubs among the allies for the accomplishment of a common 
political strategy, even if this idea cannot be proved with absolute certainty384.  
Why does Thucydides use both terms in his History? 
I think that the discussion of the political factions in the Greek world of the fifth century is of 
great interest. In the modern world, we have the tendency to put labels at the political 
constitutions of antiquity; we are used to characterizing Athens of the fifth century as 
democratic, Sparta as oligarchic, etc. But the Greek politics cannot be defined, in my opinion, 
by specified terms; the political history of Greece is much more complicated than this. 
Athens especially is considered nowadays as the establisher of the democratic ideas and way 
of governing, an ideology which is influencing modern politics till today. Few is said, 
however, about the oligarchic circles, which existed traditionally in the city and managed to 
overthrow the constitution twice, or about the corruption of the democratic electoral 
procedures, which were many times manipulated by political factions, as the example of the 
excavation of the ostraca in the Athenian Agora can prove. It is not a coincidence that in the 
period of the Peloponnesian War most of these political clubs flourished in Athens; 
Thucydides refers (except the case of Corycra) always to the Athenian democracy when he 
speaks of the hetaireiai and synomosiai. The Athenian democracy was the most fertile field 
for the development of these oligarchic clubs, which wanted the overthrow of the constitution 
and the conquest of power; like already seen, the democratic way of organization of the 
Athenian society left inevitably much free space at the oligarchs to act. From the research 
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above one can come to several conclusions about the way that these political factions 
developed and the importance that they had on the Greek politics of the fifth century. 
First of all, it is obvious, according to me, that one cannot speak of an identification between 
hetaireiai and synomosiai, like Calhoun argues, at least at the first period of their political 
action. The hetaireiai should had started, according to several scholars, as clubs of coevals of 
the Athenian aristocratic elite, which, even if they acted collectively in a political way, as the 
passage of Herodotus on Cylon can show, they cannot be characterized as political factions 
with an individual organization and action till the oligarchic coup of 411. It is not a 
coincidence that the more the Peloponnesian War proceeds, the more the ancient writers 
focus on the development of the hetaireiai as political factions and the role that they played at 
the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404 in Athens, like Thucydides, Xenophon and Aristotle 
mention. From the ancient literature consequently one can understand that the hetaireia as a 
complete political faction got formed in periods of political crisis and in particular during the 
Peloponnesian War. In periods of such cruelty, traditional values are put easily in doubt and 
internal divisions can find plenty of space to evolve.  
The synomosiai, on the other hand, have other historical origins. The obligatory vow that its 
members had to swear, in order to enter into the synomosia, transformed it automatically into 
a conspiratorial association and can be in no case compared with the hetaireia in its initial 
form. Herodotus does not even speak of synomosiai, when Thucydides mentions them twice 
in his work, both when he speaks of the two conspiratorial movements of the political 
factions against democracy, i.e. the vandalism of the Hermai and the oligarchic coup of the 
411. No other Greek writer makes a similar reference to the term synomosia as a 
conspiratorial political faction; it may have been a choice of word exclusively Thucydidean, 
in order to describe such clubs.  
Consequently, when it comes to the development of Athenian political history, one can easily 
understand that synomosia is used from Thucydides in the same historical circumstances as 
hetaireia, i.e. when the historian refers to the oligarchic circles of Athens that wanted to 
overthrow the Athenian democracy. It is, therefore, obvious that hetaireiai and synomosiai in 
the Thucydidean world receive a similar meaning, even if they start from different 
interpretations. In the eighth book especially, both terms alternate constantly when the 
historian describes the events of the oligarchic coup of 411; this means that for Thucydides at 
some point of the war both terms have the same meaning. I think that a war of such cruelty 
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does not leave much space for the formation of healthy political factions. The Peloponnesian 
War was for sure a reference point for the Greek world; after its end in 404 the Greek polis 
entered in a deadlocked crisis and collapses when the Macedonian King descended from the 
North. Under these circumstances, the commonweal comes in second place and the political 
factions got organized according to the personal interest of their members. This is the perfect 
time for the oligarchical circles to flourish and attempt the overthrow of democracy, which 
during the war got even more powerful and threatened, even more, their existence; according 
to me, if these associations should be called hetaireiai or synomosiai or whatever else, is, at 
this point of history, of least importance for our historian.  
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Chapter 5. Syracuse and its democratic period  
The constitution of Syracuse in the ancient sources 
Thucydides dedicates two books of his history at the expedition of the Athenians against 
Syracuse in the year 415 and their dramatic defeat; he considers it as one of the most 
important events of the war. During the narration of the events, the reader has the opportunity 
to gather also important information about the interesting development of the constitution of 
Syracuse during the period of the Peloponnesian War
385
. Even if in this case our historian 
does not speak of another one oligarchic constitution, but actually of a democratic one, the 
case of Syracuse and its form of government is so important that it could not be excluded 
from a research on the Thucydidean political thought. Aim of this part of my thesis, 
consequently, is to manage to understand as much as possible the nature of the Syracusan 
constitution and its potential connection with the Athenian democracy. 
Syracuse was dominated traditionally by tyrannies
386
. We get informed, however, that, after 
the long period of the tyranny of Gelon and his heirs (485-466)
387
, the city had a democratic 
period
388
, like the greatest part of the cities in Sicily
389
. Several sources offer us important 
information about this change of constitution. First of all, Diodorus describes that after the 
overthrow of the tyranny of Thrasybulus (466)
390
 the city entered into a democratic period:  
―From this time the city enjoyed peace and increased greatly in prosperity, and it 
maintained its democracy for almost sixty years, until the tyranny which was established 
by Dionysius (θαὶ δηεθύιαμε ηὴλ δεκνθξαηίαλ ἔηε ζρεδὸλ ἑμήθνληα κέρξη ηῆο Δηνλπζίνπ 
ηπξαλλίδνο.)391‖.  
The Sicilian writer describes that the fall of Thrasybulus was accompanied by long 
celebrations, which included the construction of a colossal statue of Zeus the Liberator and 
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by the insertion of the annual Festival of Liberation, during which the Syracusans made 
sacrifices and held games of distinction on the day on which they had overthrown the tyrant 
and liberated their native city.
392
 We get informed also from Diodorus that Syracuse was 
democratic and additionally liberated and restored democracies in other Sicilian cities, which 
had also been under tyranny:  
―The Syracusans, having liberated their native city in this manner, gave permission to the 
mercenaries to withdraw from Syracuse, and they liberated the other cities, which were 
either in the hands of tyrants or had garrisons, and re-established democracies in them 
(ηὰο δὲ ἄιιαο πόιεηο ηὰο ηπξαλλνπκέλαο ἢ θξνπξὰο ἐρνύζαο ἐιεπζεξώζαληεο 
ἀπνθαηέζηεζαλ ηαῖο πόιεζη ηὰο δεκνθξαηίαο).‖393  
Aristotle in his Politics refers also to the overthrow of the tyranny and the domination of 
democracy:  
―Since according to him tyranny ought to change into the first and best constitution, for 
so the process would be continuous and a circle, but as a matter of fact tyranny also 
changes into […] democracy, as that of the family of Gelo at Syracuse (θαὶ εἰο 
δεκνθξαηίαλ, ὥζπεξ ἡ η῵λ Γέισλνο ἐλ Σπξαθνύζαηο)‖394.  
Democracy survived in Syracuse till Dionysius I, who imposed a tyrannical constitution in 
the city in the year 405.
395
 Syracuse experienced subsequently a democratic period of 60 
years. Of which type of democracy, anyway, are we speaking about? 
On the characteristics of this constitution, not only Thucydides but also other sources provide 
important information. Thucydides mentions several times the existence of the ecclesia, 
which seemed to have the absolute power in the city. The historian informs us that at the time 
of the beginning of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, the Syracusans convened the Assembly 
(γελνκέλεο ἐθθιεζίαο)396, in order to discuss the news of the arrival of the Athenians. The 
ecclesia is convened again afterwards, when the Syracusans had to decide, if they should give 
absolute authority to the strategoi, which took part in the war against Athens
397
. Finally, 
Thucydides mentions another convention of the ecclesia of Syracuse in the seventh book, 
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when the citizens of the city were in doubt if they should continue the war against Athens or 
not
398
. The convergence of an assembly for every important issue of the Syracusan society 
and especially the absolute authority that was given to this assembly could be proof of the 
democratic character of the city
399
.  
All of this aside, it seems that the assignment of magistracies was filled by election from the 
Assembly
400
 and we know from Thucydides about the existence of the δήκνπ πξνζηάηεο401, 
i.e. the leader of the people, phrase often applied to unofficial leaders of a popular party. We 
get informed also from Diodorus about the existence of petalismos, a political procedure 
introduced in Syracuse in 454/453, similar to the ostracism of Athens, in order to prevent the 
appearance of new tyrants. Leaders could now be exiled by a simple popular vote; the exile 
lasted five years (instead of ten in Athens) and votes were recorded on olive leaves rather 
than ostraka. However, we know that this system did not last for a long period
402
.  
Another characteristic of the Syracusan democracy could have been the fear of a possible 
overthrow of the constitution of the city, which is expressed from the speech of Athenagoras 
in the Syracusan ecclesia. The Syracusan leader of the commons acknowledges that 
periodically the constitution of Syracuse got destroyed many times from diverse staseis and 
was overthrown by tyrannical forms of government:  
―There you have the reason why our city is rarely at peace but inflicts a multitude of 
conflicts and struggles not so much on its enemies as on itself, including sometimes 
tyrannies and illegal regimes (ηπξαλλίδαο δὲ ἔζηηλ ὅηε θαὶ δπλαζηείαο ἀδίθνπο)‖403.  
Even if this passage refers probably only to the tyranny of Dionysius that came after, 
according to several scholars
 404
, I believe that Thucydides through the words of Athenagoras 
delineates with this speech the opposition of the current constitution of Syracuse both with its 
past and – probably – its future forms of government. To the above-mentioned text should be 
added a passage of Diodorus, who describes how after the fall of tyranny and the 
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establishment of democracy, the Assembly decided to exclude from the magistracies all the 
aliens, which had been admitted to citizenship under Gelon, either because they were judged 
to be unworthy, or  
―because they were suspicious lest men who had been brought up in the way of tyranny 
and had served in war under a monarch might attempt a revolution (ηπξαλλίδη θαὶ 
κνλάξρῳ ζπλεζηξαηεπκέλνη λεσηεξίδεηλ ἐπηρεηξήζσζηλ)‖405.  
The fear of the Syracusans about a revolution of the – from the tyrannical period remained – 
‗undemocrats‘, a fear, which can be also observed in the democratic constitution of Athens406, 
makes the antithesis between tyranny and democracy even more intensive. Syracuse had 
consequently a non-tyrannical form of constitution, which is characterized as democracy 
from all sources. However, is it comparable to the Athenian ideal of governing? 
The problematic of this question is for sure of great complexity. In the seventh book, after the 
victory of Syracuse, Thucydides mentions the methods that Athens uses normally, in order to 
subjugate a city-state and the reason, why this way was not successful in the case of 
Syracuse: 
―For the first time they were coming up against cities that were similar in character to 
themselves – democratically governed, as they were (κόλαηο ἤδε ὁκνηνηξόπνηο 
ἐπειζόληεο, δεκνθξαηνπκέλαηο ηε, ὥζπεξ θαὶ αὐηνί)407, and strong in ships, horses and 
manpower; so they were unable to exploit any differences between them, either by 
imposing a change of constitution to help bring them over (νὐ δπλάκελνη ἐπελεγθεῖλ νὔη᾽ 
ἐθ πνιηηείαο ηη κεηαβνιῆο ηὸ δηάθνξνλ αὐηνῖο, ᾧ πξνζήγνλην ἄλ), or from any superiority 
of resources. They had themselves suffered repeated failures and even before the last 
reverse were already at their wits‘ end; and now that they had even been defeated with 
their fleet – something they would never have believed possible – it was that much 
worse‖408. 
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Thucydides uses actually a very interesting term, in order to describe the common 
characteristics between the two cities; he describes them – twice409 – as homoiotropoi, a 
word, which seems to be an invention of the historian
410
. The term derives from the words 
ὅκνηνο (similar) and ηξόπνο (way, manner) and indicates, in this case, two cities, which are 
―of like manners and life‖411, which means that Athens and Syracuse had obviously similar 
ways of living and governing
412
. First of all, both cities were under democracy and were both 
potent in their marine forces and the cavalry. Secondly, Thucydides mentions that, because of 
the similar constitution, the Athenians could not cause a change of constitution in Syracuse, 
which would lead to disunite the city and bring its citizens to the Athenian side. These two 
features of the Athenian democracy are here, as Hornblower says, ―by a daring and 
compressed use of language, regarded as ‗differences‘ (δηάθνξα), which normally help the 
Athenians, but not in their dealings with Syracuse (and perhaps other Sicilian cities as 
well).‖413 Athens cannot use this time its common methods of bringing a city-state to its side, 
methods, which the city used repeatedly with the Greek cities of the main Greek area. 
Syracuse is too similar to be subdued in this way. 
Athenian or Syracusan democracy? The views of the modern scholars 
Diverse opinions have been expressed by several scholars about this issue. Rutter, on the one 
hand, believes that comparing the Syracusan constitution with the Athenian democracy is out 
of the question
414
. Although sovereign power in Syracuse seems to be in the hands of the 
commons, there are many Athenian political bodies that are missing from the Syracusan 
democracy. There is a great lack of knowledge about the political decision-making, as long as 
other important areas of government such as the elections and competence of magistrates and 
the judiciary power. Of this opinion is also Hornblower, who, commenting on the above-
mentioned passage, says that ―one might try to save Th. by taking ‗like themselves‘ to mean 
they resembled Athens in having a democracy of some sort (true), rather than that their type 
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of democracy closely resembled the Athenian type (false).‖415 In Hornblower‘s opinion, the 
constitution of Syracuse may have been democratic, but it is false to believe that this 
democracy followed the Athenian type. 
At this point, one should refer also to a very important passage of Aristotle about the form of 
the Syracusan constitution after the Athenian expedition. Aristotle, referring to the changes 
instituted by Diocles
416
 after the victory of the Syracusans over the Athenians, writes the 
following:  
―and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of the victory in the war against 
Athens made a revolution from politeia to democracy (θαὶ ἐλ Σπξαθνύζαηο ὁ δῆκνο αἴηηνο 
γελόκελνο ηῆο λίθεο ηνῦ πνιέκνπ ηνῦ πξὸο Ἀζελαίνπο ἐθ πνιηηείαο εἰο δεκνθξαηίαλ 
κεηέβαιελ, […])‖417.  
The philosopher characterizes the Syracusan constitution before 412 as politeia and only after 
412 as a democracy. The discussion about what Aristotle means with the term politeia is of 
course very big, but briefly, it should be mentioned that according to the philosopher 
―politeia is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy (ἔζηη γὰξ ἡ πνιηηεία ὡο 
ἁπι῵ο εἰπεῖλ κίμηο ὀιηγαξρίαο θαὶ δεκνθξαηίαο)‖418. These political definitions in the thought 
of Aristotle seem not so definite: in one passage he characterizes the constitution of Syracuse 
as democracy
419
 and in another as politeia, which means that probably the character of the 
constitution of Syracuse was not absolutely clear even in the antiquity. Consequently, the 
comparison between the democracy of Athens and a type of constitution, about which our 
information is in great measure limited, should be made very carefully. 
On the other hand, Dover, commenting the afore-mentioned passage of Thucydides (7.55.2), 
believes that obviously Syracuse ―seemed to Thucydides democratic enough, in the Athenian 
sense, to justify the point which he makes here‖ and that Thucydides by referring to the two 
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features of the Athenian democracy, which the city used, in order to bring other cities to its 
side, ―clearly describes the consequences of the two respects in which Syracuse was like 
Athens.‖420 In his opinion, Thucydides refers to this event, in order to highlight the similarity 
of the two constitutions. Of the same opinion is also Lewis, who believes that ―for 
Thucydides, Syracuse appears to be more or less indistinguishable from Athens, in character 
and in institutions‖421.  
Additionally, Champion believes that anyway ―in 415 the Athenians […] had little to offer 
that could win over the Syracusan democrats‖422, which means that the two constitutions at 
this exact moment of their history should have been similar, even if the Syracusan democracy 
never arrived at the standards of the ―Periclean‖ democratic constitution. Even so, however, 
we should note the very interesting opinion of O‘Neil., who believes that ―the Syracusans, 
like the Argives, seem to have been influenced more by the Cleisthenic democracy than the 
contemporary Athenian radical democracy, since, […] it was only in 412 B.C. (.i.e. with the 
reforms of Diocles) that the Syracusans themselves adopted final democracy‖423. Syracuse 
may have been influenced by the traditional form of the Athenian political system (even if the 
city did never experience the ―absolute‖ democracy) but did not follow the changes of the 
democracy in Athens during the Peloponnesian War. We should not forget that some years 
later Athens lived a period of extreme oligarchy, which means that an internal political crisis 
was already active in the city in the period of the Sicilian expedition
424
. According to the 
scholar, ―on balance it would appear that the Syracusan government was a genuine 
democracy by Greek standards but not initially as ‗radical‘ as the Athenian version‖. 
Furthermore, Robinson believes that there should be no doubt about the democratic period of 
Syracuse for the period between 466 and 406 since the demos was the body of citizens, which 
controlled the state by choosing and controlling their leaders, passing and revoking laws, and 
deciding the highest matters of state policy.
425
 This means that the Syracusan constitution 
worked ―institutionally and ideologically as a thorough-going democracy, one to all 
appearances as forceful as contemporary Athens.‖426 Robinson believes consequently that the 
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Syracusan constitution was obviously democratic, because it had the main characteristic of 
the democracy – the sovereignty of law – and that the two constitutions – the Athenian and 
the Syracusan – should have been equivalent, even if they had some different characteristics. 
Last but not least, Finley believes also that the Syracusan democracy looked like the 
Athenian one. He believes, however, that there are fundamental differences between the two 
constitutions
427
. The fact that all important decisions are in the hands of the ecclesia, 
indicates by itself the existence of a democratic constitution, which follows the Athenian 
model. Apart from this, other institutions of the state, like the petalismos, should have been 
also copied from the Athenian democracy. On the other hand, however, the scholar notes that 
the fact that ―the council and the civil officials were not chosen by lot as in Athens, but were 
elected, a procedure which in the Greek view introduced the aristocratic principle and 
therefore constituted a limitation on full democracy‖428 indicates that the Syracusan 
constitution was not a typical democratic form of government like the Athenian one. Apart 
from this, there was also no ―pay for office, and this again reduced the participation of the 
poorer classes in the daily running of affairs‖. According to Finley, the fact that Aristotle 
classified the Syracusan constitution as a politeia rather than a democracy should indicate 
that the democracy of the city should have been a ‗moderate‘ one and not a ‗radical‘, like the 
Athenian one. I think that Finley summarized greatly the core of the Syracusan constitution: 
it is a full democracy, but cannot be identified absolutely with the Athenian type of 
constitution.  
The definition of oligarchy and democracy through the speech of the Syracusan 
Athenagoras 
In order to understand better the nature of the Syracusan constitution and its similarities with 
the Athenian one, one should mention the following episode from the Thucydidean narration. 
Just before the arrival of the Athenians in Syracuse, the rumours about the upcoming war and 
the intention of the Athenians to attack Sicily caused great concern among the Syracusans. In 
the ecclesia, which was convened in the city, Hermocrates and Athenagoras expressed their 
opinions about the rumours that were spread in Syracuse, discussing if the citizens should 
consider them seriously and take measures against Athens. Athenagoras the δήκνπ 
                                                          
427
 Finley 1968, 61. 
428
 Finley 1968, 62. 
103 
 
πξνζηάηεο429, i.e. the leader of the popular party, who, in opposition to Hermocrates, rejects 
the rumours of an upcoming attack of the Athenians
430
, refers, among others, also to the 
constitutions of oligarchy and democracy and makes a very interesting definition of the two 
forms of government, in order to convince the audience that the last one is the best form of 
constitution. 
The speech of Athenagoras is actually a ―hymn‖ to democracy. The orator himself expresses 
his preference and respect to the Athenians, which are characterized as ―clever and 
experienced people (ἄλζξσπνη δεηλνὶ θαὶ πνιι῵λ ἔκπεηξνη)‖431. The esteem of Athenagoras 
for the Athenians seems strange for a Syracusan orator, but it can be justified if we consider a 
fact, which Thucydides describes in the seventh book, i.e. the existence of a part of citizens of 
Syracuse, who supported the Athenians and wanted their victory.
432
 Who precisely these 
citizens are, is not made clear from the historian
433
, but the existence of some Syracusans, 
who were on the side of the Athenians, could indicate the presence of several political 
movements in the inside of the city, a usual fact for the city-states of the main Greek area, in 
which the different parties had a significant role in the political arena. Athenagoras starts his 
argumentation with the following rhetorical question:  
“Or is it that you don‘t want to be equal before the law with the majority? Yet how could 
it be right that people should not be valued on their merits, like for like? (ἀιιὰ δὴ κὴ κεηὰ 
πνιι῵λ ἰζνλνκεῖζζαη434; θαὶ π῵ο δίθαηνλ ηνὺο αὐηνὺο κὴ η῵λ αὐη῵λ ἀμηνῦζζαη;)‖435. 
For once more it appears the idea of ἰζνλνκία, which in the work of the historian expresses 
the equality of the citizens in front of the laws (see 3.62.3 and the ἰζόλνκνο ὀιηγαξρία of the 
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βνπιόκελνλ ηνῖο Ἀζελαίνηο γίγλεζζαη ηὰ πξάγκαηα θαὶ ἐπηθεξπθεπόκελνλ πξὸο αὐηὸλ ὥζηε κὴ ἀπαλίζηαζζαη, 
[…])‖. Nicias believes that the Athenians should remain in Syracuse, because of the support from the inside of 
the city. 
433
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Thebans), and is connected mainly – but not always – with democracy436. In this case, 
Athenagoras uses the idea of ἰζνλνκία as an adjective of democracy and highlights that it 
would not be just if the citizens of a city would not have the same rights. Dover mentions that 
―ἰζνλνκία, the situation in which all have the same rights, is one face of democracy; 
δεκνθξαηία, ‗power in the hands of the majority‘, is another.‖437 This is the one face of 
democracy, i.e. that all citizens have the same rights. The other face of democracy, the 
sovereignty of the commons, is the second argument of Athenagoras, which will be referred 
further down. 
Continuing his speech, Athenagoras defines the constitutions of democracy and oligarchy, in 
order to come to the conclusion that democracy is the best government. The rhetoric skills, 
which are used for this purpose, are of great interest. The orator with the constant use of 
contradictions manages to highlight the diversities between the two forms of constitution and 
bring out the virtues of democracy. First of all, he mentions that:  
―It will be said that a democracy is neither wise nor fair and that those who own property 
are the people most likely to rule well (θήζεη ηηο δεκνθξαηίαλ νὔηε μπλεηὸλ νὔη᾽ ἴζνλ εἶλαη, 
ηνὺο δ᾽ ἔρνληαο ηὰ ρξήκαηα θαὶ ἄξρεηλ ἄξηζηα βειηίζηνπο)‖438.  
Athenagoras starts his argumentation with the rumour that he wants to reverse, i.e. that 
democracy is not a just constitution and that the rich have the right to govern. According to 
Hornblower, this idea contributes to the standard justification of oligarchy and reminds us of 
the speech of the Thebans at Plataea
439
. The Thebans, in order to justify themselves about 
their attack on Plataea at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War
440
, mention that some few 
Plataeans, the first in money and heritage (νἱ πξ῵ηνη θαὶ ρξήκαζη θαὶ γέλεη), invited them to 
attack the city, with a view to restoring the traditional institutions of it.
441
 Obviously, the idea, 
which existed in the oligarchic circles, is that the rich are the most appropriate to take 
decisions. The reason for the characterization of the rich as the most prudent is not referred 
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from Thucydides directly, but as Hornblower mentions, the idea behind it is that the rich had 
a personal interest to take wise decisions, ―because they have more to lose.‖442   
The next sentence of the speech of Athenagoras is actually the definition of the two opposite 
constitutions, democracy and oligarchy:  
―But I say first that ―democracy‖ is the name of the whole and ―oligarchy‖ the name of 
only a part (ἐγὼ δέ θεκη πξ῵ηα κὲλ δῆκνλ443 μύκπαλ ὠλνκάζζαη, ὀιηγαξρίαλ δὲ κέξνο 
[…])‖444.  
The use of the antonym μύκπαλ and κέξνο highlights, even more, the contradiction between 
the two forms of government. The democracy is based on the whole of the commons, 
whereas oligarchy is based on a part of it; this is the main difference of two leading 
constitutions of the Peloponnesian War. In my opinion, it is not coincidental that Thucydides 
uses in this passage the word ὀιηγαξρία, in order to define the constitution of oligarchy. The 
reference to oligarchy with its actual name – a relatively rare fact in the work of the 
historian
445
 – highlights, even more, the antithesis between the two constitutions. 
Athenagoras proceeds with the analysis of the two ways of governing. First of all, he remarks 
on democracy that:  
―[…] while the rich are the best guardians of property, the wise would be the best 
counsellors, and the majority the best judges of what they hear (ἔπεηηα θύιαθαο κὲλ 
ἀξίζηνπο εἶλαη ρξεκάησλ ηνὺο πινπζίνπο, βνπιεῦζαη δ᾽ ἂλ βέιηηζηα ηνὺο μπλεηνύο, θξῖλαη 
δ᾽ ἂλ ἀθνύζαληαο ἄξηζηα ηνὺο πνιινύο); and all these, considered separately and together, 
have an equal share in a democracy (θαὶ ηαῦηα ὁκνίσο θαὶ θαηὰ κέξε θαὶ μύκπαληα ἐλ 
δεκνθξαηίᾳ ἰζνκνηξεῖλ)‖446.  
 The orator makes a threefold division, which, in Hornblower‘s opinion ―is not intended to be 
mapped into the usual threefold scheme of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy‖447, like we may 
well think at first reading. The scholar continues his comment saying: ―here the three 
elements of rich, wise, and many are all contributory elements in a properly working 
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democracy‖448, which means that Athenagoras differentiates the rule of the commons as the 
only ―protagonists‖ in a democratic city and introduces a threefold division of the 
governmental institutions, which, as Dover mentions, correspond to administration, 
deliberation, and decision
449
. The administration of the finances in a democracy is given to 
the rich (πινπζίνπο), because they are the best administrators of the money (θύιαθαο 
ἀξίζηνπο ρξεκάησλ), the deliberation about the important issues of the city is given to the 
wise men (μπλεηνύο), which are the best counsellors (βνπιεῦζαη ἂλ βέιηηζηα), but the 
decisions are taken (θξῖλαη ἄξηζηα) by the commons (πνιινύο), after they have heard the 
advice of the wisest.  
The use of the verb ἰζνκνηξέσ in this context is particular. The historian uses this word two 
times in his whole work
450
, but only once, in order to describe a political constitution. The 
meaning of the word is ―aequam partem habere‖ (have the same part), according to Bétant451 
and according to Liddell and Scott ―have an equal share‖452. We should not confound it with 
the idea of ἰζνλνκία, the equality in front of the laws, a common idea for the Greek political 
thought. In this case, Athenagoras speaks of an equal share, which means that obviously, all 
the classes of the democracy share an equal position in the state. I will agree with the opinion 
of Classen, who mentions that the citizens of the city share the same duties and benefits of the 
public life „und zwar „νκνίσο θαηὰ ηὰ κέξε―, sowohl nach der angedeuteten Verschiedenheit 
der Lebensstellung, καὶ ―μύκπαληα―, wie auch alle vereinigt, namentlich in der 
Volksversammlung.―453 Dover is of the same opinion and comments that Thucydides with 
ἰζνκνηξεῖλ intends to say that ―in a democracy (a) each of the three categories is allowed to 
play the part which, in his view, it is right that it should play, (b) each individual has the same 
privileges and opportunities as every other member of the same category, has the same 
protection under the law as everyone else‖454, (which means that every citizen has an active 
role that depends on his social class) and a passive role (which means that he can enjoy the 
same benefits as every other citizen of the city). The use of this verb in this special point is 
made, in my opinion, in order to demonstrate the justice of the democratic constitution, which 
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does not get influenced from the economic or social level of the citizens but distributes the 
same rights and duties to all the members of the community. 
The threefold division is very important for our knowledge about the characteristics of the 
Syracusan constitution. I do not think that it is a coincidence that Athenagoras makes a more 
complicated – and for sure diverse – definition of democracy. In the work of the historian 
democracy – and especially the Athenian example – is always presented as the constitution 
based on the sovereignty of law and the role of the rich or the wise men in the city, in general, 
is not highlighted. The Funeral of Pericles in the second book is the best example of it. 
Pericles defines the Athenian democracy in the following way:  
―Democracy is the name we give to it, since we manage our affairs in the interests of the 
many not the few (θαὶ ὄλνκα κὲλ δηὰ ηὸ κὴ ἐο ὀιίγνπο ἀιι᾽ ἐο πιείνλαο νἰθεῖλ δεκνθξαηία 
θέθιεηαη); but though everyone is equal before the law in the matter of private disputes, in 
terms of public distinction preferment for office is determined on merit, not by rank but 
by personal worth; moreover, poverty is no bar to anyone who has it in them to benefit 
the city in some way, however lowly their status‖455  
In the speech of the Athenian politician the sovereignty of the commons and the equality 
between the citizens are out of discussion, but Pericles adds also another characteristic, which 
is not considered in the speech of Athenagoras: the obtainment of public magistracies 
succeeds as a reward of merit and has no connection with the social class of the citizens and 
additionally the poverty is not a barrier for someone, who is able to serve the state. Pericles 
eliminates the social classes as a criterion for the participation of the citizens to the political 
life, contrary to Athenagoras, who highlights the role of the diverse classes (the rich, the 
wise, the commons) as important for the good functioning of democracy. 
To sum up, in the case of Syracuse, the democracy is obviously based on the sovereignty of 
the commons, which are the only political body to take decisions; the administration and the 
deliberation of the matters of the Sicilian city-state, however, are given to other political 
bodies. The beatification of the democracy in the speech of Athenagoras was made for the 
Syracusan type of constitution and not for the democracy of the Greek world in general.
456
 
This is a very important point to consider when one reads the speech of the orator and wants 
to research on a great scale the whole history of Sicily. Sicily is always a particular example. 
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Finally, Athenagoras explains why oligarchy is so different than democracy:  
―An oligarchy shares the dangers with the people but wants more than its share of the 
benefits – it actually wants to take and keep them all (ὀιηγαξρία δὲ η῵λ κὲλ θηλδύλσλ ηνῖο 
πνιινῖο κεηαδίδσζη, η῵λ δ᾽ ὠθειίκσλ νὐ πιενλεθηεῖ κόλνλ, ἀιιὰ θαὶ μύκπαλη᾽ ἀθεινκέλε 
ἔρεη)‖457.  
This is the main difference between oligarchy and democracy: while democracy distributes 
equally responsibilities and rights to all citizens, in an oligarchy the commons have to 
confront the dangers, whereas the oligoi enjoy the most of the benefits for themselves. 
According to Hornblower, ―this – the many risk making a sacrifice of their lives – is the reply 
to the Theban oligarchic argument that the rich have the most to lose in terms of sacrifice of 
property.‖458 Hornblower refers to the famous speech of the Thebans against the Plataeans in 
the third book, in which inter alia the Thebans say that the prime men of the city of Plataea 
opened the gates to the Thebans, even if they ―had more at stake (θαὶ πιείσ 
παξαβαιιόκελνη)‖459. Athenagoras overrides the oligarchic idea and demonstrates that 
democracy is the justest constitution because the benefits are shared with the whole body of 
the citizens and not only to the rich ones. 
The speech ends with the following phrase:  
―And that is what the powerful and the young among you are bent on – something 
impossible to achieve in a great city (ἃ ὑκ῵λ νἵ ηε δπλάκελνη θαὶ νἱ λένη πξνζπκνῦληαη, 
ἀδύλαηα ἐλ κεγάιῃ πόιεη θαηαζρεῖλ).‖460  
Which are exactly these δπλάκελνη θαὶ λένη, is not clear from the text. Were they the 
oligarchic party of the city, which was obviously powerful and wanted the overthrow of the 
constitution? Or were they the men of power, who possibly derived from the tyrannical 
period of Syracuse, which obviously continued to be powerful even at the democratic period 
of the city? We cannot be sure about it, but from the text, we can surely understand that there 
was a political group in the city, which wanted the overthrow of the democracy, a will that 
got accomplished when in the year 405 Syracuse passed from democracy to her old way of 
governing, i.e. tyranny.  
                                                          
457
 Thuc. 6.39.2. 
458
 Hornblower 2008, 415. 
459
 Thuc. 3.65.3. 
460
 Thuc. 6.39.2. 
109 
 
Consequently, the speech of Athenagoras is a very important passage, because it can be read 
in different ways. On the one hand, we should read it as a definition of the Syracusan way of 
governing, which obviously was a democracy, i.e. a constitution based on the sovereignty of 
the commons; even the way, in which Hermocrates and Athenagoras held their speeches, can 
remind us of the typical discussions of the Athenian assembly and the way that the different 
issues of the state were discussed in front of the ecclesia
461
. According to Lewis, the 
demagogue Athenagoras is described in terms very similar to those applied to Cleon and the 
Syracusan demos can be exhibited as no less unstable than that of Athens
462
. The similarity of 
Athenagoras with Cleon will be noted also by Andrews, who mentions that ―the similarity 
between Cleon and Athenagoras reaches beyond ―facile argument, personal invective, and 
self-advancement,‖ in that both speakers have deftly exploited fundamental principles of 
democratic ideology‖463. According to the scholar, Athenagoras (in opposition to the 
demagogic techniques of Pericles) ―aims to foster among his audience a grave distrust and 
suspicion of his political rivals, including Hermocrates‖. Anyway, I will agree with Andrews, 
that Athenagoras‘ speech serves ―to assimilate a democratic Syracuse to democratic Athens, 
to telling effect in the overall narrative‖464. 
In this case, one can speak, however, of a different type of democracy from the respective 
constitutions in the main Greek area and especially from the Athenian model. Syracuse, 
placed on the remote island of Sicily, received obviously some influence from the main 
Greek cities but still developed its own political life with different laws and political 
mentality. The distance between the island and the main Greek area probably did not leave 
space for the same extremely intense bound that existed between some city-states in 
continental Greece. The diversity of the island with the Greek city-states is appointed also 
from Thucydides, who in his first book delineates that the Sicilian tyrants, whose power 
attained its greatest height, were the exception in the ―map‖ of the Greek tyrannies, which 
traditionally were only concerned for themselves and not for the public good
465
. Sicily is 
different from the cities of the main Greek area and this is why it remains always a separate 
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example to examine and should be researched in a different way than every other 
geographical place, which emerges from the work of Thucydides. 
On the other hand, we could not ignore the involvement of the writer in the above-mentioned 
speech. This is, of course, a factor that has to be considered in the whole work of Thucydides, 
but in my opinion, it should be considered even more in the case of Sicily, because we have 
no idea, if Thucydides had ever visited the island. This means that if Thucydides had never 
been in Sicily, he could not have been present in the speech of Athenagoras like he has 
(probably) been in the Funeral of Pericles. A fact like that indicates that even if the historian 
gathered a great amount of information about the events in Sicily, he could not have 
transcribed the original speech and thus the intervention of his own vision in the text is 
unavoidable and maybe stronger than in other places of the work
466
.  
Conclusions: A different type of democracy? 
The question about the constitution of Syracuse is for sure of great complexity. On the one 
hand, the reference of the three scholars (Thucydides, Aristotle, Diodorus) to a democratic 
period of Syracuse is a relatively important sign that this democracy really existed. On the 
other hand, many characteristics of this constitution are not clarified from the ancient sources, 
a fact that demonstrates a great lack of knowledge about this subject. Even if several ancient 
scholars dealt on a great scale with Sicily, we cannot know how many of them had really 
visited the island and had the opportunity to gather information personally. A proof of it is 
referred from Nicias, when he tries to convince the Athenians to avoid the expedition in 
Sicily: Nicias is of the opinion that even if the Athenians manage to win the war, they will 
never achieve to maintain the power on the island because of the long distance between the 
two places and of the big number of its citizens.
467
 Consequently, the communication 
between Athens and Sicily should have been limited and obviously the Athenians were not 
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completely informed, what really happened on the island, in order to understand that an 
expedition of this size would lead to such an immense defeat.   
Furthermore, the constitutions developed in Sicily were for sure influenced by the main 
Greek area, but they had still different characteristics from them. Syracuse should have been 
influenced by Athens in some way; it is not a coincidence that a city, which had traditionally 
tyrannical forms of constitution, decides to establish a democratic constitution in the period 
of the great acme of the democratic Athens. The similar characteristics of the two 
constitutions additionally, like the system of petalismos, could be a proof of the fact that the 
constitution of Syracuse was influenced by the Athenian one. However, this fact does not 
mean that the two constitutions were equivalent; the lack of information and the confusion 
that probably existed already from the antiquity about the constitution of Syracuse (see 
Aristotle) does not permit us to arrive at absolute conclusions about this subject. 
Consequently, Syracuse should have been democratic but the individual characteristics of this 
constitution need to be examined very carefully.  
Additionally, I find very interesting the way, in which the speech of Athenagoras gets 
presented by Thucydides. Apart from the fact that it offers us important information on the 
constitution of the city, the speech of the Syracusan can be considered also as a hymn to 
democracy, but still to a different type of democracy than the Athenian one. Raaflaub 
believes that the speech of Athenagoras is one of the very few passages, which offers really 
positive comments about democracy in the work of the historian in opposition to the Funeral 
of Pericles, whose statements ―are defensive and ideologically exaggerated, and prove 
illusionary in the rest of the work‖468. Thucydides chooses the example of Syracuse, in order 
to present a model of a democratic constitution, which is based on the sovereignty of the 
demos, but assigns the administration and the deliberation of the matters of the state to the 
citizens, which are capable of such a responsibility: the rich are the best guardians of 
property, the wise the best counselors and the majority the best judges. Every social class has 
consequently its own incumbent, which contributes to the good functioning of a healthy 
democratic constitution and all together have an equal share of the benefits, which the state 
offers. In opposition to the Athenian model, where the obtainment of public magistracies has 
no connection with the social class, in which every citizen of a democratic society belongs, in 
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the case of the Syracusan democracy, the social and economic differences between the 
citizens are fundamental for the good functioning of the constitution. 
One should note at this point that after the death of Pericles and the exile of Thucydides, the 
historian becomes very critical on the way that the Athenian democracy gets formed and the 
errors that it committed, like the one of the decision to start a disastrous expedition against 
Sicily. The more ‗moderate‘ form of democracy of Syracuse, where the wise and rich have an 
important role at the decision-making of the state, was an interesting case for our historian, 
who lived with his own eyes the exile of himself from the city, which he even served as a 
General during the Peloponnesian War.  
To sum up, our effort to define Thucydides in an absolute way as ―oligarchic‖ or 
―democratic‖ is in my opinion very difficult, not only because the scholar makes great effort 
to remain objective in his narration, but especially because he seems not a sympathizer 
neither of the traditional Athenian democracy nor of the radical oligarchy
469
 and the case of 
Syracuse demonstrates it in a clear way. He defends the form of government of his own city 
till the end, but he has to criticize its disadvantages, especially when the Athenian demos 
becomes a victim of demagogues and politicians, who are not able to assure the commonweal 
of the city. Through Athenagoras he finds consequently a way to present another form of 
democracy, which maybe in this period could have worked better than the Athenian one. 
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Chapter 6. Athens under the Four Hundred. The rise of the oligarchy in 
Athens and the political consequences for the city 
In the last books of his history, Thucydides describes extendedly the political changes that 
will happen in Athens during and after the expedition of the city to Sicily and its defeat and 
complete destruction of its navy forces. In 415, when the Athenian assembly decides to start 
the extremely risky expedition against Syracuse
470
, the Periclean period of the city belongs 
already to the past and the political crisis of the Athenian democracy becomes ever clearer. 
Under these circumstances the traditional oligarchic circles of the city find the possibility to 
exploit the internal crisis in Athens and cause the rise of an oligarchical constitution, which 
will govern with absolute authority over the Athenian demos
471
. Aim of this part of my thesis 
is to understand first of all the historical background of the rise of power of the Athenian 
oligarchs, the nature and characteristics of this new form of oligarchic constitution and the 
importance of these political changes for the continuation of the war and the city of Athens in 
particular. 
The fear of a possible overthrow of the Athenian democracy 
One of the main subjects of the sixth book of Thucydides is the fear of a possible overthrow 
of the Athenian constitution, which gets expressed in different ways and is combined with the 
general political crisis inside the Athenian state but also with the – not only military, but also 
political – war between Athens and Sparta, a war of political ideas and mentality. This fear 
will have a decisive role in the development of the Athenian state and in the overthrow of the 
Athenian democracy some years later. 
In order to understand the important role that this fear played in Athens, one should start with 
the speech of Nicias in the Athenian assembly, when he tried to convince the Athenians that a 
war against Syracuse would be destructive for them. Among other Nicias mentions:  
―So the issue for us, if we are wise, is […] how best to keep a sharp watch on a state, 
which as an oligarchy has active designs on us (πόιηλ δη᾽ ὀιηγαξρίαο ἐπηβνπιεύνπζαλ 
ὀμέσο θπιαμόκεζα)‖472. 
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In this passage, the fear of an overthrow of the constitution gets used as political propaganda, 
in order to change the decision of the Athenians to realize an expedition against Sicily. Which 
is the state that could be hostile to Athens and its constitution, anyway, and how much truth 
exists in the words of Nicias? 
The passage is for sure not clear enough. Nicias does not denominate the city under 
oligarchic government, which has designs on the Athenians, even if the unnamed city should 
be in all likelihood Sparta like Hornblower also believes
473
. Dover wonders if Nicias in this 
passage wants to say that Sparta ―is trying to foment an oligarchic conspiracy in Athens, or 
that Sparta is hostile because she is an oligarchy, or that her hostility is particularly important 
and dangerous because she is an oligarchy‖.474 Kohl thinks that Nicias hints on Spartan co-
operation with Athenian oligarchs and that the affair of the Herms, soon to be described, 
makes this expression of fear plausible
475
. We cannot be sure about the exact meaning of the 
words of Nicias from this passage. In all respects, the idea is the same that will be expressed 
further down in the sixth book: the stability of the Athenian constitution is in danger and the 
oligarchic faction of Athens seems to ―threaten‖ the city with a possible overthrow of it. This 
danger will get more intense with the upcoming vandalism of the Hermai, which will 
increase the political crisis in the Athenian society. 
In 6.27 Thucydides describes the destruction of the facades of the Hermai, a fact that brought 
much concern to the city and was held as a bad sign for the expedition against Sicily that was 
about to start. According to Thucydides,  
―they took the matter very seriously, since it seemed like an omen for the expedition and 
at the same time to betoken a conspiracy for a political uprising and the subversion of 
popular rule (ηνῦ ηε γὰξ ἔθπινπ νἰσλὸο ἐδόθεη εἶλαη θαὶ ἐπὶ μπλσκνζίᾳ ἅκα λεσηέξσλ 
πξαγκάησλ θαὶ δήκνπ θαηαιύζεσο γεγελῆζζαη)‖.476 
For this vandalism, Alcibiades was to be accused, as the historian narrates. The Athenian 
politician, known for his anti-populist style of life, but also for his particular demagogic 
competences, was obviously a threat for his political opponents, who found the chance to 
proclaim that - with Alcibiades‘ involvement of course -―the affair of the Mysteries and the 
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mutilation of the Herms had been committed with a view to the overthrow of the democracy 
(ὡο ἐπὶ δήκνπ θαηαιύζεη)477‖. 
The vandalism of the Hermai brought on the surface the already existing fear of the Athenians 
about a possible overthrow of the Athenian constitution. The event was held by the citizens of 
the city as very serious and dangerous for the safety of democracy. The question about the 
real reasons for this act is of course very complicated and in great measure unanswered. 
Ostwald mentions that we shall never know the true motives of those involved in the 
vandalism and the fact may well be that this event ―had no political purpose‖ and was ―merely 
the unmotivated result of youthful drunkenness and exuberance.‖478 In reality, there is no 
direct connection between the vandalism of the Hermai and a potential stasis against 
democracy. Which is the reason consequently for the frustration of the Athenians after the 
episode of the Hermai? 
In order to answer this question, one should understand the burden of the fear of a possible 
overthrow of the constitution for the Athenians. This fear has some references to the past, as 
long as to the future of the history of the city and it is not only combined with the vandalism 
of the year 415. The fear of a δήκνπ θαηάιπζηο in the Athenian city-state is expressed already 
in the first book, when Thucydides narrates the events before the explosion of the 
Peloponnesian War and in particular the expedition of the Lacedaemonians in Phthiotis, in 
order to help their related Dorians, who were attacked from the Phocians in the year 457
479
. 
After their victory, the Lacedaemonians on their way home got ―trapped‖ in Boeotia because 
of the Athenians, who controlled the marine, as long as the overland street to Peloponnese
480
. 
For their decision to stay in Boeotia a big part played the fact that some Athenians ―[...] were 
secretly urging their involvement in Athens, hoping to put an end to popular rule there and 
stop the construction of the long walls (ἐπῆγνλ αὐηνὺο θξύθα, ἐιπίζαληεο δῆκόλ ηε 
θαηαπαύζεηλ θαὶ ηὰ καθξὰ ηείρε νἰθνδνκνύκελα)‖.481 Shortly after, the Athenians ―in the 
belief that the Spartans were at a loss how to find their way back, and to some extent also 
because of their suspicions about plots to overthrow the people (θαί ηη θαὶ ηνῦ δήκνπ 
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θαηαιύζεσο ὑπνςίᾳ)‖482, attacked the Lacedaemonians in Boeotia with all their forces but at 
the end without success
483
. 
In the narration of this episode of the Thucydidean history, the fear of an overthrow of the 
Athenian democracy, which is cultivated by some citizens of Athens, who seem available to 
help the Spartans, is mentioned two times (δῆκόλ θαηαπαύζεηλ; ηνῦ δήκνπ θαηαιύζεσο 
ὑπνςίᾳ). The reason for this ―betrayal‖ should have been the building of the Long Walls, 
which finished in 456
484, and which, according to Gomme, to these desperate oligarchs, ―the 
Long Walls meant […] the permanent domination of the democracy, by making Athens 
dependent on the sea‖.485  
The episode is rightly  characterized by Hornblower ―as one of the very few pieces of solid 
evidence for anti-democratic feeling and activity at Athens between Cleisthenes in the late 
sixth century and the oligarchic coup of 411 B.C.‖486 I guess, that Thucydides, in the first 
books of his work, avoids to refer to the citizens, who were against democracy in the internal 
of Athens – a reality that obviously existed ever in the city –, because he could have been 
probably much more interested to describe with every detail the structure of the Athenian 
democracy in the time of Pericles. This could be the reason, for which we have so little 
information on this fear in the first books. After the death of Pericles however, Thucydides 
focuses more on these tendencies of a possible stasis against the democracy, which will 
arrive at their peak with the events of 411. With the narration of the δήκνπ θαηάιπζηο of the 
oligarchs in the eighth book, the fear of the Athenians becomes true and the Athenian 
constitution gets finally overthrown with the establishment of the 400 oligarchs as the only 
government of the city with absolute authority.  
In order to highlight the importance of this fear, Thucydides makes a throwback to the history 
of Athens and to the tyrannical period of Hippias and Hipparchus
487
. The historian narrates 
that the memories of the oppressive tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons and furthermore the 
fact that the tyranny had been brought to an end not by the city itself but by the Spartans, left 
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the Athenians in a constant state of fear, making them regard everything with suspicion488. 
Further down Thucydides adds that:  
 ―The Athenian people had taken this very much to heart and were mindful of all they had 
learned of these events from hearsay. They were therefore now fiercely suspicious of 
those who stood accused in the affair of the Mysteries, and they thought it was all part of 
some conspiracy involving oligarchy and tyranny (θαὶ πάληα αὐηνῖο ἐδόθεη ἐπὶ μπλσκνζίᾳ 
ὀιηγαξρηθῇ θαὶ ηπξαλληθῇ πεπξᾶρζαη).‖489 
In this passage is expressed in a few words the exact fear of the Athenians during the period 
of the tyranny of the Peisistratids; they were afraid of a μπλσκνζίᾳ ὀιηγαξρηθῇ490 θαὶ 
ηπξαλληθῇ. Oligarchy and Tyranny are used as equivalent forms of government, in order to 
clarify the reason for the fear of the Athenians
491
. Hornblower characterizes the selection of 
these two words from the historian as ―a virtual hendiadys‖ and believes that they ―mean 
something like undesirable oligarchy‖492. The same opinion has Dover, who mentions that ―a 
modern historian of the archaic period would not speak of oligarchy and tyranny in the same 
breath; but after a century of democracy the concept of the tyrant as popular champion had 
faded […], and the Athenians regarded oligarchy and tyranny indifferently as the antithesis of 
democracy‖493. In fifth-century Athens, in which democracy was the dominating constitution, 
oligarchy and tyranny seem to be identified; they are both held as dynastic forms of 
government.  
The afore-mentioned fact is expressed also from Alcibiades, who after his persecution, 
resorted to Sparta and tried to convince the Lacedaemonians to start an expedition against the 
Athenians, who had already started their expedition against Sicily:  
 ―My family has always been opposed to tyrants (and every form of opposition to 
absolute power has the name of democracy) (πᾶλ δὲ ηὸ ἐλαληηνύκελνλ ηῶ δπλαζηεύνληη 
δῆκνο ὠλόκαζηαη), so as a consequence we have retained the leadership of the masses‖.494 
The word δπλαζηεύσ is not used by chance in this passage. Bétant translates it as 
―dominationem obtinere (to have the dominion)‖495, and Liddell-Scott as ―hold power or 
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lordship, be powerful or influential‖496. We should not confound the meaning of the verb with 
its noun δπλαζηεία, which is used mainly from Thucydides, in order to express a specific 
form of a tyrannical constitution, i.e. a narrow oligarchy
497
. In this case, Alcibiades uses this 
verb, in order to highlight the opposition to democracy; he makes a definition of the last, as a 
constitution, which stands against despotic forms of government. According to Dover ―it is 
not, however, an arbitrary definition; δπλαζηεύεηλ is the exercise of power unrestricted by a 
constitution or code of laws (cf. iii. 62.3), and in such conditions those who are outside the 
δπλαζηεία necessarily acquire a community of interest.‖498 What is interesting in this passage 
is that tyranny, oligarchy and all other forms of government are presented as equivalent 
tyrannical in front of democracy, the constitution based on the sovereignty of law. 
Consequently, the whole narration of the vandalism of the Hermai is for sure a very 
important event of the war, since it clarifies the internal crisis of the Athenian constitution, 
which will get worse after the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily. The Sicilian expedition did 
not cost to Athens only the defeat from the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War but led the city 
also to a big political crisis, which gets expressed basically from the oligarchic coup of the 
year 411. However, the story of the vandalism should not be considered as a particular event 
of the war; on the contrary, it is a part of a series of events, which prove the existence of 
constant fear of the Athenians against a possible overthrow of their constitution. We could 
say that this fear is equivalent to the phobos of the Spartans for the Helots
499
: in the same way 
the Athenians are afraid of a stasis in the internal of the city against their democratic way of 
governing. This is the ―Achilles‘ heel‖ of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. 
The Coup 
In the eight book of the Thucydidean narration of the Peloponnesian War, the obvious 
protagonist are the events in Athens of the year 411
500
, i.e. the overthrow of the democracy 
and the ascent of an authoritarian oligarchic government, consisted of 400 citizens. The 
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narration is very long
501
. Thucydides describes usually with great detail the events that he 
considers as very important for the continuation of the war; the oligarchic coup in 411 is for 
sure one of them. We could say that the events are divided into three periods. In the first part 
Thucydides describes the way that the Athenian democracy gets overthrown, in the second 
part how the oligarchy gets established and in the third how it falls. During this narration 
Thucydides manages to present the development of the Athenian political system after the 
disaster in Sicily and the way that this defeat led the city of Athens to an authoritarian way of 
governing. In the following text, I will try to understand in depth this new political 
development and its importance for the Athenian state in general.  
The overthrow of democracy and the establishment of an oligarchy 
Two years after the Athenian defeat in Sicily (411) Athens experienced the overthrow of its 
traditional form of government. The historical moment of this overthrow is for sure not 
incidental. After the Sicilian expedition, the Athenians were economically and 
psychologically devastated. The total defeat of them induced in the city the fear of a possible 
invasion from the enemies, which they had in Sicily and Greece.
502
 This insecurity, which 
was caused in Athens, was the perfect excuse that incited the oligarchic circles of the city to 
―wound‖ the Athenian form of constitution. We have, fortunately, two main accounts of the 
events in Athens in the year of 411; the one of Thucydides of course, which will be our main 
source and the one of Aristotle in his Athenaion Politeia, which cannot be left apart in an 
analysis of the oligarchic period of Athens. It is very interesting the fact that the narrations of 
the two writers are very different at some points since each of them describes the events from 
different perspectives. I will agree with Caspari that ―for the earlier stages of the revolution 
Aristotle is generally to be preferred to Thucydides‖, but ―for the climax of the movement, 
and still more so for its catastrophe, Thucydides is the superior authority‖503. This is why one 
should read carefully both accounts, in order to reconstruct the whole episode. Further down 
in my text, I will cite the Thucydidean narration with small interruptions, when necessary, in 
order to present also the Aristotelian version and its different perspective. 
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One of the main protagonists of these events is once more Alcibiades, who at this period was 
near to the Persian Satrap Tissaphernes. By coming in contact with the Athenians soldiers 
that were barracked at Samos, an island right in front of Asia Minor, the Athenian politician 
convinced them that he could guarantee the friendship of Tissaphernes first and then of the 
Persian King himself, if they would support an oligarchical form of governing
504
. And indeed 
Thucydides informs us that Alcibiades had a great influence on Tissaphernes and he truly 
convinced him at the beginning to stay on the side of the Athenians
505
, even if the 
continuation of the story proved that the help of the Persian King was an illusion. This is 
when Peisander, an Athenian general, returns to Athens with some of his co-citizens, in order 
to organise the overthrow
506
. Speaking at the Athenian ecclesia, Peisander tries to convince 
the citizens of the city that the only way to gain the trust of the Persian King and to defeat the 
Lacedaemonians is to bring back Alcibiades and modify the Athenian Constitution into a 
more moderate one (εἰ κὴ πνιηηεύζνκελ ηε ζσθξνλέζηεξνλ507) giving the power to the few (ἐο 
ὀιίγνπο κᾶιινλ ηὰο ἀξρὰο πνηήζνκελ). 
In this first speech of Peisander, the aim of the new government is made clear. Andrewes 
comments that ―the phrase used here suggests a system in which the assembly would retain 
its powers and existing membership, but eligibility for office, no doubt including the council, 
would be restricted.‖508 Even if the authoritarian character of the new constitution is not 
declared yet, Peisander proposes to the Athenian assembly a clearly more oligarchical way of 
governing, as we can understand from the expression ἐο ὀιίγνπο. According, to Thucydides, 
this was not an innovation that delighted the Athenians
509
, but the fear of the upcoming 
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Peloponnesians was even bigger and in this way the Athenian democracy, hundred years after 
the abolition of tyranny, fell (θαὶ θνηλῇ βνπιεπζάκελνη θαηαιύζνπζη ηὸλ δῆκνλ)510. 
After the fall of democracy in Athens, Peisander returned to Samos and started his campaign 
for the establishment of oligarchic governments both in Samos and in other Greek islands. 
When he returned to Athens, constitutional changes in the city had already started from the 
oligarchic circles; the coup instigators511 had already shown their cruel face by killing the 
ones, who considered as political enemies of the coup. All of this aside, the oligarchic circles 
had declared that public salary would be paid only to the ones that would offer military 
service (νὔηε κηζζνθνξεηένλ εἴε ἄιινπο ἢ ηνὺο ζηξαηεπνκέλνπο) and that not more than five 
thousand citizens would have participated in the government, chosen according to their 
personal abilities, their property and their personal skills (νὔηε κεζεθηένλ η῵λ πξαγκάησλ 
πιένζηλ ἢ πεληαθηζρηιίνηο, θαὶ ηνύηνηο νἳ ἂλ κάιηζηα ηνῖο ηε ρξήκαζη θαὶ ηνῖο ζώκαζηλ ὠθειεῖλ 
νἷνί ηε ὦζηλ) 512. Apart from this, the coup instigators had weakened the boule and the 
ecclesia by deciding that the two important bodies of the Athenian democracy would be still 
convened, but that no decision could have been taken without the approval of the ones to 
organize the coup (ἐβνύιεπνλ δὲ νὐδὲλ ὅηη κὴ ηνῖο μπλεζη῵ζη δνθνίε), who also provided the 
speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say513. 
The fear of these extreme changes of the oligarchs, which was spread in the city, led to the 
division of the Athenian citizens: under the constant fear of being killed in case of 
contradiction to the instigators, the trust between the people disappeared and no one could 
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express his political opinion publicly.
514
 Andrewes and Hornblower
515
 both expressed the 
idea that Thucydides uses an exaggerated tone, in order to describe the events of the coup by 
presenting the coup instigators as ―a monolithic group of extremists‖516. Even if this is true, 
one cannot dispute the fact that Athens lived in 411 an extreme change of constitution, which 
led the traditional institutions of Athens in a deep crisis and caused to its citizens the 
sentiment of insecurity about the future of their city
517
. 
The new constitution will be however formed definitely when Peisander will turn back from 
Samos. From the moment that Peisander took the helm, the principal intention of the coup 
instigators518 was made clear once and for all
519
. Peisander convened the ecclesia, which 
elected ten men with the authority to recommend the form of the new constitution (δέθα 
ἄλδξαο ἑιέζζαη μπγγξαθέαο αὐηνθξάηνξαο)520. The decisions of the commissioners declared 
the nature of the new government: on the one hand it got decided that every Athenian could 
submit a proposal without being punished (ἐμεῖλαη κὲλ Ἀζελαίσλ ἀλαηεὶ εἰπεῖλ γλώκελ ἣλ ἄλ 
ηηο βνύιεηαη); in this way the reaction of the Athenians about the reforms would be calmed. 
On the other hand, it got decided that all tenure of office under the existing constitutions 
would be at an end (κήηε ἀξρὴλ ἄξρεηλ κεδεκίαλ ἔηη ἐθ ηνῦ αὐηνῦ θόζκνπ). Apart from that, 
into the Athenian state was inserted the body of Four Hundred citizens
521
, which would exert 
power with full authority. In the city got imposed a regime of authoritarian governance: no 
pubic salary would be paid anymore (κήηε κηζζνθνξεῖλ)522 and the body of the Five 
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Thousand, would be convened only when it would seem appropriate (θαὶ ηνὺο 
πεληαθηζρηιίνπο δὲ μπιιέγεηλ ὁπόηαλ αὐηνῖο δνθῇ).  
At this point, we should note one of the main differences between the Thucydidean and 
Aristotelian narration. While in the history of Thucydides the new government started with 
the establishment of the body of the Five Thousand, which however got replaced immediately 
from the Four Hundred, in the Aristotelian version it seems that the Five Thousand were 
destined to hold power in the future, but for the time the Four Hundred would be the body to 
govern
523
: 
―The Council to consist of four hundred members according to the ancestral regulations 
(βνπιεύεηλ κὲλ ηεηξαθνζίνπο θαηὰ ηὰ πάηξηα), forty from each tribe taken from a 
preliminary list of any persons over thirty years of age that the members of the tribe may 
elect. These to appoint the officials, and to draft a proposal about the form of oath to be 
taken, and to take action about the laws and the audits and other matters as they may 
think good.‖524 
In this case, the main difference between the two authors is the fact that Aristotle makes a 
more modest narration of the events, when it comes to the oligarchy in Athens when 
Thucydides is for sure more direct and objective. He declares from the beginning that the 
body of the Five Thousand was actually a ζρῆκα πνιηηηθὸλ (a political pretence)525, in order to 
calm the masses, who opposed to the change of the constitution, when Aristotle describes in a 
detailed way
526
 this new body without making a mention on the fact that it did not really 
exist. Only at the end of his description of the events in Athens in 411 the philosopher 
changes idea and mentions that the Five Thousand were elected ιόγῳ κόλνλ (only 
nominally)
527
, which means that the non-existence of the Five Thousand was widely known 
at the end. What is clear however from both accounts is the fact that the Four Hundred were 
considered from the beginning of the coup as the leading political body in the formation of 
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the new government and the one to govern during the four months
528
 of the oligarchic period 
of Athens.  
The consequence of the afore-mentioned changes in the politics of the Athenian state is that 
the traditional Athenian institutions like the boule and the ecclesia changed completely 
character, the sovereignty of the assembly got abolished and the council of the Five Hundred 
got occupied by violence by the instigators, who designated prytaneis from their classes
529
 
and made the usual sacrifices of the boule.
530
 Thucydides describes also the cruelty of the 
new administration, which put to death, imprisoned and banished the ones, which were held 
as political enemies. Last but not least, the oligarchs made overtures to Agis, King of the 
Spartans, in order to make peace with him now that they were in command and could not be 
impeded by the not trusty Athenian public (ηῶ ἀπίζηῳ δήκῳ)531. 
It is strange that Thucydides does not describe with more detail all reforms that the 
government brought about in the city of Athens, when on the other hand he is used to 
describing with every little detail military events of the war, as justly several scholars 
remarked
532. He merely says that the new government ―made major changes to the whole 
system of administration by the people (πνιὺ κεηαιιάμαληεο ηῆο ηνῦ δήκνπ δηνηθήζεσο)‖533. 
To sum it up, the historian remains basically to the fact that the Four Hundred took absolute 
control of the city, demonstrated a violent policy towards their political enemies and tried to 
gain the friendship of the king Agis in Sparta, which ended futile, since Agis got convinced 
that the citizens of Athens would not abandon so easily their former freedom (νὐδ᾽ εὐζὺο 
νὕησ ηὸλ δῆκνλ ηὴλ παιαηὰλ ἐιεπζεξίαλ παξαδώζεηλ).534  
Aristotle, on the other hand, makes a more detailed description of the reforms of the new 
government. Among others, Aristotle mentions that the Council would consist of members 
over thirty years of age holding office for a year and without emolument
535
. He denominates 
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also several magistracies, which the new Council would include, like the Generals, the Nine 
Archons, the Sacred Remembrancer, the Company-commanders, Officers of the Horse, et.al. 
The philosopher speaks also of some future changes of the government, according to which 
four Councils would be formed from persons of the stated age, but the in-service boule would 
be selected by ballot
536
. Aristotle describes, furthermore, all the new tasks and responsibilities 
of the Council with great detail
537
 and it is indeed remarkable that Thucydides does not make 
a more detailed description of a constitution so important for the development of the history 
of his city. 
According to Erbse
538
, the deficient description of important events from Thucydides can be 
justified from the fact that the historian ―schreibt nicht Verfassungsgeschichte, sondern setzt 
die Fakten in Beziehung zu den menschlichen Plänen‖539. I will agree with this idea: 
Thucydides is not primarily interested in writing constitutional history; more than that he 
wants to understand, how the development of the political ideas influenced the way that its 
protagonists behaved. We could say that he is the painstaking scholar not of the events 
themselves but of the motivations of the participants of the war that cause these events. This 
is a very important observation about the way that Thucydides writes his history, which one 
should consider for the analysis of the development of the political history in Greece during 
the Peloponnesian War. 
The new constitution, however, was destined to be soon overthrown. The reaction to this 
authoritarian government started from Samos and the Athenian military troops, which were 
barracked there. After the hard competition between those who, convinced by the coup 
instigators, wanted to impose the oligarchy on the army (νἱ δὲ ηὸ ζηξαηόπεδνλ 
ὀιηγαξρεῖζζαη)540 and the ones against the authoritarian way of governing of the Four 
Hundred, who wanted to impose the democracy on the city (νἱ κὲλ ηὴλ πόιηλ ἀλαγθάδνληεο 
δεκνθξαηεῖζζαη)541, the ecclesia of Samos542 decided to refuse the new way of governing and 
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to establish once and for all the democracy on the island. The contribution of Alcibiades in 
this was very important for the after overthrow of the oligarchy in Athens: he prevented the 
Athenians of Samos from sailing against the oligarchs in Athens and in the meantime sent a 
message in the city representing the Athenian military by declaring that the governors could 
keep the Five Thousand as governing body but the body of the Four Hundred should be 
abolished
543
. The authoritarian oligarchy of the Four Hundred was not destined to last long in 
the traditionally democratic Athens. 
The Fall of the Four Hundred and the mixed constitution in the modern debate 
In the next paragraphs of the History, the historian describes the debilitation of the Four 
Hundred and the ascent of a new form of government
544
. The message of Alcibiades spread 
the hope to some moderate oligarchs, who were not anymore satisfied with the existing 
constitution. In this way the body of the coup instigators got divided into the extremists, who 
supported a more absolute form of government and the moderates, who wanted the return to a 
more democratic form of constitution. The extremists barricaded in Piraeus, a fact that led the 
leader of the moderate group of the instigators Theramenes and his supporters to react, 
destroy the wall and demand a more democratic way of governing by giving the lead of the 
city to the Five Thousand. These internal conflicts in connection with the defeat of the 
Athenians during the battleship between them and the Peloponnesians in Eretria led the 
Athenians to convene the ecclesia and abolish the constitution of the Four Hundred by 
creating a new form of government for the city. 
First of all, the assembly decided545 that the arche of the Four Hundred would be abolished 
and in its position would be set the body of the Five Thousand
546
, consisted only by the ones, 
who could be equipped at their own cost (ηνῖο πεληαθηζρηιίνηο ἐςεθίζαλην ηὰ πξάγκαηα 
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παξαδνῦλαη (εἶλαη δὲ αὐη῵λ ὁπόζνη θαὶ ὅπια παξέρνληαη)547. All of this aside, no public salary 
would be paid (θαὶ κηζζὸλ κεδέλα θέξεηλ κεδεκηᾷ ἀξρῇ). Thucydides informs us, that several 
other assemblies were convened, which inter alia inaugurated nomothetai, i.e. lawmakers, a 
fact that indicates that the new constitution, in opposition to the one of the Four Hundred, 
should have been based on laws. No more information is given from the historian about other 
decisions of these assemblies; the historian mentions merely that the assembly passed also 
other constitutional measures (θαὶ ηἆιια ἐςεθίζαλην ἐο ηὴλ πνιηηείαλ) without nominating 
                                                          
547
 This new form of government is one of the most difficult chapters of the Greek constitutional history. Harris 
1990, 258, for example basing his argumentation on epigraphic evidence (256-258) argues that ―we have every 
reason to believe that the Constitution of the Five Thousand found in chapter 30 of the Constitution of the 
Athenians is the constitution that Thucydides says was instituted after the fall of the Four Hundred and was "a 
moderate blending in respect to the few and to the many." In this case "the many" were the Five Thousand who 
had the right to vote in elections, to hold both elective and sortitive offices, and to serve on the Council‖. At this 
point I should note that the Five Thousand of the Athenaion Politeia (30) were actually the ones, who organized 
the structure of the new authoritarian government of the Four Hundred, which means that this event of the 
Aristotelian work refers to the beginning of the coup in Athens and not to its overthrow. Of the same opinion is 
also Vlastos 1952, 189, who also believes that ―the Constitution of the Five Thousand‖, outlined in Chapter 30 
of the Athenaion Politeia, came into force in the interval between the overthrow of the Four Hundred in 
Semptember, 411 B.C. and the restoration of democracy, soon after the battle of Cyzicus (Arpil, 410)‖. See also 
Harris 1990, 258, who argues that ―we have every reason to believe that the Constitution of the Five Thousand 
found in chapter 30 of the Constitution of the Athenians is the constitution that Thucydides says was instituted 
after the fall of the Four Hundred and was ―a moderate blending in respect to the few and to the many‖. On the 
same idea see also Ferguson 1926, 72ff. and Ehrenberg 1922, 613ff. I understand the way of thinking of the 
afore-mentioned scholars, since the constitution, which arises after the fall of the Four Hundred is without exact 
definition from no one of the ancient scholars and someone could easily think that Aristotle speaks in such a 
detailed way of the Five Thousand, because it was the perfect mixture of democracy and oligarchy and this is 
why it should fit perfectly as the governing political body of the difficult phase between the Four Hundred and 
the restoration of democracy in Athens. I cannot however agree with this opinion. A look at the text of Aristotle 
can easily show that the scholar dedicates a separate paragraph (even if it is a small one and without details) on 
the events after the fall of the Four Hundred and that when he speaks of the Five Thousand, he obviously refers 
to the first political body established in the city after the fall of democracy and before the accession of the Four 
Hundred. In sum, even if Aristotle (30) mentions that the political body of the Five Thousand was established 
not for the first period of the Athenian oligarchy but for the future (a fact that could give an evidence that it 
could have come into force in the period of the mixed constitution), I cannot honestly find any really trustworthy 
evidence in the texts of our two main sources of the events in Athens in the year 411, which can reinforce the 
afore-mentioned idea. See also Rhodes 1972, 188, who also argues that ―there was little connection between this 
intermediate constitution and the ‗future‘ constitution of Athenaion Politeia 30)‖. Last but not least, I will have 
to mention the opinion of Fritz and Kapp 1950, 182, who draws the conclusion that the assumption mentioned 
by several scholars, ‖that the constitution following the overthrow of the Four Hundred was identical with the 
constitution described by Aristotle in Chapter 30 of the present treatise is at variance with the fact that Aristotle 
does not count this constitution in his enumeration of constitutions in Chapter 41 (in which the successive 
constitutions after the restoration of democracy in Athens are mentioned), implying that this constitution was 
never actually applied, and also with Thucydides‘ account of the events which followed the overthrow of the 
Four Hundred‖. I think that the mixed constitution, which arose after the fall of the Four Hundred was actually a 
new form of government, destined to lead to a full democracy some years later and could not have been 
determined by the oligarchs, who organized the coup and aimed at the estrangement of the Athenian demos from 
its democratic roots.  
128 
 
which ones exactly. Nevertheless Thucydides mentions that the new constitution was a 
mixture between the few and the many (κεηξία γὰξ ἥ ηε ἐο ηνὺο ὀιίγνπο θαὶ ηνὺο πνιινὺο 
μύγθξαζηο ἐγέλεην) and that the city, for the first time in the life of our historian, was well-
governed (εὖ πνιηηεύζαληεο), a fact that managed to enable the state to raise up her head after 
her manifold disasters
548
. 
There has been a lot of discussion from several modern scholars about the characteristics of 
this new constitution for one simple reason; Thucydides is too laconic about the constitution 
that arises after the fall of the Four Hundred. Actually, we have two basic characteristics of 
the new form of government. The first one is that the new constitution is based on the power 
of Five Thousand hoplites, i.e. the well off upper social class, who would be able to pay the 
costs of its own equipment and not receive a public salary. The second is that the constitution 
of the Five Thousand is a mixed constitution between the ὀιίγνη and the πνιινί. This lack of 
information has caused a very large discussion between De ste Croix and Andrewes about 
what should have been the real nature of this constitution, which is interesting to be analysed 
briefly. 
The main contradiction of the two scholars has been the question about if Athens after the 
overthrow of the Four Hundred returned to an absolute form of democracy or to a rather 
mixed constitution. De ste Croix expressed the idea that Athens after the fall of the Four 
Hundred returns to its former democratic constitution. He bases his theory on a very large 
argumentation, which I will mention here shortly. First of all, he believes that ―since it was a 
general assembly of all citizens in which supreme political power ultimately resided, and the 
oligarchic features of the new constitution could be abolished or modified at any time at the 
pleasure of the assembly, the constitution would be basically democratic.‖549 The repeated 
convening of the ecclesia and its obvious sovereignty in defining the new constitution is, 
according to the scholar, a proof of the return of Athens to the democracy.  
Secondly, he mentions that the reference of Thucydides to a mixture between the Few and the 
Many does not imply the identification of these groups with oligarchy and democracy, like 
several scholars supported. According to him, the Few and the Many should be understood in 
a social sense; the Few should be the upper propertied classes when the Many should be the 
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lower poor classes, who of course would be the first to want full democracy
550
. The new 
constitution consists of citizens from all social and economic classes, which indicates a clear 
democracy. The exclusive participation of the hoplites in the new government should be also 
a proof of the return to democracy, according to De ste Croix. The scholar claims that the 
thetes, i.e the lowest social Athenian class, were anyway excluded from political rights in the 
Athenian democracy and therefore could not legitimately be described as having any share at 
all in the constitution; it was in effect, according to him, very little difference between the 
constitution of the Five Thousand and full democracy
551
.  
Last but not least the fact that, besides Thucydides and Aristotle
552
, there are no other ancient 
sources, which mention the existence of the constitution of the Five Thousand, is another sign 
for De ste Croix of the re-democratisation of Athens: since the city returned to its former 
traditional democratic constitution, why should an already known and usual way of 
governing be even worthy of mention by the ancient scholars?
553
 According to him: ―Here for 
once Thucydides has declared himself plainly, in favour of what we can only call a moderate 
or modified democracy, a democracy which accepted certain oligarchic elements as a 
temporary measure but retained the power to abolish those elements and did before long 
abolish them, without resort to violence.‖554 Even if the new constitution had some oligarchic 
elements, the base of it was the sovereignty of the people, which should indicate beyond any 
doubt a democratic way of governing. 
The theory of De ste Croix has been supported from several scholars. First of all, Sealey 
believes that the theory of Ste. Croix about the function of the Five Thousand should be 
accepted and that after the Four Hundred the new regime was a modified democracy, in 
which ―the aim of the plans was economy: political office was to be restricted to men of 
wealth because these could undertake political office without receiving public pay‖555. Donini 
is also of the same opinion. The scholar mentions that the new government should have been 
probably a democracy with oligarchic elements rather than an oligarchy with democratic 
elements
556
. The mixed constitution should have been consequently a moderate democracy 
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especially if we consider the fact that the assembly, which is the main body of democracy, 
had a principal role in this new constitution and that the oligarchic elements of this new form 
of government were actually temporary and could be abolished at any time. 
On the other hand, against this theory stand several modern scholars, like Andrewes. In his 
note, he claims that there has been a change of constitution in Athens, but not a complete re-
democratization of it. In this new constitution it seems that the electorate broadens from Four 
Hundred to Five Thousand people, a mixed body of oligarchs and democrats, in other words 
the mixture of the different interests of the Few and the Many
557. According to Andrewes, „to 
include in the ‚few‗ ὁπόζνη θαὶ ὅπια παξέρνληαη does not indeed make the Five Thousand a 
democracy, even a modified one, but it does remove their regime very far from what a Greek 
of that time would ordinarily understand by oligarchy, and here we clearly stand on the 
middle ground of compromise‖558. Consequently, the new constitution is a middle way 
between the constitution of the Four Hundred established by the coup of oligarchs and the 
traditional democratic way of governing in Athens; the city did not arrive yet in full 
democracy. 
The same idea supports also Rhodes, who inter alia points out that the democratic element of 
the new constitution is the fact that the power passes from the boule, previously consisted of 
the Four Hundred, to the ecclesia, now consisted by the mixed Five Thousand hoplites. This 
is not, however, evidence of full democracy; even in this composition the assembly was 
always limited and one should not confound this mixed form of constitution with the 
democracy established in Athens in the summer of 410 some months later shortly after the 
battle of Cyzicus
559. According to the scholar ―the transition from the intermediate regime to 
the full democracy was comparatively smooth‖560. Last but not least, Lintott argues that a 
return to full democracy directly after the oligarchy of the Four Hundred is difficult to accept, 
since ―the limitation of public office to men of hoplite status was to some extent part of the 
earlier democracy. At best one could argue that the difference between the intermediate 
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regime and the democracy lay in membership of the council being limited to men of hoplite 
status‖.561 
It is remarkable that this passage of the Thucydidean history caused such a large discussion 
between the scholars. As far as I am concerned, the opinion of De ste Croix has too little 
evidence to rely on. Thucydides does not give any clear evidence of the characterization of 
the constitution of the Five Thousand as a democratic one and it should be more logical to 
believe that Athens would return to its former constitution gradually – like the city actually 
did in the year 410, according to Aristotle. Even the constitution of the Four Hundred was not 
imposed from day to day; the citizens of Athens had to be prepared, in order to accept it. This 
is why I think that, without having more evidence, it is very risky to support the re-
democratization of Athens in such an extremely fast way. 
But why should the text of the historian cause such a large discussion between the scholars? 
The answer is simple and is always the same one that I noticed in other parts of my thesis: 
Thucydides‘ text can be characterized many times by ‗polyinterpretability‘ like Hornblower 
justly remarks
562. According to him, ―some of Th.‘s most important political judgments 
present great difficulties of interpretation, and can be taken in more than one way‖. However, 
the historical truth should not be the only subject of study to research in the text of the 
historian; equally (if not more) interesting is the way that Thucydides writes his history and 
the motivations behind it. Like the historian himself mentions:  
―But it was no easy matter, after a span of a hundred years or so since the tyrants were 
overthrown (ἐπεηδὴ νἱ ηύξαλλνη θαηειύζεζαλ), to deprive the Athenian people of their 
freedom (ἐιεπζεξίαο παῦζαη), when not only had they never been subjects (θαὶ νὐ κόλνλ 
κὴ ὑπήθννλ ὄληα) but for more than half of that period they were themselves used to 
ruling others (ὑπὲξ ἥκηζπ ηνῦ ρξόλνπ ηνύηνπ αὐηὸλ ἄιισλ ἄξρεηλ εἰσζόηα)‖563. 
Until its decision to declare the war against Syracuse in 415, Athens is the sovereign power in 
the Greek world. The ever-growing power of the city provoked its arrogant behaviour, about 
which the reader of the text of Thucydides gets already prepared in the description of the 
Melian dialogue in 416, during which the Athenians declared their sovereignty over the 
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Greek city-states and conquered the island
564
, but takes its final form, when the Athenians 
decided to start an extremely risky expedition against Syracuse, a very powerful city far away 
from their own. The narration of the constitution imposed by the Four Hundred, 
consequently, is not only written, in order to describe the constitutional changes in Athens in 
411, but also in order to show the consequences of the former arrogant behaviour of the 
Athenians. In this case, Athens experienced an ―earthquake‖ of its cultural and political 
ideals, based on its democratic way of governing. The historical truth about the constitutional 
history of the Greek world through the work of Thucydides is therefore important, but its 
research has, in my opinion, a limit, because we will never be able to understand completely 
its development. On the other hand, I think that if one tries to follow the way of thinking of 
Thucydides, without being obsessive about the truth behind it, he will be able to comprehend 
not only the motivations of the protagonists of the Peloponnesian War but also the changes 
that this war caused to the city-states. The Greek world after the Peloponnesian War will 
never be the same again. 
The aim of the Thucydidean narration   
The overthrow of the Athenian democracy and the rise of the authoritarian constitution of the 
Four Hundred is for sure one of the most interesting passages in the history of Thucydides 
and can lead us to several conclusions about the development not only of the Athenian 
politics but also of the Peloponnesian War in general. Reading the narration of the historian, 
one can immediately understand the particularities of its account in comparison with the other 
large account of the overthrow of the Athenian democracy, i.e. the one of Aristotle. Like 
already said the two main accounts of the events in 411 in Athens are very different from 
each other and serve different purposes. Lang mentions on the different accounts of the two 
scholars that: 
‖All of the details and steps of the revolution which Aristotle records have documentary 
basis or legislative significance, while all those included by Thucydides are those which 
were proved by the end result of the revolution to have been actual and effective 
actions‖565. 
On the one hand, the account of Aristotle seems more ‗pragmatic‘. The philosopher narrates 
the events of the coup much more analytically than Thucydides and offers more detailed 
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information about the new constitution. However, he is not interested in narrating the social 
effect that this coup had on the Athenian demos. He does not refer to the fear or the 
disappointment that these extreme constitutional changes caused by a body of citizens used to 
a democratic way of governing. His narration is so ―diplomatic‖ that someone could 
characterize his version of the story more favourable to the oligarchs, even though Rhodes 
justly, according to me, notes accurately that Aristotle ―probably chose to use this material 
because of the details which it offered rather than because of its political slant‖566.  
On this subject, the account of Thucydides is much more detailed. The historian describes the 
sentiments of the Athenians in front of these historical changes for their city, their fear and 
delusion for the overthrow of their traditional form of government, the terror spread in the 
city because of the rigid administration of the new constitution and the ―civil war‖ which 
exploded in Athens at this moment of the extreme social crisis. Harris mentions very 
accurately that Thucydides describes the change of constitution as ―coup d‘état accomplished 
by terror and intimidation‖ when Aristotle describes it as ―a smooth and orderly transition 
from one regime to another‖.567 Harris even mentions that Thucydides invented details or 
exaggerated certain facts, in order to give a more dramatic tone to the events of 411 and 
present them as a coup d‘état, when the political reforms of the Four Hundred could have 
happened actually under much calmer conditions
568
. Even though this opinion is interesting, I 
cannot say that I can agree completely with this idea, because for a traditional democratic city 
like Athens, the political changes of the 411 should have brought much fear and 
dissatisfaction and even if the narration has a dramatic character, I do not think that it is much 
exaggerated. I believe that Taylor recapitulates in a great way the differences between the 
two accounts: 
―Thucydides gives a detailed background and context to the constitutional change and 
includes in it elements of terror and propaganda (8.65). Aristotle, on the other hand, 
provides little context beyond nothing that the people ‗were compelled to abolish the 
democracy‘ and did so ‗because of the belief that the King of Persia would be more likely 
to fight with them if they had an oligarchical constitution‘ (29.1)‖569. 
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All this information about the psychological consequences of the new government on the 
demos of Athens is completely ignored by Aristotle and one could ask why the philosopher 
does not enter deeper in the Athenian society and its reaction in front of this extreme change 
of government. First of all, one should mention that between the two ancient scholars, 
Thucydides was the one to be present at the events. I imagine that Aristotle could have 
known the detailed information of the coup, but he could not have known the exact 
sentiments that these events caused at the citizens of Athens.  
Apart from that, one should also mention that Thucydides is concentrated many times more 
on the consequences of the acts of the protagonists of the war on themselves, than on the 
events, like already said. It is not the first time, in which our historian leaves out some events 
and concentrates his narration on the impact that the development of the war had on the 
persons, who participated in it. Several examples of his history prove this fact; the Melian 
dialogue, for example, is characterized by the detail, with which the historian describes the 
authoritarian behaviour of the Athenians. During the description of the civil war in Corcyra, 
Thucydides also dedicates a large part to the negative sentiments that this civil war caused at 
the citizens of the island. It is obvious once more that Thucydides is not interested to write 
constitutional history and analyse in great detail all the reforms of the new government. He is 
more interested to analyse the reasons for such extreme political changes, to describe the 
consequences that the events had on the society itself and to comprehend the importance of 
these events for the development of the Peloponnesian War in general.  
In conclusion, even if we are rather unfortunate in this case since the narration of Thucydides 
ends not long after the events in 411, one can easily understand the importance of the 
political changes in Athens for the continuation of the war and its end (narrated fortunately 
by Xenophon). This extreme political crisis, which hit Athens after its defeat in Sicily, 
worked as precursor, could someone say, for the final defeat of the city from the opposed 
forces of the Lacedaemonians in Aegospotami (405)
570
. A political crisis of this measure 
indicates a fragile society, which seems rather weak to deal with a strong enemy, like Sparta. 
The importance of the consequences of the Sicilian expedition for the city of Athens will be 
noticed from the historian itself already in his second book: 
―That was not so much a mistake of judgement about the enemy they were attacking as a 
failure on the part of those sending the men abroad to follow up this decision with further 
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support for them. Instead they engaged in personal intrigues over the leadership of the 
people and so blunted the effectiveness of the forces in the field and for the first time 
embroiled the city at home in factional turmoil (θαὶ ηὰ πεξὶ ηὴλ πόιηλ πξ῵ηνλ ἐλ ἀιιήινηο 
ἐηαξάρζεζαλ)‖571. 
Athens started the war as the military and financial superpower of the Aegean, finished 
defeated and under a great social and political crisis and, even after the liberation of the city 
from the Lacedaemonians, was destined to not find never again its former glory. The Sicilian 
expedition cost the city too much. 
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Chapter 7. The term oligarchy in the work of the historian 
Forms of Oligarchy 
As last part of my thesis, I left a chapter, which in some way contains all the diverse 
oligarchies, to which Thucydides refers in his narration. In the forthcoming text, I will 
mention a list of all the possible examples of oligarchic ways of governing, as described by 
our historian, by adding some extra information to the cases of oligarchy, which were not 
already analysed during my thesis. Aim of my research is, as has always been in my work, 
first of all to gather more information possible on the oligarchic states of the Greek world of 
the fifth century, as presented in the work of our historian, and secondly to come a bit closer 
to the way, in which Thucydides understood oligarchy as a political condition of his times. In 
my thesis it was made clear – or at least I hope so – that a researcher of the development of 
the political history of Greece during the Peloponnesian War should be very careful on the 
real meaning of the term ὀιηγαξρία and its synonyms; oligarchy can have many names and 
shades in the work of the historian. After all, what is oligarchy for Thucydides? 
The proper term: ὀλιγαρχία 
At this point, I will have to make a really important observation: the use of the term ὀιηγαξρία 
is rare in the work of the historian except for his last book. Concretely, Thucydides uses the 
term 8 times in the rest of the work and 31 times during the narration of the events in Athens 
in 411
572
. The few times that Thucydides refers to the proper term are not obviously 
equivalent to the times that Thucydides describes the different forms of an oligarchic way of 
governing; in my thesis, I pointed out all the passages, in which the historian speaks of 
oligarchic constitutions. It is however impressive that in most of the cases he does not use the 
exact word, but describes them in other ways, mainly using the adjective ὀιίγνη573, when on 
the other hand he chooses in some few cases to use the proper term. In which passages uses 
consequently the historian the precise term of ὀιηγαξρία and what can we understand from 
this research about the idea that Thucydides himself had about this way of governing?  
 
                                                          
572
 See for exact passages Thuc. 8.47.2; 8.48.3-5; 8.54.1; 8.63.3-4; 8.64.1; 8.64.5; 8.66.5; 8.68.3; 8.72.1-2; 
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573
 Viz. inter alia Thuc. 2.37.2; 3.39.6; 3.82.1; 5.81.2; 5.84.3-85. 
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The typical form 
Like already said, ὀιηγαξρία is not one and precise form of constitution in the work of our 
historian. He uses the word, in order to describe several forms that this constitution takes 
during the Peloponnesian War. The first to be analysed is for sure the typical form of 
oligarchy, i.e. the oligarchic constitution, which, even if its characteristics change from city to 
city, is always based on the sovereignty of laws. Ι have already researched thoroughly in 
separate chapters two basic forms of law-abiding oligarchies of the Thucydidean History. The 
first is for sure the ὀιηγαξρία ἰζόλνκνο, i.e. a law-abiding government, in which all citizens 
have equal rights, but not equal political power, which Thucydides mentions when he 
narrates the episode of the indictment of the Thebans in 426
574
. The other one is the oligarchy 
επηηήδεηα, i.e. the oligarchy of the Spartan type, adapted to the Lacedaemonian mentality of 
life
575
.  
What our historian comprehends as an oligarchy, can be understood also from the examples 
further down, according to me. As already seen, in the sixth book, at the discussion of the 
Syracusian ecclesia before the arrival of the Athenian naval in 415, the pro-democratic 
Athenagoras makes a definition of the two main constitutions of the Peloponnesian War, 
democracy and oligarchy
576
. He defines democracy as the best constitution, which distributes 
equally the responsibilities and rights to all citizens, while oligarchy as the government of the 
few (ἐγὼ δέ θεκη πξ῵ηα κὲλ δῆκνλ μύκπαλ ὠλνκάζζαη, ὀιηγαξρίαλ δὲ κέξνο), by which the 
commons have to confront the dangers, whereas the oligoi enjoy the most of the benefits for 
themselves (ὀιηγαξρία δὲ η῵λ κὲλ θηλδύλσλ ηνῖο πνιινῖο κεηαδίδσζη, η῵λ δ᾽ ὠθειίκσλ νὐ 
πιενλεθηεῖ κόλνλ, ἀιιὰ θαὶ μύκπαλη᾽ ἀθεινκέλε ἔρεη).577  
A similar definition will be made by Thucydides in the eighth book when the historian 
describes the events, which led to the fall of the Four Hundred and the split among the 
Athenian oligarchs, a part of which expressed openly their will to give the power to the Five 
Thousand than the Four Hundred:  
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 Thuc. 3.62.3, For a more detailed analysis of the idea of isonomia in Thucydides, see the chapter on eunomia. 
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 See corresponding chapter. 
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 For a more detailed analysis of the speech of Athenagoras, see the chapter on Syracuse. 
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 Thuc. 6.39. 
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 ―Most of them578 were drawn through personal ambition into a mode of behaviour that is 
sure to end up destroying any oligarchy that emerges from a democracy (ὀιηγαξρία ἐθ 
δεκνθξαηίαο γελνκέλε). Right from the first day they not only all fail to consider 
themselves equals, but each thinks he deserves the very first place himself (πάληεο γὰξ 
αὐζεκεξὸλ ἀμηνῦζηλ νὐρ ὅπσο ἴζνη, ἀιιὰ θαὶ πνιὺ πξ῵ηνο αὐηὸο ἕθαζηνο εἶλαη). Whereas 
under a democracy an election is held and a person can bear the result more easily, telling 
himself that he was not defeated by his peers (ἐθ δὲ δεκνθξαηίαο αἱξέζεσο γηγλνκέλεο 
ῥᾷνλ ηὰ ἀπνβαίλνληα ὡο νὐθ ἀπὸ η῵λ ὁκνίσλ ἐιαζζνύκελόο ηηο θέξεη)‖579. 
The naturalness, with which the historian uses the expression ὀιηγαξρία ἐθ δεκνθξαηίαο 
γελνκέλε seems a bit strange since there are no other examples of an oligarchy emerged from 
a democracy in the History of the historian. Andrewes mentions on this passage that this 
expression is used by Thucydides as a psychological explanation for the split among the 
Athenian oligarchs
580
. In any case, Thucydides expresses in this passage his idea on the 
difference between democracy and oligarchy once more: oligarchy is defined by the fact that 
everyone wants to have the first place when by a democracy all citizens are equal and for this 
reason the vote results are accepted easier, since nobody feels inferior.  
The extreme forms 
It is very interesting, as already said, that the term ὀιηγαξρία has, according to the historian, 
many different shades and does not always correspond to law-abiding forms of government. 
Characteristic example in the Thucydidean History is for sure the authoritarian oligarchy of 
the Four Hundred in Athens in 411
581
. Furthermore, in the sixth book, when Thucydides 
describes the vandalism of the Hermai in Athens before the Sicilian expedition, our historian 
refers to the already existing internal crisis in Athens and the fear of a possible overthrow of 
the constitution; this fear will be realized in 411 with the coup. Inter alia the historian 
mentions that the vandalism of the Hermai and the ambiguous behaviour of Alcibiades (who 
was accused that he desecrated the Eleusinian Mysteries) caused the suspicion of the 
Athenians, who remembering the tyrannical period of the Peisistratids, were afraid that the 
events of 416 were part of some oligarchic or tyrannical conspiracy (ἐπὶ μπλσκνζίᾳ 
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 I.e. the oligarchs, who tried to overthrow the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. 
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 Andrewes 1981, 300-301. 
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ὀιηγαξρηθῇ582 θαὶ ηπξαλληθῇ πεπξᾶρζαη583). In this passage oligarchy and tyranny are 
considered as equivalent forms of government, a really strange idea, since the two 
constitutions are extremely different between each other; oligarchy is usually held as a law-
abiding constitution based on the power of the few when tyranny represents an absolute form 
of government
584
. In any case, the reference to oligarchy next to tyranny is very important, in 
order to understand that oligarchy in the world of Thucydides is not one single thing. In this 
passage, it is considered as an authoritarian form of constitution and it is not considered this 
way by chance; some years later the oligarchic circles of the city will indeed overthrow 
democracy and impose a ―tyrannical‖ form of oligarchy. Last but not least, Thucydides refers 
also to another case of extreme oligarchy, when he speaks of Megara and its constitution in 
424, of which I will speak at length in the following pages. 
The Megarian ὀλιγαρχία τὰ μάλιστα 
The case of Megara is of great interest, in order to understand the political changes in Greece 
during the Peloponnesian War. The city of Megara has a very interesting political history. Its 
geographical place between Athens and Sparta had as a consequence the constant contact of 
Megara with both cities, which tried continuously to take advantage of its strategic place. 
Indeed Megara is attested as an ally of both Leagues, of the Peloponnesian
585
 and the 
Delian
586
, in different periods of its history till the fourth century, when the city attempted to 
maintain neutrality among its larger neighbours and more distant powers
587
. It is not a 
coincidence that the Athenian-Megarian relationships are considered by several scholars the 
major factor responsible for the outbreak of the war.
588
 This particular story of Megara 
caused also a variable political development in the city, which is characterized by several 
political changes. Megara has been traditionally oligarchic, but this fact did not impede also 
the establishment of other political constitutions in the city. In the seventh century Megara is 
governed by the tyranny of Theagenes
589
, which – as Plutarch narrates590 – gets replaced by 
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an extreme violent democratic constitution, which caused a great discussion between the 
modern scholars, about if it has been indeed a real democracy or not
591
. It seems that Megara 
returned to its traditional oligarchic constitution till 427 when the democratic faction seized 
power and had the leading oligarchs exiled. A renewed stasis in Megara three years later led 
the city to an extreme form of oligarchy, the character of which will be our main subject of 
discussion in the next pages of my thesis. 
Thucydides narrates the conflict in Megara, which exploded between the two opposite 
political sides of the war, including the two powerful cities, Athens and Sparta, in the year 
424
592
. The story starts with the attack of the Athenians against the city, supported from the 
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 The ancient sources do not allow us, unfortunately, to have a clear image of the political situation in archaic 
Megara and especially of the radical political changes in the city after Theagenes. Aristotle refers three times in 
his politics to Megara, but he does not make clear always, of which period he speaks. The philosopher, for 
example, in 5.1302b, 27-31, speaks of the existence of a democracy in Megara, which got overthrown, when 
―they (the democrats) had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy (δη᾽ ἀηαμίαλ θαὶ ἀλαξρίαλ ἡηηεζέλησλ)‖. 
Aristotle speaks again of Megara in 1304b, 34-39, when he says that ―the democracy at Megara was put down in 
a similar manner; the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on expelling many 
of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body (νἱ γὰξ δεκαγσγνί, ἵλα ρξήκαηα ἔρσζη δεκεύεηλ, ἐμέβαινλ 
πνιινὺο η῵λ γλσξίκσλ, ἕσο πνιινὺο ἐπνίεζαλ ηνὺο θεύγνληαο), and these came back and defeated the people in 
a battle and set up the oligarchy (νἱ δὲ θαηηόληεο ἐλίθεζαλ καρόκελνη ηὸλ δῆκνλ θαὶ θαηέζηεζαλ ηὴλ ὀιηγαξρίαλ)‖. 
Both passages, however, have been disputed by the modern research, since it is not always easy to understand, if 
Aristotle speaks of the ―democracy‖ established after Theagenes or the one, which preceded the extreme 
oligarchy of 424 (on this discussion, see also the very detailed note of de Luna; Zizza; Curnis 2016, 289f.). At 
this point one should consider also the text of Plutarch (Plut. Quaes.Gr.18), who mentions that when the 
Megarians expelled Theagenes, ἐζσθξόλεζαλ θαηὰ ηὴλ πνιηηείαλ (i.e. had a moderate constitution). Plutarch is 
not clear, which characteristics this ―moderate‖ constitution really had (see also the very interesting theory of 
Birgalias 2008, 116ff. that the constitution of Megara at this period can be characterized as an isonomia). An 
important source of these political changes in Megara is also Theognis, a Megarian aristocrat and contemporary 
of the facts, who speaks of a new demos in the city, which becomes the dominating political group in Megara, 
consists mainly of land-owners (v. 53-57) and merchants (672-679, 1202) and is administrated by demagogues 
(41-42). This is not the right place to speak more detailed about the political changes in archaic Megara. On the 
modern bibliography on this subject anyway, the discussion of the constitution, which arose after Theagenes and 
the question on if it was a real democracy or not and on if the passages of Aristotle refer to this one or to the 
political changes of 424, see among others Legon 1981, 104ff.; Newman 1902, 265; Oost 1973, 193ff.; 
Robinson 1997, 114ff.; Williams 1903, 4ff.; Walter 1993, 102ff.; O‘Neil 1995, 21f. and Highbarger 1927, 197, 
n. 15 (who believe that the passages of Aristotle refer to the constitution of the city after the tyranny of 
Theagenes) and on the other hand Gehrke 1985, 106ff. (who believes that Aristotle speaks of the events in 424). 
I will agree with the majority of the afore-mentioned scholars that Aristotle refers to the democracy of the sixth 
century and not to the one of the fifth and this is why I will not consider the text of the philosopher as a source 
of the characteristics of the Megarian democracy from 427 to 424. For the opposite opinion, see Forsdyke 2005, 
74ff. who claims that ―it is extremely unlikely that there was democracy in sixth-century Megara‖.  
592
 I think that, in order to understand the help from the Spartans in the city of Megara, one should mention at 
this point that Megara was traditionally in good relationships with the Lacedaemonians and in bad relationships 
with the Athenians. An evidence of this fact is the so-called Megarian decree, a set of economic sanctions levied 
upon Megara in 433/ 432 by the Athenian ‗Empire‘ shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The 
Lacedaemonians tried to convince the Athenians to cancel the decree, a request, which Athens rejected (Thuc. 
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democratic faction of Megara
593
, continues with the involvement of Brasidas in the war
594
 
and the attack of the Boeotians against the Athenians in the city
595
 and ends with the retreat 
of the Athenians and Spartans without getting involved in a battle between them and the 
return of the oligarchic exiles from Pegae
596
, who settle down a so-called ὀιηγαξρία ηὰ 
κάιηζηα597. During this conflict, we can observe the change of the constitution of Megara 
from its former law-abiding constitution to an extreme oligarchy. How can we define the 
constitution of the city during the Peloponnesian War and what sort of constitution is this 
ὀιηγαξρία ηὰ κάιηζηα exactly? 
The first subject to be analysed is the definition of the constitution of Megara in 424 before 
the stasis, which Thucydides does not specify. The narration starts with the collaboration of 
Athens with the democratic faction of the city, in order to avoid the attack of the oligarchic 
exiles of Megara, who were sent to Pegae:  
―The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities of the Athenians, 
who invaded their country twice every year with all their forces, and harassed by the 
incursions of their own exiles in Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the 
majority of the people (νἳ ζηαζηαζάλησλ ἐθπεζόληεο ὑπὸ ηνῦ πιήζνπο), began to ask each 
other whether it would not be better to receive back their exiles, and free the town from 
one of its two scourges.‖ 598  
From the text, it seems that the city is divided into two parts, the one part on the side of the 
πιήζνο, which exiled a part of the oligarchs to Pegae and the other on the side of these 
oligarchic exiles. These two sides could hypothetically represent the two political factions of 
the city. After a sort of ζηάζηο it seems that the oligarchs were exiled to Pegae from the 
πιῆζνο. This revolution, which is described in this passage, could possibly refer to a 
revolution of the democratic faction against the oligarchic one and to an – at least – small 
period of dominance of the democratic faction in the city of Megara in the years before the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1.139.1). For more information on the Megarian decree, see among others Bonner 1921; Brunt 1951; de Ste. 
Croix 1972, 225ff.; French 1976; and MacDonald 1983. 
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stasis. The use of the word πιῆζνο in this case indicates the majority of the citizens of 
Megara, which could mean that the majority had – in this case at least – the political and 
military power in the city
599
. Apart from this, the fact that the oligarchic exiles of Megara 
collaborated with the Lacedaemonians after the destruction of Plataea should indicate an 
oligarchical political direction of them and consequently, a banishment of them from their 
city could indicate the dominance of the democratic faction in Megara.  
On the other hand, Thucydides refers to oἱ ηνῦ δήκνπ πξνζηάηαη600, that is the leaders of the 
democratic faction
601
, who came in collaboration with the Athenians, because of the fear that 
the δῆκνο will abandon them and that the oligarchs would return from Pegae. This is evidence 
of the existence of a democratic political faction in the city of Megara, but it does not prove 
with absolute certainty the dominance of it. In particular the fact that this faction is willing to 
concede the city to the Athenians could be a proof that the democratic faction in Megara was 
not dominant in the city. In any case, we have little information on the short-lived democracy, 
which could have dominated in the city of Megara, which means that it is not easy to draw 
absolute conclusions about the form and the character of the democratic period of Megara. 
The problem of the constitution of Megara appears also in modern literature. Gomme asserts 
that the narration of Thucydides indicates a democracy in Megara, although the leaders of the 
democratic faction did not carry the majority with them.
602
 This opinion is supported also 
from Legon, who writes that: ―The period from 427 to 424, when the oligarchs returned and 
the democracy collapsed, is the first clearly attested democratic regime in Megarian history, 
and possibly, the first period of popular government since the fall of the ―unbridled 
democracy‖ in the early sixth century.‖603 Legon speaks of a small period of a democratic 
government in Megara, which could have been characterized by the fact that ―the Megarian 
assembly was more active than it had been during the centuries of oligarchy‖604. On the other 
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 Legon 1968, 214 believes also that the victorious faction in this strife should have been democratic, ―at least 
in the sense that it had prevailed with the support of the demos, and relied upon a continuance of that support to 
maintain itself against an oligarchic reaction‖. 
600
 Thuc. 4.66.3. 
601
 The use of oἱ ηνῦ δήκνπ πξνζηάηαη with the meaning of ―the leaders of the democratic faction‖ is usual by 
Thucydides, see 3.75.2; 3.82.1; 4.66.3; Gomme 1956, 528, also believes that in this case Thucydides means ―the 
leaders of the popular faction, not the leaders of the majority of the people; for they clearly did not carry the 
majority with them‖. 
602
 Gomme 1956, 528. Of the same opinion is also Hornblower 1996, 231f. 
603
 Legon 1981, 236. 
604
 Legon 1981, 237. 
143 
 
hand, De Ste. Croix
605
 leans on the text of Aristophanes
606
, in which seems that in Megara in 
this period existed the political body of probouloi, a body that is directly connected by 
Aristotle with oligarchy
607
. This is for de Ste. Croix the proof that Megara had never a 
democratic period. Consequently, in my opinion, it is extremely difficult to define clearly and 
absolutely from the text of the historian, if Megara had really a democratic period or not.  
The other important event of this period is the returning of the oligarchic exiles in Megara 
and the establishment of a type of oligarchy, which Thucydides calls, ὀιηγαξρία ηὰ κάιηζηα:  
―When these men assumed office (νἱ δὲ ἐπεηδὴ ἐλ ηαῖο ἀξραῖο ἐγέλνλην), however, they 
called for an inspection of arms, divided up the companies and picked out those they 
identified as their personal enemies and the ones who seemed most complicit in the 
dealings with the Athenians, about a hundred men in all, and forced the people to hold an 
open vote on them. When they were convicted they executed them, so restoring the city to 
an extreme form of oligarchy (θαὶ ἐο ὀιηγαξρίαλ ηὰ κάιηζηα θαηέζηεζαλ ηὴλ πόιηλ)‖608. 
It would be interesting to understand, how this type of constitution can be defined. The form 
ηὰ κάιηζηα and ἐο ηὰ κάιηζηα is used from Thucydides in order to express that something 
happens ―in the highest degree‖609. Consequently, this ὀιηγαξρία ηὰ κάιηζηα should be an 
oligarchy in its highest degree, that is to say, an extreme oligarchy. The historian does not 
give us more information about this type of constitution, but we can see some similarities 
between the description of this form of oligarchy in our text with the ways of government of 
other absolute constitutions in Athens
610
. The review of the infantry that the oligarchic exiles 
made in Megara, for example, is similar to the review that the Thirty Tyrants made of the 
Three Thousand that composed the number of citizens in Athens after the establishment of 
the tyranny, as Xenophon describes
611
. All of this aside, Hippias' method of reviewing the 
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army men during the procession of Panathenaia after the killing of Hipparchos from 
Armodios and Aristogeiton
612
 was not so different from the act of the Megarian oligarchs. 
Beside this, the Thirty tyrants forced the infantry and cavalry of Eleusis to make an open 
voting in order to condemn the citizens of the city, who were caught from the Thirty 
Tyrants
613
, a tyrannical practice that was used also from the oligarchs in Megara, when they 
forced the demos of the city to condemn the citizens who had collaborated with the 
Athenians. Obviously all these facts cannot define the ὀιηγαξρία ηὰ κάιηζηα of Megara. We 
speak of different constitutions and periods. However, from the similar devices of governing, 
which can be observed in the different constitutions that were mentioned, but also from the 
cruelty, which the oligarchs demonstrated towards their political enemies, when they 
managed to dominate in the city, we could maybe come to the conclusion that the oligarchy 
of Megara was closer to a tyrannical constitution than to a lawful oligarchy. Unfortunately, 
we do not have any other evidence of this constitution
614
, besides from the fact that it lasted 
for a long period
615
 and that by the time that Thucydides wrote these words, this extreme 
oligarchy had already fallen
616
. 
It is obvious from the afore-mentioned text that the political history of Megara in 424 is not 
so clear. Even though Thucydides describes the military history of the city, he is – once again 
– not interested to make an extensive political analysis, a fact that does not help us to 
understand how the political history of the city was really developed. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
while the men were off duty and away, they sent their Lacedaemonian guardsmen and such citizens as were in 
sympathy with them, seized the arms of all except the Three Thousand, carried them up to the Acropolis, and 
deposited them in the temple‖, transl. by Carleton 1918, ad locum. 
612
 Thuc. 6.58, ―Without betraying anything of the crisis in his expression he (Hippias) pointed to a certain spot 
and told them to go there leaving behind their arms. They did so, thinking that he had something to say to them, 
whereupon he ordered his bodyguards to remove the weapons and immediately picked out the men he held 
responsible along with anyone else carrying a dagger (the practice being to parade only with shield and spear)‖. 
613
 Xen. Hell. 2.4.9-10, ―On the following day they summoned to the Odeum the hoplites who were on the roll 
and the cavalry also. Then Critias rose and said: ―We, gentlemen,‖ said he, ―are establishing this government no 
less for you than for ourselves. Therefore, even as you will share in honours, so also you must share in the 
dangers. Therefore you must vote condemnation of the Eleusinians who have been seized, that you may have the 
same hopes and fears as we.‖ Then he showed them a place and bade them cast their ballots therein, in plain 
sight of everybody (εἰο ηνῦην ἐθέιεπε θαλεξὰλ θέξεηλ ηὴλ ςῆθνλ)‖, transl. by Carleton 1918, ad locum. 
614
 Note at this point also the passage of Diod. 12.67.1, who also speaks of Brasidas, who advanced against 
Megara, expelled the Athenians from Nisaea and then he set free the city and brought it back into the allegiance 
of the Lacedaemonians. Unfortunately, Diodorus does not speak of the constitutional changes in the city of 
Megara and of the new oligarchical form of constitution, which was established in the city. 
615
 See Thuc. 4.74.4, who mentions that ―and never was there a change of constitution arising from internal 
conflict that was brought about by so few and lasted so long‖. See also Thuc. 5.31.6, where the historian clearly 
speaks of an oligarchy in Megara in 421, three years after the stasis in the city. 
616
 See Hornblower 1996, 244, who bases this conclusion to the aorist μπλέκεηλελ. 
145 
 
description of this scene in the text of Thucydides demonstrates once more how powerful the 
political factions were in the cities and how much these factions were influenced by the two 
big forces of this war. Once again we observe the political bond between the different 
political factions in the Greek city-states and their political relatives, Athens and Sparta, a 
bond that overcomes sometimes also the interest of the city-state, like we have seen in 
Megara, when the leaders of the democratic faction invited the Athenians to conquer the city, 
in order to avoid the return of the oligarchic exiles from Pegae. According to Trever, this 
attitude was too characteristic in most of the Greek city-states and ―was largely responsible 
for the tragic failure of Greek politics‖617.  
Besides this, the case of Megara is also important, in order to understand the different types 
of constitution that existed in the Greek city-states. Megara has been traditionally a city 
characterized by internal conflict and the continuous change of its forms of government. 
When it comes to the oligarchy established in the city in 424, unfortunately, we cannot be 
sure from this passage of the Thucydidean history, which were the characteristics of the 
ὀιηγαξρία ηὰ κάιηζηα, like already said. However, what I find as the most interesting part, in 
this case, is that the Greek world is riddled with different types of constitutions, which arise 
from the different cities and their history. Consequently, when we speak of oligarchy in the 
Greek world, we can never speak of one type of oligarchy, but of many different types, which 
change depending on the different history of every city. I think that Thucydides with his type 
of narration and his description of so many different types of oligarchy in his work makes this 
observation even clearer. 
A controversial case: the constitution of Melos 
As last example of an oligarchic constitution, I left the case of Melos, which cannot be really 
included in one of the afore-mentioned categories, since the information that we have on its 
characteristics is extremely incomplete. The Melian dialogue is one of the most interesting 
and important episodes in the work of Thucydides and constitutes by itself an important 
subject, which can cover many pages of historical analysis. The attack of Athens against 
Melos in 416 and the effort of the Athenians to force the citizens of the island to enter in the 
Athenian League, a demand expressed in the most violent and authoritarian way has 
interested thoroughly the modern research and has demonstrated once and for all the 
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changeover of the Athenian League to an Athenian hegemony
618
. One of the several subjects, 
which arise from this passage, is also the problematic constitution of the city of Melos.  
Melos, the island of Cyclades, was colonized by Lacedaemonians
619
. During the 
Peloponnesian War, the Melians seem to be aloof and to not want to join the Delian 
League
620
. About the history of the island limited information has survived and the lack of 
much information about Melos limits also our knowledge about its constitution. The facts that 
we have about the constitution of the island are restricted and basically, derive from the 
description of Thucydides. The Aristotelian collection of politeiai should have included a 
Constitution of the Melians (fr. 564), but we know almost nothing about the Melian political 
institutions
621
. The most important source about the constitution of the island is, 
consequently, the text of Thucydides, who mentions that: 
―The Melians did not bring this delegation before the people in assembly but told them to 
explain the business they had come on to the authorities and the smaller ruling group (νὓο 
νἱ Μήιηνη πξὸο κὲλ ηὸ πιῆζνο νὐθ ἤγαγνλ, ἐλ δὲ ηαῖο ἀξραῖο θαὶ ηνῖο ὀιίγνηο ιέγεηλ 
ἐθέιεπνλ πεξὶ ὧλ ἥθνπζηλ). So the Athenian envoys addressed them as follows. ‗We see 
that our discussions are not to take place before the popular assembly (ἐπεηδὴ νὐ πξὸο ηὸ 
πιῆζνο νἱ ιόγνη γίγλνληαη) – no doubt to prevent us from deceiving the people at large 
with one continuous presentation of persuasive arguments that would go unchallenged 
(for we do realise that this is the point of your bringing us before this smaller body) 
(γηγλώζθνκελ γὰξ ὅηη ηνῦην θξνλεῖ ἡκ῵λ ἡ ἐο ηνὺο ὀιίγνπο ἀγσγή)‖622. 
Our historian narrates that the Athenian ambassadors were asked to discuss with a smaller 
group of citizens in Melos and not with the demos, even if the topic of discussion was 
actually of vital significance for the future of the island. It seems also that the Athenians 
reacted ironically to the fact that the Melians did not bring the subject for discussion at the 
Assembly, as a democratic state would do. The text itself does not define clearly the 
constitution of Melos, but if we analyse it deeper, we could come a bit closer to the 
assumption that Melos could have been an oligarchy
623
.   
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First of all, we should make a deeper lexicological analysis of some terms that the historian 
uses in the text. The Melians refuse to present the Athenians to the πιῆζνο but ask them to 
express the reasons for their presence in Melos ἐλ ηαῖο ἀξραῖο θαὶ ηνῖο ὀιίγνηο. At first sight, 
we read about the existence of three political (?) groups in the city: the πιῆζνο, the ἀξραί, and 
the ὀιίγνη. Certainly, we cannot be sure about the role and function of these groups, because 
the text does not offer us this information, but we can try to research a bit further the above-
mentioned words, in order to come a bit closer to the constitution of Melos. 
The πιῆζνο is defined by Bétant in this passage as the ―vulgus‖, i.e. the mass, the people, the 
multitude.
624
 The denial of the Melians to present the Athenians in front of the mass, could 
indicate the existence of an assembly
625, which, like Andrewes believes, ―summoned rarely 
and only for certain purposes or at the will of the council‖626 and of whose decision the 
Melians were obviously afraid, like the Athenians highlight right afterwards
627
. On the last 
argument, Hornblower mentions that: ―perhaps the oligarchs did not feel sure of carrying 
their fellow-citizens with them, and this is part of the reason for the secret negotiations‖.628 
The scholar identifies the Melians of this passage with the oligarchs, which avoided the 
meeting of the assembly because of their insecure feeling about its decision.  
Instead of the πιῆζνο, the Melians bring the Athenians in front of the ἀξραί and the ὀιίγνη. 
The ἀξρή, in this case, is, in Bétant‘s opinion, ―qui magistrate fungitur‖629, i.e. the one that 
practices a magistracy, which means that obviously the ἀξραί are the magistrates. Of the 
same opinion is also Parker.
630
 Which are those magistrates, however? In Andrewes‘ opinion: 
―ἀξραί in Greek would include the council, often the most powerful organ in an oligarchy, as 
well as magistrates in the more familiar sense‖.631  
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The ἀξραί, however, should not discuss alone the proposals of the Athenians: they are 
accompanied by the ὀιίγνη. Bétant defines these ὀιίγνη as the ―optimates‖632, i.e. the 
adherents of the best men, the aristocratic party, the aristocrats. Andrewes defines them as 
―the privileged voters‖633, i.e. the aristocrats of the city, which obviously were powerful 
because of their aristocratic heritage and wealth. It is remarkable the contrast between the 
πιῆζνο and the ὀιίγνη that is highlighted by the Athenians right afterwards634, when they 
comment the decision of the Melians to bring them in front of the few: the Athenians use this 
word, in order to highlight the few citizens that will decide about the fortune of the island 
(ὀιίγνη), in contrast to the multitude (πιῆζνο), which should be the one to decide according to 
the ideals of the Athenian democracy. Consequently, the two above-mentioned groups, the 
ἀξραί, and the ὀιίγνη, were responsible in this case to discuss with the Athenians and decide 
about the submission or not to them and not the πιῆζνο.635  
Can we identify, consequently, the above-mentioned groups with political institutions? It is 
hard to answer this question, as long as to determine absolutely the constitution of the island. 
The possible existence of an assembly, a fact that should exclude tyrannical or dynastic forms 
of the constitution and in the same time the absence of the absolute domination of this 
assembly, especially in matters of negotiation and submission of the city to Athens, could 
indicate the existence of an oligarchical constitution. Additionally, the use of the expression 
ἐλ δὲ ηαῖο ἀξραῖο θαὶ ηνῖο ὀιίγνηο can be parallelized with ἔο ηε ηὰο ἀξρὰο θαὶ ηὸλ δῆκνλ636 in 
the case of the democratic Argos. During the negotiations between Argos and Corinth for a 
peace treaty in 421, the democratic Argives
637
 bring the proposals of Corinth for discussion to 
the ἀξραί, i.e. the magistrates and the δῆκνο, i.e. the assembly, in contrast to the ―oligarchic‖ 
Melians, which bring the proposals to the ἀξραί and the ὀιίγνη. The contrast between δῆκνο 
and ὀιίγνη from Thucydides in these passages and the fact that Argos was a democracy could 
indicate that the Melian constitution could have been the opposite of democracy, i.e. an 
oligarchy. If we include to all these facts also the blood relation between Melos and Sparta, as 
we have already seen, and the continuation of the good relationships between the two city-
states, which gets emphasized especially during the announcement of the decision of the 
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Melians to stay independent, basing to the help of their blood relatives Spartans
638
, one could 
come to the (insecure) conclusion that Melos could have been oligarchic.  
Unfortunately, we have no other evidence on the Melian constitution during the 
Peloponnesian War, like already said, and this fact does not permit us to understand 
absolutely if the constitution of Melos was oligarchic or not
639
. I will try anyway to enrich 
our knowledge about the Melian form of government by making parallelism with other 
examples of the Thucydidean history, which have some similarities with the case of Melos. In 
the fourth book for example, when the Lacedaemonian ambassadors went to Athens, in order 
to sign peace, the Lacedaemonians ask from the Athenians to speak with some few 
commissioners (ὀιίγνηο δὲ ἀλδξάζη μύλεδξνη)640 and not with the demos, a fact that provokes 
the reaction of Cleon and ends with a non-agreement of the two cities. Hornblower believes 
that ―presumably the Spartans wanted the boule or Council of 500 to take a hand, in what 
they surely knew was the usual way, cp. V. 45.1, where a preliminary diplomatic audience 
before the Council is treated as normal‖641. Even if it this procedure does not seem 
completely unknown in the Athenian democracy, it is important at this case that Thucydides 
uses the same word, i.e. μύλεδξνη, which he uses, also when he speaks of the Melian 
commissioners
642
 and that the Spartans, an oligarchic state, asked in this case for the same 
procedure, as the Melians. 
A similar example can be seen once more in the work of the historian. During the afore-
mentioned negotiations of the city of Argos with Corinth for the peace treaty, the Corinthians 
decide to discuss only with a part of them and not the Assembly (πξόο ηηλαο η῵λ ἐλ ηέιεη 
ὄλησλ Ἀξγείσλ) and ask the Argives to appoint a few individuals with plenipotentiary 
powers, excluding in this way the demos from the negotiations of peace (ἀπνδεῖμαη δὲ ἄλδξαο 
ὀιίγνπο ἀξρὴλ αὐηνθξάηνξαο θαὶ κὴ πξὸο ηὸλ δῆκνλ ηνὺο ιόγνπο εἶλαη)643. If we consider that 
Corinth was an oligarchic state, when Argos was in this period democratic
644
, one can make 
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easily the parallelism with the case of Melos, in which once again the ―oligarchic‖ side 
decides to assign the decision-making to the few and not the many. 
Consequently, the dialogue of the Melians with the Athenians gives us the chance to 
investigate the Melian constitution and to come a bit closer to the conclusion that it could 
have been oligarchic. The evidence, which Thucydides offers to us, could indicate the 
existence of a political structure based on an oligarchical model in Melos, but we cannot say 
for sure that the city was oligarchically governed. It is also interesting, as Thucydides 
narrates, that it should have existed a sort of stasis between a pro-Athenian and an anti-
Athenian faction
645
 in Melos, which indicates some sort of political instability on the island. I 
believe, however, that this ―division‖ of the citizens should have been the result of the 
approaching Athenian attack and total destruction of Melos, a fact that the islanders could 
foresee; no further conclusions can be drawn from this fact according to me. The lack of 
substantial evidence is the reason, why the bibliography on this matter is almost non-existent. 
The subject is very interesting, but the material instruments to research it are not enough.  
Sophrosyne and Aristocracy in the Thucydidean world 
The use of sophrosyne  
What I find extremely interesting on the way, in which Thucydides speaks of the diverse 
oligarchic forms of government during the Peloponnesian War, is the fact that the historian 
refers to this constitution with diverse denominations. I have already analysed thoroughly the 
oligarchic character of eunomia and dynasteia
646
. Another important example in the work of 
the historian is the connection of oligarchy with the idea of ζσθξνζύλε. Sophrosyne can have 
many different interpretations in the work of our historian. The term means literally 
―soundness of mind, prudence, discretion‖647. Ιn a political sense, however, it represents a 
moderate form of government
648
 and is generally combined with the constitution of Sparta 
and with oligarchy in general
649
.  
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First of all, it is not a coincidence that the Spartan way of governing is combined several 
times with sophrosyne in the work of the historian. In the first book, for example, the 
Spartans are characterized as ζώθξνλεο from the Corinthian Ambassadors in the Conference 
of the Peloponnesian League (ζσθξνζύλελ κὲλ ἔρεηε)650. This adjective will be given also to 
the king Archidamus, who is characterized later in the first book of Thucydides as ἀλὴξ 
ζώθξσλ651. Finally, Archidamus in his speech in the Spartan apella before the beginning of 
the war, when he tries to convince the Lacedaemonians to not start a war against Athens 
arbitrarily, makes a large speech about the Spartan way of life, which inter alia gets 
characterized also by sophrosyne: 
―Moreover, the city we live in has always enjoyed freedom and fame. So what these traits 
really amount to is enlightened self-discipline (ζσθξνζύλε)‖652. 
According to Rademarker, through the words of Archidamus sophrosyne gets presented as a 
―typically Spartan asset‖653. As North notes, ―Spartan sophrosyne […] has two principal 
facts: the tendency to maintain the status quo in external affairs and internally, the repressive 
discipline and restraint essential to a militaristic regime‖654. North justly notes also that 
Thucydides avoids the word in the speeches of Pericles and when he commends his restraint, 
he uses the adjective κέηξηνο (moderate)655 and not ζώθξσλ656. This is a remarkable fact, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1966 has analysed already deeply the different shades of this idea in the Greek world. It is, however, very 
interesting that the Greek literature of the Thucydidean period does not concentrate on the political meaning of 
sophrosyne, as our historian does. Herodotus uses its derivative ζσθξνλέσ in the meaning of ―become sane‖ 
and ζώθξσλ as ―reasonable‖, ―rationally (Powell 1938, ad locum). Plato conceives the word as ―sanitas animi‖ 
(soundness of mind) and the adjective as ―sobrius, prudent‖ (temperate, prudent, see Astius 1838, ad locum) 
(even if one should note that in Gorgias (519a) he criticizes fifth-century democratic Athens for being devoid of 
sophrosyne and dikaiosyne). Last but not least, Aristotle interprets the word in his Politics mostly as ―temperate‖ 
and is connected with human behaviours and not with political constitutions (for a detailed reference to all 
interpretations of sophrosyne in the work of Thucydides, see Bonitz 1995). 
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according to the scholar, since sophrosyne ―more than any other sums up the inimitable 
balance of dynamism with restraint underlying the greatest achievements of that age‖ and its 
absence from a speech like the Funeral Oration, which celebrates ―the spiritual, political, and 
aesthetic values of Athens in the age of Pericles‖657, indicates that sophrosyne should have 
been, in the mind of Thucydides at least, a Spartan value
658
. Rademarker justly remarks that 
―ζσθξνζύλε had a special appeal for Sparta and […] the Spartans generally lived up to their 
ideology‖659, which means that this ―moderate‖ way of governing, which takes the name 
sophrosyne in the work of the historian accompanied Sparta through the whole Peloponnesian 
War and characterized its closed and conservative constitution. I will agree with North that 
―sophron is the operative word denoting oligarchy, because it was a commonplace of political 
thought that a democracy was more inclined to be turbulent, an oligarchy to be better 
disciplined‖660. The adjective sophron is, consequently, more than suitable to a way of 
governing with the characteristics of the Lacedaemonian one, according to me.  
At this point, I would like to refer to a rather ambiguous passage of the Thucydidean history. 
Down the narration of the events in Athens in 411, Thucydides mentions the following: 
―In Thasos, therefore, the result was the opposite of what those Athenians establishing 
the oligarchy had wanted, just as it was, I suppose, in many of the other subject states as 
well. After acquiring prudence and losing their fear of reprisals, the cities went straight 
for outright freedom in preference to the festering eunomia offered by the Athenians 
(ζσθξνζύλελ γὰξ ιαβνῦζαη αἱ πόιεηο θαὶ ἄδεηαλ η῵λ πξαζζνκέλσλ ἐρώξεζαλ ἐπὶ ηὴλ 
ἄληηθξπο ἐιεπζεξίαλ ηῆο ἀπὸ η῵λ Ἀζελαίσλ ὑπνύινπ εὐλνκίαο)‖661. 
This is for sure a difficult passage and several opinions have been expressed on its 
interpretation. Thucydides narrates that two months after the establishment of the oligarchy 
by the Athenian general Diitrephes in Thasos, the city managed to rebel against the tyrannical 
constitution of the Athenians with the help of Sparta
662
. According to some modern scholars, 
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the sophrosyne, which the poleis acquired, refers to the constitution, which the Athenian 
oligarchs tried to impose on Samos. Consequently, Thucydides, on the one hand, 
characterizes the constitution imposed from the Athenian oligarchs in Samos as sophron, 
when right afterwards he speaks of it as a ―festering‖ eunomia, two characterizations 
completely opposed to each other, if we consider of course that in this case eunomia is 
accompanied by the adjective ypoulos. The use of sophrosyne at this point is considered from 
several modern scholars as a clear irony from the historian
663
 since Thucydides could have 
never characterized a tyrannical form of constitution as sophron; indeed right afterwards he 
re-defines this form of government as a hollow constitution. For all these reasons this passage 
is considered from the modern scholars as the clearest example in the work of Thucydides of 
the oligarchic meaning of the term in general and of the oligarchy imposed by the Athenian 
oligarchs on the island in particular
664
.  
Even though I find the afore-mentioned interpretation as tempting, my personal opinion on 
this subject is a bit different. Let us have a closer look at the text at first. Thucydides says 
clearly that the cities after acquiring sophrosyne went on to absolute freedom in preference to 
the festering eunomia offered by the Athenians. I cannot see sincerely any connection of 
sophrosyne with the form of government, which the Athenian oligarchs tried to impose on the 
city. I think Thucydides wants to say exactly the opposite: the cities refused the Athenian 
oligarchy exactly because they became prudent and understood that this form of government 
would be a disaster for their cities. I think, consequently, that any connection of the 
sophrosyne with the Athenian oligarchy, in this case, is out of context. On the other hand, I 
cannot completely deny an oligarchical meaning of the term. Thucydides mentions clearly 
that Thasos received the Spartan contribution against Athens (ηὴλ δ᾽ ἀπὸ Λαθεδαηκνλίσλ 
ἐιεπζεξίαλ ὁζεκέξαη πξνζδερόκελνη)665 and we know that the city acquired an oligarchy 
influenced by the Lacedaemonians
666
. Even though in this passage our historian speaks of 
several cities and not only Thasos, the fact that the last at the end became oligarchic could 
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indicate an oligarchical colouring of the sophrosyne, which the cities acquired, when they 
refused the Athenian oligarchy. I will completely agree with North, who mentions that ―here 
the restoration of oligarchy is described as ―acquiring sophrosyne‖, and this condition is 
equated with genuine eunomia, in contrast to the counterfeit of this excellence under the 
democrats‖667. Sophrosyne as the opposite of ―tyrannical‖ forms of government will appear 
again in the work of the historian, where it is considered as the opposite of dynasteia, a 
tyrannical form of oligarchy (ηῶ ζσθξνλεζηάηῳ ἐλαληηώηαηνλ)668. Consequently, sophrosyne, 
in this case, is, in my opinion, opposed to the fraudulent oligarchy of Athens and should not 
be considered as the ironical label of the Athenian oligarchy, as several scholars believe. 
In order to understand this concept of sophrosyne in Thucydides, one should notice also the 
case of Peisander, one of the coup instigators in Athens in 411, who uses the idea of 
sophrosyne during his speech in the Athenian ecclesia as a part of his political propaganda. 
Inter alia, Peisander says that Athens will never manage to gain the support of the Persian 
King if the city will not change its constitution into a more moderate one, i.e. an oligarchy (εἰ 
κὴ πνιηηεύζνκελ ηε ζσθξνλέζηεξνλ θαὶ ἐο ὀιίγνπο κᾶιινλ ηὰο ἀξρὰο πνηήζνκελ)669. 
Obviously, the oligarchic constitution imposed by the Four Hundred and the ideal of 
sophrosyne are in reality two ideas completely opposed to each other, but the use of an 
adjective commonly combined with ―healthy‖ oligarchic forms of government, was for sure a 
clever profession from Peisander, in order to convince the Athenians to accept the overthrow 
of democracy; the Athenians could have not imagined in this way the cruelness of the new 
authoritarian oligarchy. As Rademarker notes, ―ζσθξνζύλε in Athens tended to be claimed as 
a distinctive ἀξεηή by elitist citizens who disapproved of the excesses of democracy and 
favoured a modified, more ‗moderate‘ form of government‖670. 
The new concept of aristocracy 
Another important term, which arises in the work of our historian and can be considered as an 
oligarchic ideal is the political form of aristocracy. The civil war, which exploded in Corcyra 
in 427 was the result of the extreme concurrence of the two main political factions, which 
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used every means, in order to dominate
671
. During this internal conflict, Thucydides narrates 
that the oligarchic faction uses as ensign the ἀξηζηνθξαηία ζώθξσλ672, a glorified profession 
that will be used as its slogan against the democratic faction. It is for sure not a coincidence 
that the oligarchic faction of Corcyra uses this slogan, in order to support its political 
propaganda. A research on the way, in which Thucydides conceives aristocracy, in this case, 
would help us a lot, in order to understand deeper the political value of sophrosyne. 
It is notable that ἀξηζηνθξαηία emerged as a separate political institution in the period after 
the Dark Ages, in order to replace monarchy
673
. In the next centuries, anyway, including the 
period of the Peloponnesian War, the term gets used also in order to express the constitution 
of the ἄξηζηνη, of the best and most capable citizens of the city. Aristotle claims that an 
aristocratic constitution could be the one, which is based on the wealth (πινῦηνλ), the virtue 
(ἀξεηὴλ) and the people (δῆκνλ), like the constitution of Carthage but also the one, which is 
based only on the virtue and the people and not the wealth, like the constitution of Sparta.
674
 
This means that ἀξηζηνθξαηία is a constitution based basically on the ἀξεηὴ, i.e. the goodness, 
the excellence of its citizens and not on the wealth. Consequently, aristocracy is the 
government by νἱ ἄξηζηνη and not the government by νἱ εὐγελεῖο. In Gomme‘s opinion: ―Any 
form of government could be ―aristocratic‖ in the Greek sense: a democracy, if in fact the 
masses elected the most suitable men to office; an oligarchy, if the governing class consisted 
of the most suitable men to govern (also if they elected to office their own best men); a 
monarchy, if the monarch was the best man in the state.‖675 So we could say that 
ἀξηζηνθξαηία is a characteristic that can be observed in several types of constitutions. In this 
passage, however, the term ―has nothing to do with the rule of an established nobility of birth 
or plutocracy‖, as Graham justly remarks676. Graham notes that ἀξηζηνθξαηία677 here is the 
―counterblast to δεκνθξαηία with great stress placed upon the contrast of the prefixes, ἀξηζην- 
versus δεκν-.‖ This idea can be even more reinforced if we notice that the term is combined 
with sophrosyne. Since sophrosyne is combined several times in the Thucydidean world with 
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oligarchy, in this passage the ἀξηζηνθξαηία ζώθξσλ should be conceived as a moderate 
oligarchy
678
.  
It is not a coincidence that the oligarchic faction uses this slogan for its political propaganda. 
If we have a look at the text of the historian, we will notice that the democratic faction in the 
Corcyraean civil war used as ensign the political equality of the people in front of the laws 
(πιήζνπο ηε ἰζνλνκίαο πνιηηηθῆο). Isonomia, usually combined with democracy679, is used 
clearly here as the slogan of the plethos, the multitude. In consequence, the two different 
political factions of the war used as slogan for their political propaganda, not the real terms, 
which define the constitutions (democracy and oligarchy), but political terms that evoke old 
times, (ἰζνλνκία πνιηηηθὴ and ἀξηζηνθξαηία ζώθξσλ), which serve as glorified slogans to 
their political propaganda. These ideas are backward-looking for the Peloponnesian War and 
the world of the historian. According to me, the use of these words in the propaganda of the 
political factions is made on purpose, in order to beautify their policy and to attract more 
supporters. ―Democracy‖ and ―oligarchy‖ as slogans of the political factions would not be 
successful for this goal since they had taken a negative character during the Peloponnesian 
War
680
. Athens and Sparta, the two big representatives of democracy and oligarchy, had 
demonstrated an imperialistic policy towards their allies, had been violent in respect to their 
enemies and their political systems had been connected with the cruelty of the war. 
Consequently, the glamorization of the speeches of the political factions was necessary for 
their political propaganda during the conflicts between the Greek city-states at the end of the 
fifth century.  
At this point, one should mention also another event of the Thucydidean narration. When the 
historian describes the events in Thasos and the establishment of the ―fraudulent eunomia‖ of 
the Athenians
681
 the historian mentions among others that the Thasians got on fortifying their 
city, thinking that they had no further need of an aristocracy supported by the Athenians (ηῆο 
κὲλ κεη᾽ Ἀζελαίσλ ἀξηζηνθξαηίαο)682. The oligarchy of the Four Hundred gets characterized 
here as an aristocracy backed by and dependent from Athens. In this case, oligarchy is 
equated with the aristocracy founded by the Athenian coup instigators. The fact that 
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Thucydides uses this term to describe the Athenian oligarchy indicates that aristocracy was 
really perceived from Thucydides as an oligarchical value. 
Both references of the historian to an aristocracy are expressed in the frame of political 
propaganda. In the case of the civil war in Corcyra, the propaganda indicates the effort of the 
oligarchic faction to gain more supporters. On the other hand, in the case of Thasos and the 
effort of the Athenian oligarchs to impose their new authoritarian constitution, the use of 
aristocracy indicates, according to me, both the type of propaganda made by the instigators, a 
propaganda based on the idea of a glorified form of a moderate constitution, named 
aristocracy and also, according to Andrewes
683
, the irony expressed by the historian about the 
new fraudulent ―moderate‖ form of constitution (like already observed in 8.64.5). It is for 
sure not a coincidence that Thucydides uses only two times the term ἀξηζηνθξαηία and only in 
this political context; in the fifth century, when the old aristocratic values of the precedent 
centuries seem to belong to the past, aristocracy receives a new interpretation and gets used 
as a glorified slogan for the political propaganda of the oligarchic factions. 
Sophrosyne, aristocracy and their raison d'être in the History 
To sum up, I think that the analysis both of sophrosyne and aristocracy are very important, in 
order to understand a bit more the political way of thinking of Thucydides. Our historian is 
not only known for his effort to remain more objective possible in his narration, but he could 
be also characterized more as ―Kriegshistoriker‖ than ―politischer Philosoph‖, as Leppin 
justly remarks
684
. The fact that he does not restrict himself to use only one term to describe 
oligarchic forms of government, but several ones, many times also in an ironic way, could 
seem strange for a researcher of his History. We have noticed that the historian uses 
sophrosyne as an oligarchic label of Sparta, but also, in order to express his irony for the 
constitution of the Four Hundred and, in my opinion, his rejection of the new constitution 
imposed in Athens in 411. On the other hand, aristocracy as a political label of the fifth 
century abandons its former characteristics of the archaic period as the government of the 
aristoi and becomes the political slogan of the oligarchic faction in Corcyra, in order to 
delineate the glorious history of the constitutions governed by the few. Thucydides 
demonstrates consequently that he is more interested in political history than we tend to think 
nowadays and that, even if he seems to prefer to describe in every detail battles than political 
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constitutions, he really had a critical thinking on the politics of the Greek world during the 
Peloponnesian War. This critical thinking, however, has to be always covered by his need to 
be more objective possible in his narration and this is why we have to read behind the lines, 
in order to understand a bit more his political position; even for a historian of the intelligence 
and importance of Thucydides, absolute objectivity cannot be succeeded. 
Oligarchy in the ancient literature 
It is extremely interesting the way that the historian uses the term ὀιηγαξρία in his work, but 
Thucydides is not the first one to use it. The term is mentioned for the first time in the Greek 
literature from Herodotus at the famous discussion of the three Persians about the ideal 
constitution for Persia
685
. One of them, Megabyzus, will support the constitution of oligarchy, 
i.e. the sovereignty of the few, as the best way of governing. (Μεγάβπδνο δὲ ὀιηγαξρίῃ ἐθέιεπε 
ἐπηηξέπεηλ686). Megabyzus bases his argument on the fact that ―nothing can be both more 
unintelligent or insolent than the worthless, ineffectual mob‖687 and sustains that they cannot 
give the power to the demos, who ―has not been educated and has never seen anything good 
or decent‖. This is why the Persian Grandee insists that they should give the power to the best 
men (ἀλδξ῵λ η῵λ ἀξίζησλ), which are most likely to make the best decisions. This almost 
―aristocratic‖ view of oligarchy of Megabyzus, will be completely refused by the supporter of 
monarchy, Darius, who believes that even if the ―few‖ of an oligarchic constitution have the 
best intents, they always end with discords (ζηάζηεο) and bloodsheds (θόλνο), since ―each 
man wants to be the head of affairs and desires that his own opinions prevail‖688. The result 
of this deviation of oligarchy and the bloodsheds between its governors, according to Darius, 
is the transformation of the constitution into a monarchy, established by the one, who will 
survive the staseis. 
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All of this aside, Herodotus refers to oligarchy, when he speaks of the organization of the 
Corinthian state (Κνξηλζίνηζη γὰξ ἦλ πόιηνο θαηάζηαζηο ηνηήδε: ἦλ ὀιηγαξρίε, […]689). He 
mentions that Corinth used to be ruled under an oligarchy by the Bacchiadae, the ruling 
aristocratic family of Corinth in eighth and seventh centuries, until replaced by the Cypselid 
dynasty in the eighth and seventh centuries
690
. I imagine that in this case, the historian uses a 
term, which represents Corinth of the present, since the city was traditionally oligarchic
691
, 
but in a historical background of the past, since aristocracy, the government of the best men, 
was connected many times with oligarchy, the government of the few, in the Greek political 
thought of the fifth century, as we have already observed. 
When it comes to antecedent sources of Thucydides, Herodotus (even if he can be considered 
almost as contemporary of our historian) is actually our only source; the term does not occur 
in sources of the antecedent centuries. When it comes, on the other hand, to other 
contemporary or subsequent ancient sources, we can surely say that Plato and Aristotle are 
the ones, who tried more than anyone to understand the concept of oligarchy. This is not the 
right place and time to make a very detailed analysis of the way, in which the two main 
philosophers of the fifth and fourth century understood the political form of oligarchia. What 
interests me more at this moment is to understand how Thucydides managed to influence our 
philosophers in the way, in which they understood the government of the few
692
.  
Starting with Plato, the philosopher defines oligarchy as ―the state that is ruled by the few 
(ηὴλ δὲ ὑπ᾽ ὀιίγσλ γε ἑθάζηνηε θξαηεζεῖζαλ πόιηλ)‖693. Plato highlights however, that 
oligarchy is a form of government ―based on property qualification‖, ―wherein the rich hold 
office and the poor man is excluded (ηὴλ ἀπὸ ηηκεκάησλ, ἦλ δ᾽ ἐγώ, πνιηηείαλ, ἐλ ᾗ νἱ κὲλ 
πινύζηνη ἄξρνπζηλ, πέλεηη δὲ νὐ κέηεζηηλ ἀξρῆο).‖694 Plato seems to speak in a negative way of 
the nature of this constitution, which he characterizes as ―a constitution teeming with many 
ills‖695. Actually Plato mentions that both aristocracy and oligarchy are constitutions based on 
the sovereignty of the few; the difference between them is the fact that by an aristocracy ―the 
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rich imitate this government (ὅηαλ ἄξα νἱ πινύζηνη ηαύηελ κηκ῵ληαη),‖696, when by an 
oligarchy ―they (the rich) disregard the laws (ὁπόηαλ δὲ η῵λ λόκσλ κὴ θξνληίδσζηλ)‖697.  
In the category of the constitutions based on the sovereignty of the few, aristocracy, the rule 
of the best is in this case considered as a better form of constitution in opposition to 
oligarchy, the constitution ―according to the whim of those in office‖, according to Rowe698. 
Plato considers oligarchy worse even than democracy. In his Laws, he mentions that the best 
State would arise from a monarchy when an oligarchy ―would admit of the growth of the best 
State only with the greatest difficulty since it has the largest number of rulers (πιεῖζηνη γὰξ ἐλ 
αὐηῇ δπλάζηαη γίγλνληαη)‖699. The negativity, with which the philosopher deals with oligarchy 
does not, however, indicate only that Plato was against this form of government; Plato has a 
critical view with many constitutions of his times. As Ostwald justly remarks ―he thinks that 
none of the governments of the world in which we live pursues the true goal of governance, 
the "real" good of the governed‖700. The research on what Plato considers as the ideal form of 
government is very large and this is not the right place and time to be done. What is more 
interesting for my research is the fact that in the time of Plato, oligarchy seems to be already 
a formed type of constitution in the political thought, a fact that gave the possibility both to 
him, and Aristotle (as we will see consequently), to study its form and characteristics and 
accept it or reject it in their research of the ideal government. 
 When it comes to a specific definition of oligarchy, Aristotle is for sure the one to attempt 
it
701
. According to Aristotle, oligarchy is the government of the few rich and is directly 
combined with wealth and property. He clearly speaks of a constitution, in which the 
sovereignty of the state is in the power of the few
702
, who own the properties
703
. The 
philosopher highlights the fact that ―the real thing in which democracy and oligarchy differ 
from each other is poverty and wealth (ηὸ κὲλ ηαῖο ὀιηγαξρίαηο ηὸ δὲ ηαῖο δεκνθξαηίαηο, δηὰ ηὸ 
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ηνὺο κὲλ εὐπόξνπο ὀιίγνπο, πνιινὺο δ᾽ εἶλαη ηνὺο ἀπόξνπο παληαρνῦ)‖704, he defines 
consequently oligarchy and democracy on the economic-social status of the ones, which hold 
the power, as Accattino and Curnis justly remark
705
. He even makes a classification of the, 
according to him, four types of oligarchy, by starting from the more law-abiding forms of 
oligarchic constitutions, continuing with the more conservative forms based on richness and 
power and finishing with the most ―tyrannical‖ form of oligarchy, the so-called dynasteia706. 
The fact that the philosopher defines in such a decisive way the oligarchic forms of 
government indicates for sure that in the fourth-century oligarchy was a more or less familiar 
idea. However, in which way could the Thucydidean narration have influenced the concept of 
this constitution in the subsequent Greek literature? 
It is obvious that Thucydides is not the first to use the precise term in Greek literature. The 
use of the term in the text of Herodotus indicates that the idea of oligarchia as the 
constitution based on the power of the few should have been already established in the fifth 
century. However, between Herodotus and Thucydides, is the second the one to speak of 
different types of oligarchy, law-abiding and tyrannical ones, when the first limits his 
narration to a more theoretical approach of the term through the speech of Megabyzus. This 
more practical concept of the idea of oligarchy of Thucydides bequeathed to the subsequent 
scholars a more complete and concrete idea of this constitution, by offering them the 
possibility to analyse more deeply its functionality and malfunctions as a form of 
government
707
. Thucydides, even if not a historian, who aimed to write down thoroughly the 
political history of the fifth century, managed to leave as heritage very important observations 
on the political development of the Greek states.  
What is oligarchy for Thucydides? 
In order to understand the way that Thucydides understands the idea of oligarchy, it is worth 
mentioning, in my opinion, that the historian uses the word in a different frequency in his 
whole work. Like already mentioned, he uses the term extremely rarely in his first seven 
books and more frequently in the eighth book, when he describes the coup of the Four 
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Hundred. This seems for sure awkward; why does he refer in his work to so many oligarchic 
constitutions without using the proper term ὀιηγαξρία and decides only in the last book to use 
the term every time he wants to refer to the constitution that arose from the coup of the Four 
Hundred?  
I cannot imagine as an answer that Thucydides considered the constitution of the Four 
Hundred as a ―more oligarchical‖ one than other constitutions in the Greek world of the fifth 
century. On the one hand, one should note one more time that Thucydides is not interested to 
write constitutional history; he is not interested to make a painstaking definition of oligarchy 
as a way of governing, but much more to investigate the way that its development influenced 
the behaviour of the participants of the war. However, I think that the answer has to do more 
with the use of the proper word in the development of the political history in Greece. It is for 
sure not a coincidence that the frequency of the use of this word increases gradually from 
Herodotus to Thucydides and from Thucydides to the philosophers of the fourth century. 
Oligarchy is for sure not an unknown form of government in the fifth century. The 
innovation, however, which Herodotus in small part and Thucydides afterwards introduce to 
the Greek political thought, is the definition of this way of governing with precise political 
terms, an unknown idea for the scholars of the archaic period. Ostwald mentions very 
accurately, according to me, that the appearance of the term oligarchia in Herodotus and 
Thucydides means that ―the recognition of different types of régime necessarily lagged 
behind the existence of these types‖, which means that oligarchy was known in Greece, but 
was not understood as a precise political term before the narrations of Herodotus and 
Thucydides; it was them to define for the first time this political idea in the Greek literature. 
There is also something else to consider in these conclusions. In the period, in which 
Herodotus and Thucydides write their history, the political situation of the Greek city-states is 
different than in the former centuries. The archaic period is riddled with different types of 
governing, like tyrannies and aristocracies, which in the fifth-century collapse and get 
replaced mainly by democracies and oligarchies. The explosion of the Peloponnesian War 
had as a consequence the extreme concurrence between Athens and Sparta and the political 
constitutions, which each of them represented.  A civil war of this importance could not leave 
unaffected the traditional political structures, the stability of which gets questioned during the 
war. The Greek world gets divided into two parts and democracy and oligarchy become the 
slogan of the two different political factions, as the civil war in Corcyra demonstrated so 
accurately. Ostwald justly remarks that the Greek words ὀιηγαξρηθόο and δεκνθξαηηθόο are 
163 
 
both terms, which are born from the concurrence of the two political mentalities of the war. 
He believes that although differences between both ideologies were present in Greece much 
time before the fifth century, ―they had not yet been transformed into the kind of ideology 
that proved to be so divisive internally in the Greek cities from the late fifth century on‖708. In 
the period, in which Thucydides writes his history consequently, oligarchy is one of the two 
main constitutions in Greece, a fact, which offers much more evidences than in the past 
centuries to a historiographer, who is willing to write down this history, to define in a more 
thorough way this type of governing. 
What is Oligarchy according to Thucydides consequently? For sure not one and only idea. In 
the work of the historian oligarchy can be a law-abiding government and at the same time 
also an authoritarian constitution of the few. On the other hand, oligarchy itself can have 
different denominations in the Thucydidean text. One can observe that Thucydides uses 
several terms, when he speaks of oligarchic ways of governing, like eunomia, aristokratia, 
sophrosyne, oi oligoi, etc. He likes to change the denomination of oligarchy extremely often, 
according to the idea that he wants to pass to the reader in every moment of the 
Peloponnesian War and to the type of oligarchy, of which he speaks, but we cannot speak of 
an absolute correspondence between every denomination of oligarchy with a specific 
definition of it. It seems, consequently, that oligarchy can have several denominations in the 
work of the historian and can for sure not be defined in one and only way and it seems that 
Thucydides chooses on purpose this method of describing oligarchy; this constitution has so 
many different shades and characteristics as the variety of the different city-states of the fifth 
century in Greece.  
In this new era, consequently, oligarchy becomes the main constitution based on the 
sovereignty of the few and takes the place of all the archaic equivalent forms of government, 
like aristocracy. This should be the reason, for which oligarchy adopts a more precise 
definition and Thucydides manages to describe as first so many different kinds of oligarchic 
constitutions of the Greek world of the fifth century and leave a θηῆκά ηε ἐο αἰεὶ (a possession 
for all time)
709
 at his subsequent scholars of the political history and not only. Our historian 
makes clear that the variety of the Greek states of the fifth century, each of them governed 
and administered by its own rules, had as a consequence the existence not of one type, but of 
many different ones, each of them adapted to the character and organization of each state. 
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And if it was not for him, other thinkers of the fourth century, would probably never had had 
the instruments to research in-depth the diverse political systems developed in the Greek 
world of the fifth century. 
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Conclusions  
A research on the oligarchic forms of governing of the fifth century through the eyes of 
Thucydides was of great interest and offered to me a great amount of information on the 
development of politics in Greece in the classical period. It also demonstrates, in my opinion, 
how the Peloponnesian War changed once and for all the history of Greece. Thucydides has 
shown clearly that oligarchy was not one and only idea and that the diversity of the Greek 
city-states had as a consequence also the development of diverse political structures among 
them.  
Oligarchy cannot be described with one sentence, and this is evident in the History. The 
history of every city-state characterized also its very unique form of governing, which, even 
if it can be defined under the term oligarchy (or democracy, as we have seen in the case of 
Syracuse), it cannot be perceived in one and only way. This is a very important observation, 
according to me, because nowadays we tend to define ancient oligarchy in a precise way, to 
characterize it as the law-abiding constitution, governed by a small clique of persons and 
institutions. Actually, I believe, that we tend to identify it with the constitution of Sparta, the 
most famous oligarchy of the fifth century. The work of Thucydides demonstrates exactly the 
opposite: there is no absolute definition of the term and no oligarchic constitution of a city-
state has the exact same characteristics as the one of its neighbour city. I think that a research 
of this kind can open to the reader (as it happened also to me) a completely new way of 
thinking on oligarchy as a political structure and as one of the two fundamental constitutions, 
which determined the development of the greatest war of all times, as our historian defines it 
(Thuc. 1.1.2). 
I have to admit that a research of this type involves several difficulties. As it emerges from 
my work, the primary goal of the Thucydidean History was not to understand deeply the 
political structure of the Greek city-states of the fifth century. Οur historian does not insist on 
the description of the diverse political structures. This fact does not indicate, however, that 
Thucydides was not interested in the political development of the Greek cities: in reality, he 
is the painstaking scholar, who is interested in writing down all the information that he 
managed to gather through his personal research and with the most objectivity possible. 
Consequently, Thucydides does not speak further of a constitution, if he does not have 
enough information on it and this is the reason, in my opinion, for which, we know so few 
things on important forms of governing of the fifth century, when we have much more 
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information on military events of the war. This is why one should try to educe as much as 
possible from the text, in order to construct an – as complete as possible – image of the 
diverse oligarchic forms of governing of the period of the Peloponnesian War.  
But can we really speak of absolute objectivity in the words of our historian?  Thucydides 
demonstrated in several parts of his work his subjective point of view on the politics of 
Greece. His famous speeches are for sure characteristic for the length and the amount of 
information, which provide to the reader. The speeches of Pericles, in particular, indicate also 
the admiration of the historian for the dominant politician in Athens, a fact that is actually 
very far from an objective view of the facts. This means that our historian was actually 
available to introduce his own opinion, even indirectly, in order to support or reject a political 
idea. This fact makes the work of a researcher of his text more difficult, but also more 
interesting at the same time. Thucydides remains always our only contemporary source of the 
Peloponnesian war and his text is extremely important for the research of this period of 
history. 
Aim of my research was to comprehend the Thucydidean point of view, because, I believe 
that if one manages to come a bit closer to the way of thinking of our historian, he will 
manage also to comprehend more the society itself. Thucydides is a contemporary of the 
events and his text represents the society of the fifth century in a very direct way. His work 
can be an important manual, in order to comprehend not only the ancient times but also a bit 
more the politics and society of today. No research of antiquity, in my opinion, should be 
done with the aim to understand only the past. The Thucydidean History can be a precious 
instrument not only for the further research of the development of politics through the 
centuries but also for the comprehension of the ambitions, sentiments, and desires of the 
human beings, who today like yesterday try to shape the world in which they live. 
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